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December 4, 1962

To Members of the Forty-fourth Colorado General Assembly:
As directed by the terms of Senate Joint Resolution
No. 14 (1961), the Legislative Council is submitting herewith
its report and recommendations concerning criminal law
revision. The report covers several areas of criminal law,
but because of the complexity and scope of the study, it was
not possible to give full study and consideration to a
number of important subjects.
The Committee appointed by the Legislative Council
to make this study submitted its report on November 30, 1962,
at which time the report was accepted by the Legislative
Council for transmission to the General Assembly.
ctfully submitted,

Donnelly
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December 4, 1962

Senator James E. Donnelly, Chairman
Colorado Legislative Council
341 State Capitol
Denver 2, Colorado
Dear Senator Donnelly:
Transmitted herewith is the report of the
Legislative Council Criminal Code Committee appointed
pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution No. 14 (1961). This
report covers the areas of criminal law studied by the
committee during the past two years and the recommendations
relating thereto. The subjects presented in the report
include: sentencing, regulation of professional bail bondsmen, provision of counsel for indigent defendants, inchoate
crimes, crimes against property, criminal insanity, narcotics,
and statutory changes resulting from the adoption of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure by the Colorado Supreme Court.
Because of the scope and complexity of the
field of criminal law, the committee did not have sufficient
time to consider such subjects as crimes against the person;
crimes against public health, safety, and decency; arrest,
arraignment, and other pre-trial procedures; and probation
and parole. Further study is also needed on sentencing,
criminal insanity, and crimes against property.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/

Charles E. Bennett, Chairman
Criminal Code Committee
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FOREWORD

This study was authorized by Senate Joint Resolution No. 14
(1961). This resolution directed the Legislative Council to appoint a
committee to continue the study of the Colorado criminal statutes and
their application, including, but not limited to such related subjects
as parole, probation, sentencing, criminal insanity, narcotics, bail
bonds, and criminal jurisdiction.
The Legislative Council Committee appointed to make this study
included: Senator Charles E. Bennett, Denver, chairman; Senator Wilkie
Ham, Lamar, vice chairman; Senator Edward J. Byrne, Denver; Senator
Carl W. Fulghum, Glenwood Springs; Senator J. William Wells, Brighton;
Senator Paul E. Wenke, Fort Collins; Senator Earl A. Wolvington, Sterling;
Representative Robert S. Eberhardt, Denver; Representative Frank E.
Evans, Pueblo; Representative Bert A. Gallegos, Denver; Representative
Harry C. Johns, Sr., Hygiene; Representative John L. Kane, Northglenn;
Representative Phillip Massari, Trinidad; Representative Harold L.
McCormick, Canon City; and Representative Walter R. Stalker, Joes.
Senate Joint Resolution No. 14 (1961) authorized the Legislative
Council to appoint in its discretion an advisory committee representing
a cross section of knowledge and interest in criminal law and related
matters. Pursuant to this authorization the Legislative Council appointed
the following advisory committee members: Justice Edward Pringle,
Colorado Supreme Court; Justice Leonard v.B. Sutton, Colorado Supreme
Court; Judge Jean Jacobucci, 17th-Judicial District; Judge Gerald
McAuliffe, 2nd Judicial District; Judge George Mclachlan, 15th Judicial
District; Judge Hilbert Schauer, 13th Judicial District; Judge David
Brofman, Denver County Court; Judge Hal Chapman, Otero County Court;
Judge Daniel J. Shannon, Jefferson County; Judge Rex Scott, Boulder
Municipal Court; Warden Harry Tinsley, Chief of Corrections, Department
of Institutions; Warden Wayne Patterson, .Colomdo State Reformatory;
Edward Grout, Director, Division of Adult Parole; Frank C. Dillon,
Director, 2nd Judicial District Probation Department; District Attorney
Marvin Dansky, 17th Judicial District; District Attorney Martin P.
Miller, 18th Judicial District; District Attorney Fred Sisk, 16th Judicial
District; Assistant District Attorney Leonard Carlin, 2nd Judicial
District; Assistant District Attorney David Hahn. 18th Judicial District;
Assistant District Attorney James P. Johnson, 8th Judicial District;
Dr. Mark P. Farrell, consulting psychiatrist, state penitentiary and
reformatory; Dr. John McDonald, Assistant Director, Colorado
Psychopathic Hospital; Dr. Charles E. Rymer, Denver; Tom Adams, Juvenile
Delinquency Project, Western Interstate Commission on Higher Education;
Frank Dell' Apa, Colorado Prison Association; William L. Rice, Colorado
Bar Association Criminal Law Committee; Professor Austin W. Scott,
University of Colorado Law School; Chief Harry Cable, Salida Police
Department; Lieutenant J. F. Moomaw, Denver Police Department; Captain
James F. Shumate, Denver Police Department; Sheriff Ray K. Scheerer,
Larimer County; Sheriff Guy Van Cleave, Adams County; and the following
attorneys: Donald Brotzman, Boulder; Fred Dickerson, Denver; John
Gibbons, Denver; Ernest Hartwell, Loveland; Dean C. Mabry, Trinidad;
Isaac Moore, Denver; John Sayre, Boulder; Vasco Seavy, Pueblo~ and
Anthony Zarl~ngo, Denver.
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The staff work on this study was the primary responsibility of
Harry o. Lawson, Legislative Council senior research analyst. Professor
Jim R. Carrigan, University of Colorado Law School, served as legal
consultant to the committee.
The Legislative Council Criminal Code Committee held 11 meetings
between May 1961, and November 1962. One two-day meeting was held at
the penitentiary and reformatory to review correctional problems and
another two-day meeting was held in connection with the 1962 Colorado
Judicial Conference and the annual meeting of the Colorado Bar
Association. One committee meeting was devoted to a discussion of
narcotics legislation and control with William Eldridge, American Bar
Foundation, who directed the foundation's study on this problem.
The subject matter of criminal law is extremely diversified and
complex, so the committee was forced to select certain areas upon which
to concentrate its efforts. The subjects studied during the past two
years and covered in this report include: sentencing, regulation of
professional bail bondsmen; provision of counsel for indigent defendants;
inchoate crimes; crimes against property; criminal insanity; narcotics
legislation and control; and statutory changes resulting from the
adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure by the Colorado Supreme
Court.
The committee wishes to express its deep appreciation to the
advisory committee, many members of which gave considerably of their
time to attend the committee meetings at their own expense. The
assistance provided by advisory committee members in exploring the
many complex problems involved in criminal code revision was invaluable.

Lyle C. Kyle
Director

December 4, 1962
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RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS
1) The Criminal Code Committee makes no specific recommendations on the sentencing of criminal offenders at this time. The
committee is of the opinion, however, that if any change is made in
sentencing procedures, such change should follow one of three
alternatives:
a) Sentence set by statute. Either the maximum and minimum
sentences would be set by statute, or the maximum would be set by
statute and the court could impose a minimum not to exceed one-third
of the maximum. Good time allowances would apply only against the
maximum sentence. The parole board would have the authority to review
and release an offender after half of the minimum sentence is served.
Offenders not paroled prior to the expiration of their maximum sentence
(less their good time allowance) would be released under parole
supervision at that time, such supervision to continue until the date
of maximum sentence expiration. Offenders released on regular parole
could be kept under supervision until expiration of their maximum
sentence, unless released sooner by the parole board.
b) Court provided with sentencing options. In sentencing an
offender the court could choose among several options:
i)

The court could designate the length of sentence within
the maximum prescribed by statute and also the minimum
term which must be served before an offender would become
eligible for parole, which term may be less than but could
be no more than one-third of the maximum sentence imposed.

ii)

The court could set the maximum sentence as prescribed
by statute, in which event the court may specify that the
offender would become eligible for parole at such time as
the parole board may determine.

iii)

The court could commit the defender to the Department of
Institutions for extensive study and evaluation. Under
this alternative, it would b~ assumed that the maximum
statutory sentence has been imposed, pending the results
of the study and evaluation which would be furnished to
the committing court within three months, unless the
court granted additional time to complete the study.
After the court receives the department's report and
recommendations, it may do one of several things: place
an offender on probation; affirm the sentence already set
and let the parole board determine the date of parole
eligibility; affirm the maximum sentence and set a minimum,
not to exceed one-third of the maximum; or reduce the
sentence already imposed and set a date for parole
eligibility not to exceed one-third of the sentence.

(Under both a) and b) above, the court could also place an
offender on probation or commit him to the state reformatory.)
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c) Adopt the Model Penal Code Provisions. All crimes would
be divided into several grades: felonies of the first degree, second
degree, and third degree; misdemeanors; and petty misdemeanors. The
court would fix the minimum and maximum terms within the limits specifi.ed
for the grade of crimes within which the offense falls. The limits
would be higher for per~istent offenders, professional criminals, and
dangerous mentally abnormal persons. The court would be prevented
from imposing what in effect would be a fixed sentence by the requirement
that the minimum could not be more than half of the maximum. The parole
board would determine parole release after the minimum sentence (less
any good time allowance) had been served.
There are good and bad points to all three of these approaches
to sentencing, and these are discussed in considerable detail along
with other sentencing problems and considerations in the research report
pp. 1-36.
Findings. The subject of sentencing is an extremely complex
one, especially when considered within the context of the total
correctional process. Further, it is difficult to recommend specific
changes in sentencing until the entire criminal code has been reviewed
and revised as needed. As an illustration of the complexity of this
subject, the following questions have been considered by the committee
in the course of its study:
a)
What should be the basic approach to sentencing? Assuming
that protection of society is the major objective, how may this best
be achieved? Should the underlying philosophy (in addition to society's
protection) be rehabilitation, punishment, or retribution? how can
these different approaches to sentencing be reconciled? Does sentP.ncing
serve as a deterrent? if so, to what extent, and should this be a
prime consideration?

b) What should be the extent of judicial authority in
setting sentences? Should courts be limited to a finding of guilt?
Should sentences be set by statute? If so, should this apply to both
maxima and minima, or just one end of the sentence (which one)?
Should it be possible to release an offender before completion of his
minimum; on what basis and under what circumstances? If continuation
of judicial sentencing authority (at least to a limited extent) is
desirable, what would be a satisfactory combination of judicial and
board sentencing authority, not only with respect to the role of
each, b~t also in relationship to the basic approach to sentencing?
Are the offender's rights safeguarded under the methods of sentencing
being considered?
c) If greater responsibility is given to the parole board,
what should the composition of the board be (number, qualifications,
method of appointment, civil service) and should it serve on a fulltime basis?
d) What should be the relationship between the board
and the institutions (as to scope of authority, division of responsibilities, supervision)? Specific~lly, should the board pl~y any role or
have any respon~ibility in initial classification, assignment, and
placement of offenders? if so, to what extent?

xiv

5)

payment of fees not corrvnensurate with the work involved
in preparing an adequate defense; and

6)

total cost of providing court-appointed counsel in some
of the larger counties.

The proposed legislation has been adopted from the Model
Public Defender Act and is entirely permissive, so that each county
can make its own determination as to whether it wishes to adopt
public defender system or any of the other alternatives in the act.
4) The Criminal Code Committee recommends the adoption of
proposed legislation which would define attempted crime and provide the
penalties therefor.
{The text of the proposed legislation on criminal
attempt will be found on pp.71-75.)
Findings. Present Colorado law has many gaps with respect
to attempted crimes. There are a number of statutes in which the
commission of a serious crime is punishable, but which provides no
penalty for an attempt to commit the crime. Therefore, a person
whose criminal intent is shown in conduct falling short of completing
a crime, or whose attempted crime is aborted by alert police work,
legal impossibility to commit the crime,or an effective defense
against the intended crime by the intended victim cannot be
prosecuted.
5) The Criminal Code Committee recommends the adoption of
proposed legislation which would define criminal solicitation and
provide the penalties therefor.
(The text of the proposed legislation
on criminal solicitation will be found on PP.78-80•)
Findings. In Colorado, one who advises or encourages
another to commit a crime which the party thus solicited actually
commits is guilty as a principal and punished as if he had personally
committed the crime. There is no general criminal statute, however,
defining as a crime the solicitation of another to commit a crime
when the party solicited does .!1Q.:t commit the offense. While there
are several statutes defining the solicitation of certain specific
crimes as criminal and providing penalties, there are many gaps in
the coverage of these provisions, and there is a wide divergence
in the penalties provided.
6) The Criminal Code Committee recommends that further study
be made before any changes are made in criminal insanity definitions
and proceedings. The committee calls special attention to the chapter
on criminal insanity in this report (pp. 102-127) for an explanation
of the problems and the presentation of some alternatives to present
Colorado law. Attention is also directed to the addendum to this
report covering some of the constitutional questions involved.
Findings. There has been considerable dissatisfaction with the
present criminal insanity statute. Some of this dissatisfaction is
centered on the criminal insanity tests used, limitations on evidence,
and jury determination.
Other objections are related to the number of times the plea
is made and the number of times it is successful. A study of Denver
District Court criminal cases, however, shows that the plea actually
xvi
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1

I

is seldom used and is even less often successful (pp. 119-12.l).

Several proposals have been made to change both the procedure in

criminal insanity trials and the test to be used to determine insanity.

One proposal goes much further in that it substitutes a three-judge

panel for the jury and eliminates criminal insanity as a defense,
substituting a new procedure therefor. There are several
constitutional questions related to all of these recommendations, and
further study and careful consideration is needed.
7) The Criminal Code Committee recommends the statutory
changes and deletions listed on pp. 149 through 154 to be made to
bring the criminal statutes in conformance with the Rules of Criminal
Procedure adopted in September 1961 by the Colorado Supreme Court.
Further, the committee requests that the Colorado Supreme Court
consider the changes in the Rules of Criminal Procedure listed on
pp. 154 and 155.

Findings. The statutory conflicts and duplications resulting
from the adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure have been studied
for over a year by a subcommittee of the Colorado Bar Association's
Criminal Code Committee and reviewed extensively by the Criminal Code
Committee. · Existing statutes which parallel the rules, whether the
language is exactly the same or not, should be repealed as creating
unnecessary duplication and confusion. Existing statute& which are
inconsistent with the rules should be repealed to avoid the even
greater confusion resulting from the question of which law to follow.
Some statutes should be amended rather than repealed.
8) The Criminal Code Committee recommend3 that the study of
criminal law revision be continued under the auspices of the Legislative
Council through the passage of a joint resolution to this effect at the
first session of the Forty-fourth General Assembly.

Findings. Although the Criminal Code Committee has studied
and considered many subjects in the state's criminal laws and ha5 made
recommendations concerning several, there is a large amount of work
yet to be completed. The ultimate goal of further study should be
the complete revision and codification of Colorado's criminal law&.
In other states, such revision and codification has been a four to
six-year project. Subjects already considered by the committee on
which further work is needed include crimes against property, sentencing,
narcotics control, and criminal insanity.
Subjects which are still to be considered includes a) crimes
against the person; b) crimes against public health, safety, and
decency; c) crimes against the government; d) arrest, arraignment,
and other pre-trial procedures; and e) probation and parole.
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CRIMINAL CODE STUDY:

AN INTRODUCTION

The Legislative Council Criminal Code Committee was charged
by Senate Joint Resolution No. 14 (1961) with the responsibility of
examining all of Colorado's criminal laws, including, but not limited
to, parole, probation, sentencing, criminal insanity, narcotics laws
and their enforcement, bail bonds, and criminal jurisdiction.
As an initial step in making an over-all study of Colorado's
criminal laws, an index has been compiled of all statutes related in
any way to crime and criminal proceedings. These statutes are scattered
throughout the volumes of the 1953 Colorado Revised Statutes and the
1960 Cumulative Supplement. A detailed cross index to all of these
statutes will be published as a supplement to this report.
The area of property crimes was focused upon as the starting
point in making a complete revision of the criminal statutes. A general
theft statute has been considered by the committee, but a number of
questions have yet to be answered. Closely related to the property
crime area are inchoate crimes (acts which are criminal even though a
crime has not been committed) such as attempt and solicitation, and
considerable attention has been given to these offenses.
Extensive material has been compiled on the sentencing of
criminal offenders and the possible effect of adopting certain approaches
in Colorado. Generally, sentencing legislation and procedures should
be considered within the context of over-all criminal code revision.
Criminal insanity and narcotics control problems are among
other subjects studied by the committee and covered in this report.
Attention was also directed to the regulation of professional bail
bondsmen and the problems of the indigent offender in criminal actions.
As can be seen from the foregoing, the subject of criminal
law is a complex and detailed one. Many other aspects are worthy of
study, and more work is needed on some of the matters already given
consideration by the committee.

Sentencing
In Colorado, the statutes presently provide for a form of
indeterminate sentencing for convicted felons (i.e., rather than a
fixed sentence, an offender is given a maximum and a minimum sentence
by the judge which must be within the maximum and mimimum limits set
by statute). 1 An offender must serve his minimum sentence, less statutory
1.

Some statutes provide only for a sentence of not more than a certain
number of years. The supreme court has ruled, however, that the
judge shall also set a minimum. If an offender is sentenced to the
reformatory, he receives an indefinite sentence; no minimum or
maximum is set, but the offender cannot be incarcerated for a period
longer than the maximum set by statute for confinement in the
penitentiary. The offender may be released at any time within the
maximum at the discretion of the parole board. Usually, six months
must be served before the parole board even considers the case.

good time, before he is eligible for parole. He receives statutory
good time for good behavior and work performance while he is in the
penitentiary.
Sentencing Difficulties
Several impediments to the successful functioning of the
sentencing process in Colorado have been identified by a number of
judges, correctional officials, and members of the bar. Some of these
impediments result from sentencing practices within the statutory
limits and others appear to be inherent in the system itself. Because
of these problems and in light of the methods of sentencing followed
in other jurisdictions, there has been considerable support for a
reexamination of Colorado's sentencing provisions and practices.
Sentencing Disparity. A problem of great concern to
correctional officials is sentencing disparity. With respect to
sentencing disparity, Warden Harry Tinsley of the state penitentiary
has made the following comments:2
It is obvious that in the population of over
sixteen hundred in the Colorado State Penitentiary,
going there_pu~suant to sentences imposed in
seventeen Lsiy separate judicial districts, there
is a great disparity in the sentences of prisoners
who have been sentenced for similar crimes committed
under rather similar circumstances. The prisoners
at the penitentiary work closely together, are
celled closely together, take their recreation in
the same places, do the same things every day and,
in general, receive the same general type of treatment. Those persons who have received severe
sentences are thrown in daily contact with those who
have received more lenient sentences for what may be
the same crime committed under similar circumstances
by those with much the same individual backgrounds. The
person who has received the light sentence generally
feels fortunate, but also he may think that his
sentence was not so long but what he can afford to
have another try at his criminal activities. On
the other hand, the individual who has received the
longer sentence is understandably embittered toward
society in general and toward authority in particular.
This natural feeling may be heightened when he finds
his short-term fellow prisoners back again in
prison for crimes committed after their release,
while he himself is still serving his original long
sentence. This makes it extremely difficult to effect
any positive change for the better in this prisoner's
makeup during the time he is in the institution; for
whether or not there has been an actual injustice,
he himself is convinced that he has received unfair
treatment. Often this conviction makes it impossible
2.

Rocky Mountain Law Review, "Indeterminate Sentencing of Criminals,"
by Harry C. Tinsley, Volume 33, Number 4, June, 1961, pp. 536-543.
- 2 -

to produce any positive or corrective change in him
during his stay at the penitentiary. Because his
minimum sentence is near his maximum sentence, he
leaves the institution with a comparatively short
period of parole which he, probably, can and will do
in a satisfactory manner. But he often feels that
he must get his revenge against society for being
unfair to him. This, no doubt, is unsound thinking,
but it is to be remembered that those who populate
our correctional institutions are not here because
they have done sound and constructive thinking in
their past lives.
Relationship Between Maximum and Minimum. It has been the
opinion of most correctional authorities that an indeterminate sentence
is much more satisfactory than one of a set number of years. The
flexibility provided by a maximum and minimum offers a greater
probability that an offender may be released at the time when he is
best able to make a successful return to society. Society is further
protected by a system of indeterminate sentencing, because the offender
is placed under parole supervision until the expiration of his maximum
sentence. With a sentence of a fixed duration it is assumed that his
debt to society is paid upon its completion, and he is free to do as
he wishes.
The potential advantages of indeterminate sentencing may be
negated in two ways: 1) by the imposition of sentences with the
minimum and maximum set so close together that the effect is the same
as if a determinate sentence is imposed, e.g., nine years and 11 months
to 10 years or four years and six months to five years; 2) by the use
of statutory good time allowances to decrease the minimum sentence which
must be served.
An examination of the penitentiary's annual statistical report
shows that almost 10 per cent of the offenders confined in that
institution as of June 30, 1961 received sentences in which the maximum
and minimum were set so close together that these sentences were not
actually indeterminate.3 Slightly more than one-third of the inmates
as of June 30, 1961 received sentences in which the minimum was more
than one-half of the maximum.

3.

Statistical Report and Movement of Inmate Population, Annual Report,
July 1, 1960 through June 30, 1961, Colorado State Penitentiary.
- 3 -

Good Time Allowances. Statutory good time allowances reward
an inmate for good behavior while he is in the institution. The
subtraction of good time allowances from the minimum sentence adva~ces
considerably the date at which an offender is eligible for parole.
Unfortunately there is not necessarily any correlation between good
behavior during confinement and an offender's readiness to return to
society. While the parole board has the sole authority to determine
release, each inmate knows that he is eligible for parole upon completion
of his minimum sentence, less his good time credit. It has been the
general practice over the years to release most inmates on this basis,
and it is expected. The parole board will turn men down with good
reason, but should there be a wholesale refusal of parole, the
penitentiary might be faced with a difficult situation.
Reason for Concern. Approximately 95 per cent of all committed
offenders return to society sooner or later, even if some return only
for relatively short periods of time. It is the opinion of correctional
authorities and some judges and attorneys that the inadequacies of
Colorado's present sentencing procedures result in some offenders being
incarcerated longer than necessary to assure society's protection and
in some being released who should remain for a much longer period or
perhaps not be released at all.
It is the observation of the wardens of both the penitentiary
and the reformatory and the director of the adult parole division that
unless an offender is released at the time he appears to have the best
opportunity for a successful return to society, the chances of rehabilitation are considerably lessened and perhaps eliminated entirely.
Many of those who have expressed concern over the sentencing
of offenders feel that only minor changes are needed. Others have
expressed the opinion that a complete revision is needed. It is the
committee's judgment based on its study and discussion thus far that
no method of sentencing is perfect, although the approaches taken in
some jurisdictions may be more satisfactory than the present procedures
in Colorado.
Purpose of Incarceration
During the colonial period and for at least the first hundred
years of the nation's history, punishment was considered the major
reason for imprisonment. This approach was more sophisticated than the
4.

105-4-4. Reduced time for good conduct. -- Every convict who is,
or may be imprisoned in the penitentiary, and who shall have
performed faithfully, and all who shall hereafter perform faithfully, the duties assigned to him during his imprisonment therein,
shall be entitled to a deduction from the time of his sentence for
the respective years thereof, and proportionately for any part of
a year, when there shall be a fractional part of a year in the
sentence: For the first year, one month; for the second year,
two months; for the third year, three months; for the fourth year,
four months; for the fifth year, five months; for t~e sixth a~d.
each succeeding year, six months. Inmates may receive an additional
10 days per month as trusty time (105-4-5).
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~eye for an eye" concept. It was assumed that punishment was a crime
deterrent to the incarcerated criminal with respect to future offenses
and to others who would be less likely to commit offenses because of
the fear of retribution. The concept of rehabilitation as it is known
at present did not play an important role in penal confinement, except
that if imprisonment as punishment actually acted as a deter~ent to
further crime, then, in that sense, rehabilitation can be said to have
been accomplished.
Although the concept of punishment is still an important
factor to a varying degree, modern penology is based on the premise
that institutional confinement has two purposes: l) the protection
of society; and 2) rehabilitation of the offender. The second cannot
be stressed to the detriment of the first, so that both probation and
parole should be judiciously granted and competently supervised. The
aspect of punishment through confinement for at least a specified
number of years has been tempered by the desire to release an offender
at the time at which he is considered to have a chance to make a
successful return to society under parole supervision for as long a
period as necessary.
The adoption of minimum and maximum sentences is an implementation of the approach to penology which incorporates protection of
society and rehabilitation of the offender. It provides a latitude
within which an offender may be released, while at the same time the
length of the minimum and maximum reflect the punishment aspect, inasmuch as these minima and maxima are usually set according to the severity
of the various categories of crime in relationship to one another.
While views on the purposes of incarceration have changed
generally, the concepts of punishment, retribution, and deterrence are
still cited as important reasons for penal confinement. To a certain
extent, these three purposes of confinement are not necessarily
incompatible with rehabilitation, but, according to many correctional
authorities, their emphasis diminishes the possibility of developing
meaningful rehabilitation programs. They argue that such programs,
even with their present limitations, offer the best possible for the
protection and safety of society and for the offender to become a
useful citizen.
Generally, law enforcement officials have placed considerable
emphasis on the concepts of punishment and deterrence, and they have
been joined in this point of view by many citizens who have been the
unwilling victims of criminal acts and who also would like to see
retribution made. This point of view is understandable, but carried
to an extreme would result in lengthy sentences for most offenders,
regardless of other considerations. Institutional personnel and
programs also exhibit in varying degrees the concepts of punishment,
deterrence, and retribution, even though there is more and more emphasis
on rehabilitation. For this reason, there appears to be no state or
other jurisdiction where correctional programs embody all aspects of
the rehabilitative approach to penology to the exclusion of other
concepts; given the general public reaction to the criminal offender
it is little wonder that this is true. It can and has been argued that
until much more is known about man and his reaction to his environment,
society is best served through continued reliance on older and established
concepts of incarceration, although these concepts more and more are
being questioned.
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Different Approaches to Sentencing
In the broadest sense indeterminate sentencing may be defined
as any method of sentencing which includes a variable rather than a
fixed period of incarceration. This definition applies, regardless of
whether sentencing is a judicial prerogative, set by statute, or the
responsibility of a par6le board or similar authority.
While the broad definition of indeterminate sentencing
encompasses at least some part of the penal codes of more than two-thirds
of the states, a more restricted definition would apply to relatively
few. Advocates of sentencing reform usually refer to indeterminate
sentencing as a system of sentencing in which judicial authority and
responsibility extend only to the finding of guilt; the determination
of actual sentence is the responsibility of the parole board or some
similarly constituted commission. When sentence is passed by the
courts under this system only the statutory limits may be imposed.5
Discretion within these limits passes from the judiciary to the paroling
authority.
Some indeterminate sentencing advocates (within the narrow
definition used above) believe in a flexible sentencing structure which
allows an immediate parole in cases where such release is justified
and likewise permits detention for a lifetime where that is justified -both without regard for the particular crime for which the conviction
was .had. This approach assumes that knowledge of human behavior has
advanced to the stage that legal safeguards are unnecessary because the
vesting o~ this power in a parole board or similar commission would not
result in its arbitrary and/or capricious exercise. This method of
sentencing in actuality provides an indefinite sentence rather than an
indeterminate one and is similar to Colorado's sex offender law and to
S.B. 188, introduced during the Forty-second General Assembly, First
Session, 1959, and H.B. 42, introduced during the Forty-third General
Assembly, First Session, 1961.6
Because of ·the interest in this approach shown in Colorado, the
following comments by the American Correctional Association are
appropriate:?
... The only form of sentencing which would place full
discretion with the parole board to select and to
release prisoners on parole at the time they are most
ready for release and to retain in confinement as long
as necessary those who are not ready for release would
5.

Variations of this approach include: a) imposition of statutory
maximum only, minimum established by parole authority; orb)
maximum set by judge within statutory limit, minimum established
by parole authority.

6.
7.

If the latter plan is followed, it is

usually recommended that parole supervision be extended to the
end of the statutory maximum term at the discretion of the paroling
authority rather than be terminated at the end of the judicially
imposed maximum.
Provisions of these bills are discussed in a subsequent section.
Manual of Correctional Standards, American Correctional Association,
1959, p. 535.
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be an indeterminate sentence of one day to life for
every offense for which a prison sentence could be
given. In a model correctional system with all the
necessary diagnostic and treatment resources within
the institution to prepare prisoners for release,
with a professional board of parole to determine the
optimum time for release, and with sufficient trained
parole staff to give supervision, the complete
indeterminate sentence law would be workable and
practical. However, to place the power of life
sentence over all prisoners with parole board members
who were not appointed for their professional
knowledge and competence, to permit lifelong
confinement without legal safeguards in institutions
without sufficient staff or facilities for effective
treatment would be unthinkable (underlining added
for emphasis).
Dr. John MacDonald has also made some comments on the wholly
indeterminate or ind~finite sentence drawn in part from the views of
other psychiatrists.8
The demands of some criminologists for wholly
indeterminate sentences has been criticized by
Jerome Hall.
'From a medical viewpoint, it may
be absurd to release an offender at a fixed time
that in fact has no relation to rehabilitation.
But if no law fixes an upper limit, there is no
adequate protection from life imprisonment.'
Certainly there is the danger of unnecessarily
prolonged imprisonment and this danger might be
greater if the medical and psychological experts
on the parole board were administratively rather
than therapeutically oriented.
Indeed the tyranny of the harsh judge might well
be replaced by th~ tyranny of the scientist. The
moral judgement Lsif/ so often condemned by
psychiatrists, might be replaced by the last word
of science. Yet the complexity of mental and social
phenomena allows many a fallacy to be taken for the
last word of science~ ..
Unfortunately psychiatry lacks reliable predictive
techniques and it is not always possible to
predict, with any degree of confidence, the
future career of an individual offender. Even the
experienced psychiatrist is liable to serious error
in prognosis ...
Some psychiatrists have suggested that criminals
should be divided into 2 groups; those who should
be treated, and those who should be confined
indefinitely. It is not clear, however, upon what
criteria the differential diagnosis is to be made ••.
8.

Psychiatry and the Criminal, Dr. John M. MacDonald, 1958, pp. 199
and 200.
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... Although psychiatry has much to offer in regard
to the rehabilitation of offenders, few psychiatrists
would be willing to accept responsibility for
confining a non-psychotic criminal, regardless of
the crime for which he has been convicted, for the
remainder of his life.
It is not surprising that none of the states have gone this
far with indeterminate sentencing. Those states which are considered
the most advanced in this respect provide that no one may be incarcerated for a period longer than the maximum prescribed by law;
although in some of these states it is possible to be released prior
to the statutory minimum.

Sentencing in Other States
Sentencing as a Judicial Function
In twenty-four of the states having indeterminate sentencing
as broadly defined, setting the sentence is a judicial responsibility.
In five of these twenty-four states, one ~f the two extremes is fixed
mandatorily by statute while the other may be varied by the sentencing
authority. These five states include: Michigan, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. In all except Michigan, the court
may set the maximum term, but not the minimum, which is set by statute.
In Michigan, the maximum term imposed is the statutory maximum, while
the judge has the discretion to set the minimum.
In eighteen of these twenty-four states, the judge sets the
maximum and minimum at his discretion within the statutory limits.
These states include: Arizona, Arkansas, COLORADO, Connecticut,
Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Vermont, and Wyoming. In Georgia, sentence is prescribed by the jury
within the statutory minima and maxima.
In three of these states, there are statutory provisions
designed to prevent a judge from fixing a minimum term so closely
identical to the maximum that the combined effect would approximate a
definite sentence (e.g., 4½-S years). The statutes in these states
(Maine, New York, and Pennsylvania) provide that the minimum term may
not exceed half of the maximum term imposed.
Generally, in these twenty-four states, parole eligibility
depends upon completion of the minimum sentence. The exceptions are
as follows:
State

Earliest Date of Possible Parole Release

Georgia

when one-third of minimum sentence has
been served

New Hampshire

parole possible after two-thirds of minimum
sentence, if minimum is two years or more
- 8 -

State

Earliest Date of Possible Parole Release

New Mexico

when one-third of minimum sentence is
served, if minimum less than 10 years; if
more than ten years, must serve one-third
of first ten plus one month for each
additional year

North Carolina

when one-fourth of minimum sentence has
been served

Texas

with ~rfect prison conduct record, when
either minimum or one-fourth the maximum
has been served, whichever is less; with
imperfect conduct record, one-third of
maximum or fifteen years, whichever is
less, must be served

Wisconsin

after two years, or one-half maximum
sentence, whichever is less

Several of these states allow prisoners time off for good
behavior (known as statutory good time and trusty good time). This
"good time" is subtracted from the minimum sentence in determining
eligibility for parole release.9
In the states which allow release prior to completion of the
minimum sentence, the parole authority in effect has some of the powers
of the sentence-fixing board in that it can release an inmate sooner
than was prescribed in the minimum sentence. It would appear that the
parole authorities in the states where the minimum (less good time)
must be served still has some sentencing discretion, because the parole
boards have the discretionary power to withhold release until the
maximum is served. In actual practice this may not be the case, if
the Colorado practice of releasing almost every inmate of the
penitentiary on parole upon completion of minimum sentence less statutory
good time is an example of the procedures in these other states.
Sentence Set by Statute
In twelve states, the courts have the responsibility only for
the determination of guilt. In seven of these states {California,
Indiana, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, and West Virginia), the
sentence imposed is a restatement of the maximum and minimum set by
statute. In the other five states {Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Utah, and
Washington), there is no minimum sentence and the statutory maximum
sentence is imposed.
Maximum and Minimum Set by Statute. Parole board authority
and application of statutory good time varies among the seven states
in which both the maximum and minimum are set by statute. These
differences are indicated in the following table:
9.

In Wisconsin, statutory good time is deducted from the maximum
sentence to insure that every inmate will be subject to at least
some parole supervision after release.
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State

Parole Eligibility

Good Time Allowance

California

after one-third of minimum if
more than one year, if minimum
less than one year, six months
or end of minimum

applies to maximum
sentence

Indiana

must serve at least one year
of minimum sentence (less good
time)

applies to minimum
sentence

Kansas

after minimum sentence (less
good time)

applies to minimum
sentence

New Mexico

if minimum sentence is 10 years
or less, must serve at least
one-third of minimum; if
minimum is more than 10 years,
must serve one-third of 10
years plus one month for each
year over 10

applies to maximum
sentence

Nevada

must serve at least
of minimum sentence
time), unless three
felony convictions;
must be served with
felony convictions

applies to minimum
sentence

Ohio

statutes not clear as to whether
minimum (less good time) must
be served or board can release
prior to expiration of minimum
sentence

applies to minimum

West Virginiaa

after minimum sentence, if
conduct record good for three
months prior to date of
eligibility, except those with
definite sentence must serve
one-third

applies to definite
sentences only

a.

one year
(less good
prior
seven years
three prior

The provision for parole eligibility after one-third of a definite
sentence is served was apparently designed to cover inmates
incarcerated prior tp the adoption of indeterminate sentences.

As shown by the above table, in four of the states (California,
Indiana, Nevada, and New Mexico), an inmate may be paroled prior to the
expiration of his minimum sentence. In two of these states (Indiana
and Nevada), good time allowances are subtracted from the minimum time
to be served. It has been indicated that many correctional authorities
feel that good behavior and parole readiness do not necessarily coincide,
yet these two states as well as Kansas and ?hio (which re9uire the .
minimum, less good time, to be served) provide for good time deductions
from the minimum time to be served. This conflict was apparently
- 10 -

recognized in Indiana where another statutory section states that
parole release is not a reward for good conduct or efficient performance
of duties in the institution, but depends on the inmate's readiness
to return to society and the reasonable probabilities of his success. 10
In addition to Kansas and Ohio, West Virginia also requires
that the minimum sentence be served. It is the only one of the three,
however, in which good time allowances do not apply to the minimum
sentence.
No Minimum - Statutory Maximum. In the five states where
there is no minimum, good time is deducted from the maximum sentence.
There are, however, some differences in the date of parole eligibility
and parole board authority among these states. In Utah, the Board of
Paroles and Pardons has full authority to set the minimum sentence but
both the judge and the prosecutor make sentence recommendations to the
board. These recommendations are accompanied by information concerning
the crime and surrounding circumstances and any other pertinent data.
The board is not bound by these judicial recommendations but must review
them prior to setting the minimum sentence.
Judges and prosecutors may also make recommendations as to
sentence to the Washington Parole Board. While the board is not bound
by these recommendations, there are certain statutory restrictions
which must be adhered to in setting the minimum sentence. Any first
offender who is sentenced for a crime involving the use of a deadly
weapon must serve at least five years. Any offender with a previous
felony conviction who is sentenced for a crime involving a deadly weapon
must serve at least seven and one-half years. Habitual offenders
(three previous felony convictions) must serve at least 15 years, and
embezzlers of public funds must serve at least five years.l
In Iowa, the parole board may release a first offender after
conviction, but prior to incarceration. (A further examination of the
Iowa statutes indicates that there are no provisions for probation, so
that this method of parole is actually a probation substitute. This
premise is confirmed further by the statute providing that the
committing judge may recommend immediate parole release.) Offenders
in Florida must serve at least six months before being considered for
parole release. Florida has a statutory provision very similar to
Indiana's, which specifies that parole is not a reward for good conduct
and efficient performance and that: "No person shall be placed on
parole until and unless the commission shall find that, there is
reasonable probability that if he is placed on parole, he will live
and conduct himself as a respectable and law abiding person, and that
his release is compatible with his own welfare and the welfare of
society. 11 12
10.

11.
12.

13-15-33, Burns Indiana Statutes Annotated. It is not known how
the Indiana Parole Board reconciles the two different philosophies
expressed by statute; that of rewarding an inmate for good
institutional behavior by good time deductions, while at the same
time specifying that parole release is not a reward for such
behavior.
9.95.040, Revised Statutes of Washington.
947.18, Laws of Florida, 1957.
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Various Methods of Sentencing:

A Summary

As seen from the sentencing practices of other states, there
are various approaches which are used. These may be summarized as
follows:
l) Definite Sentence: No maximum or minimum, sentence could
be set by statute or court; a limited amount of flexibility could be
provided by deduction of good time credit.
2) Maximum and Minimum Limits Set by Statute, Court Sets
Sentence Within Statutory Limits: This approach followed by several
states, including Colorado. Most of these states allow good time
deductions from minimum sentence. Parole release is usually not
possible until expiration of minimum term (less good time).
.
3) Either Maximum or Minimum Sentence Set by Statute, With
the Other End of the Sentence Set by the Court: If the minimum is set
by statute, the court's authority extends only to the determination of
the maximum period of incarceration. The parole board may fix a release
date after·completion of the minimum sentence or soonerJ if so provided
by law. Good time may be allowed and in some jurisdictions applies to
the minimum sentence and in others to the maximum. If the maximum
sentence is set by statute, the court's discretion extends only to the
determination of the minimum sentence. The parole board then has
discretion between completion of the judicially-imposed minimum and the
statutory maximum, although eligibility for release after completion
of a certain portion of the minimum term may be provided by law. Again
good time may be allowed, with a difference among the states which
have this- provision as to whether good time is deducted from the
minimum or maximum sentence.
4) Maximum and Minimum Limits Set by Statute, Court Sets
Sentence Within Statutory Limits, Except that Court is Restricted on
the Len th of the Minimum Sentence: This approach is very similar to
2 above except that the court may impose a minimum not to exceed a
certain proportion of the maximum (e.g., one-third or one-half).
5) Maximum and Minimum Sentence Set by Statute: The court's
only function is the determination of guilt. The paroling authority
determines release within the statutory sentence limits, although the
statutes may provide that an offender is eligible for parole after
completion of a specified portion of the statutory minimum. Good time
may also be allowed under this approach, applying to the minimum
sentence in some jurisdictions and to the maximum sentence in others.
6) Maximum Sentence Set by Statute, No Minimum: As in the
preceding approach, the court's function is limited to a determination
of guilt. The paroling authority fixes the minimum sentence by
determining the release date. Good time allowances apply to the maximum
sentence.
It should be noted that 2) through 6) above do not apply to
capital crimes or certain others where life imprisonment is the p 7nalty.
There may be other ,crimes as well, such as armed robbery, or multiple
convictions for which a specified term of confinement is provided by
law before an offender is eligible for release. A number of states
- 12 -

provide that an offender may be considered for parole release after a
specified number of years of a life sentence has been served. In
others, the life term offender may be considered for commutation of
sentence after serving a specified number of years.
Good Time Applied to Maximum Sentence
While correctional authorities appear to be in general
agreement that there is little relationship between institutional good
behavior and societal readiness, a good case can be made for allowing
good time credits to be applied to the maximum sentence. Good time
deduction from the maximum sentence, however, should not result in an
offender being released without supervision prior to the expiration of
his maximum sentence~ Rather it should be used as a method of providing
parole supervision, even if only for a limited time, for every offender.
The offender who has not been released on parole prior to
completion of his maximum sentence or who has failed on parole poses
the greatest potential menace to society. Yet if he is released after
completion of his maximum sentence, he has paid his debt to society
and is free to do as he chooses. It is possible that such an offender
could accumulate good time credit for his institutional behavior, even
though the parole board has not considered him ready for release. In
Wisconsin, for example, he would be released under parole supervision
after he completed his maximum sentence, less good time, and would
remain under supervision until expiration of the maximum sentence.

Sentence Determination by Board -- Some Pros and Cons
Following is a brief summary of some of the major arguments
for and against giving broad sentencing determination powers to a
parole board.

1) Legal training does not necessarily equip judges to be
able to make proper determination of the sentence to be imposed.
Consequently, the sentence may bear no relationship to the period of
incarceration needed before an offender is ready for a successful
return to society. Some violators need little if any confinement, while
others may never be released safely.
2) The courts for the most part do not have enough adequately
trained probation officers to provide judges with sufficient pre-sentence
data to assist them in setting sentences commensurate with an offender's
possibilities for rehabilitation.

3) Sentencing practices differ among judges -- not only among
those whose courts are in different districts, but also among judges
in the same district. This disparity is known to convicted offenders
who compare sentences and it lessens the success of institutional
rehabilitation programs for this reason.
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4) Judicial sentencing when combined with statutory good
time deductions results in virtually automatic parole for all inmates
upon completion of their minimum sentence minus good time allowance.
Such parole release may or may not coincide with the inmate's potential
for successful return to society. In those cases where inmates are
not ready for parole, an injustice is done both to them and society.
An injustice is also done to those inmates who perhaps are ready for
release, but are held up because their minimum sentence was lengthy
and has not yet been completed. The inclusion of statutory good time
presumes that there is a direct correlation between institutional good
behavior and readiness for release, which may not be the case, especially
in regard to the institution-wise prisoner.
5)
Length of sentence can be more adequately and fairly
determined by a full-time qualified board removed from the heat and
emotionalism of the court room and local attitudes toward crime. This
is especially true, when the board has the assistance of competent,
professional, institutional personnel who can observe and evaluate the
offender during his period of incarceration.

1) The judge is the person most acquainted with the case.
He has presided during the trial, has observed the offender, and is
acquainted with his record. Consequently, the judge can do a better
job of setting sentence than a board whose determination will be based
primarily on secondary written reports and brief personal observation.
2) There is no basis for assuming that a board would be any
better at sentencing than the courts, either with respect to length
of sentence, or sentence variation for the same offense. In fact, a
qualified board could do much worse than the courts, if the institutions
are not adequately staffed to provide the data the board needs, and if
the board members are not well qualified and cannot devote full time to
their deliberations.
3) There is the possibility of recourse in the courts, if
the offender believes that he has been given an unfair sentence. What
recourse would be available from an unjust sentence determination on
the part of the parole board?
4) There are institution-wise prisoners who can con professional personnel as easily as they can accumulate good time credits.
Institutional conduct may not indicate that a man is ready for release,
but it does show an effort to get along and obey rules and regulations;
therefore, it should be considered in determining release.
5) The paroling authority will be subjected to undue public
pressure and criticism if it exercises sentencing authority. Mistakes
made by the board will cause public reaction which in turn could limit
the board's effectiveness by forcing it to be more conservative in its
actions regardless of the worthiness of the cases before it.
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Method of Sentencing Proposed in the Model Penal Code
The following description of and comment on the sentencing
method proposed in the Model Penal Code is abstracted from a recent
Rocky Mountain Law Review article ~3 Professor Austin W. Scott, Jr.
University of Colorado Law School:
The American Law Institute has been at work for
about ten years (with one more year to go for
completion of its task) on a Model Penal Code,
which, in addition to defining the various
principal crimes from murder down to disorderly
conduct, and stating the various general principles
(e.g., insanity, self-defense, mistake, coercion)
applicable to several or to all crimes, contains
a number of sentencing and parole provisions,
The Code divides all crimes into several categories:
felonies of the first degree, second degree, and
third degree; and misdemeanors and petty misdemeanors.
For felonies other than some forms of murder, and
for misdemeanors calling for an extended term of
imprisonment, the Code provides for a type of
indeterminate sentence in which the court, as well
~s the pa~o~e authority, plays a substantial part
1n determining the length of the imprisonment. The
court (besides having power to suspend the imposition
of sentence and place the convicted defendant on
probation) generally fixes the minimum and maximum
terms within limits provided by the Code for the
particular type of offense; the limits are, of
course, placed somewhat higher in the case of extended terms given to persistent offenders,
professional criminals and dangerous mentally abnormal
persons. The Code prevents the court from imposing
(as a Colorado court may impose) what is in effect
a fixed sentence (e.g., 9½-to-10 years imprisonment)
by requiring, where the court fixes both the minimum
and .the maximum, that the minimum be no more than
half the maximum. Within these minimum- and maximum
limits, as they may be reduced by good time deductions,
the parole board determines the actual date of the
prisoner's release under parole supervision.
The Model Code also concerns itself with the problem
of concurrent versus consecutive sentences for a
defendant tried and convicted in a single trial on
a single accusation charging several crimes or on
several accusations consolidated for trial; in general,
the Code imposes some limitations upon the discretionary power of the trial court to aggregate to

13.

Rocky Mountain Law Review, "Comment on Indeterminate Sentencing
of Criminals," Professor Austin W, Scott, Jr., Vol. 33, Number 4,
June, 1961, pp. 547-549.
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great lengths the. terms of imprisonment for the
various crimes. On the other hand, the Code
gives the sentencing court some discretionary
power, which it does not now enjoy in Colorado
and elsewhere, to alleviate hardship in a
particular case, by entering a judgment of
conviction for a lesser degree of crime than
the degree of crime for which convicted,
when in view of all the circumstances the
punishment would otherwise be too harsh.
Besides the above provisions concerning length
of imprisonment, the Model Penal Code introduces
a new concept into the handling of parole.
In each case whe~ the defendant is sentenced
for an indefinite term of imprisonment, the
sentence automatically includes as a separate
portion of the sentence an indefinite "parole
term" -- of from one to five years, for most
crimes. The parolee may be discharged from
parole by the parole board any time after one
year and before five years. If he violates
the terms of his parole before his discharge,
however, he may be recommitted.
The new Code provision thus does away with
the anomalous situation, which exists in
Colorado as in other states, whereby those
who need parole the most get it the least,
and those who need it the least get it the most
-- the situation which necessarily prevails
when the term of parole terminates when the
maximum sentence has been served.
Besides these provisions relating to length
of imprisonment and length of parole, the
Model Penal Code calls for a full-time, salaried,
nonpolitical parole board consisting of
persons possessing skill~ evidenced by training
or past experience, in correctional
administration or criminology.
Classification of Offenses and
Penalties as Proposed in the Model Penal Code
Felony--Ordinary Term
Grade of Felony
first degree
second degree
third degree

Minimum
l
l
l

(fixed by court)

to 10 years

to 3 years
to 2 years
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Maximum (fixed by court)
20 years or for life

not more than 10 years
not more than 5 years

Felony--Extended Term
Grade of Felony
first degree
second degree
third degree

Minimum
5
l
l

Maximum
life imprisonment
10 to 20 years
5 to 10 years

(fixed by court)
to 10 years
to 5 years
to 3 years

Misdemeanor--Extended Term
Grade of Misdemeanor
Misdemeanor
Petty misdemeanor

Minimum
(fixed by court)
not more than l year
not more than 6 months

Maximum
(fixed by law)
3 years
2 years

Parole Boar~ Comgosition
If considerable sentencing discretion is given to the parole
authority, it is extremely important that the board be composed of professionally trained and experienced personnel who serve in this capacity
on a full-time basis. The American Correctional Association recommends
the following qualification standards for parole board members:14
l) Personality: He must be of such integrity,
intelligence, and good judgment as to command respect
and public confidence. Because of the importance
of his quasi-judicial function, he must possess the
equivalent personal qualifications of a high judicial
officer. He must be forthright, courageous, and
independent. He should be appointed without reference
to creed, color, or political affiliation.
2) Education: A board member should
have an educational background broad enough to
provide him with a knowledge of those professions
most closely related to parole administration.
Specifically, academic training which has qualified
the board member for professional practice in a
field such as criminology, education, psychiatry,
psychology,social work, and sociology is desirable.
It is essential that he have the capacity and desire
to round out his knowledge, as effective performance
is dependent upon an understanding of legal process,
the dynamics of human behavior, and cultural
conditions contributing to crime.
3) Experience: He must have an intimate
knowledge of common situations and problems
confronting offenders~ This might be obtained from
a variety of fields, such as probation, parole, the
judiciary, law, social work, a correctional institution,
a delinquency prevention agency.
14.

A Manual of Correctional Standards,
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cit., pp. 537 and 538.

4) Other: He should not be an officer
of a political party or seek or hold elective office
while a member of the board.
It might be expected that most small states would have parttime parole boards, even though the paroling !uthority has a considerable
amount of discretionary sentencing power. Most of these states do
not have a sufficient number of offenders appearing before the board
to require a full-time parole authority. What is surprising, however,
is that some of the larger states have part-time parole boards, when
these boards have considerable authority in setting sentences.
States in this category with part-time boards include: Iowa,
Indiana, Kansas, and Tennessee, although the Tennessee board has one
full-time member.
Full-time parole boards with broad sentencing authority are
found in Michigan, Texas, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
California, and Florida.
Eight of the states under discussion (both large and small)
have no statutory qualifications for parole board members: Idaho,
Tennessee, Texas, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Washington, and Indiana.
The statutory qualifications in three additional states (Kansas,
South Dakota, and Iowa) do not specifically require knowledge and
experience in corrections or related fields. Wisconsin is the only
sta~e in which the parole board is under civil service. In most
of the other states, board members are appointed by the governor,
usually with senate approval.

New Federal Approach to Sentencing
Federal judges have several alternatives in sentencing
offenders as a consequence of the adoption of Public Law 85-752 (1958).
This law applies only to offenders for which the court feels that a
sentence of at least one year is required to serve "the ends of justice
and the best interests of the public."
First, the court may designate the length of the sentence
within the maximum prescribed by statute and also the minimum term
which must be served before an offender shall become eligible for
parole, which term may be less than but shall be no more than one-third
of the maximum sentence imposed. This alternative incorporates the
features of indeterminate sentencing, because even though a
definite sentence is imposed (e.g., 10 years), the offender will be
eligible for parole no later than the completion of one-third of this
sentence (three years and four months if sentence is 10 years) and
possibly sooner if the court so indicates.
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Second, the court may set the maximum sentence as prescribed
by statute, in which event the court may specify that the offender may
become eligible for parole at such time as the board of parole may
determine. This alternative is very similar to the method of sentencing
followed in some states in which the maximum sentence
set by statute
and the minimum is determined by the parole authority.

i~

Third, if the court desires more detailed information as a
basis for determining the sentence to be imposed, the court may commit
the defendant to the custody of the attorney general for purposes of
extensive study and evaluation. If this alternative is followed by
the court, it is deemed that the sentence imposed is the maximum prescribed by law, although the results of this study and evaluation shall
be furnished to the committing court within three months, unless the
court grants additional time, not to exceed three months, for completion
of the study. After the court receives the report and any recommendations which the director of the Bureau of Prisons believes may be
helpful in determining disposition, the court may do one of several
things:
1)

place the offender on probation;

2)

affirm the maximum sentence already imposed, and leave
it up to the parole board to determine the date of parole
eligibility;

3)

affirm the maximum sentence already imposed and set a
date for parole eligibility which may be less than but
not more than one-third of the maximum; or

4)

reduce the sentence already imposed and set a date for
parole eligibility which may be less than but not more
than one-third of the maximum.

There are also two other sentencing alternatives afforded the
court. The court has the following authority with respect to offenders
convicted of any offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment;
1) Regardless of the maximum penalty provided by law, the
court may suspend sentence and place the offender on probation for a
period not to exceed five years.
2) If the maximum penalty provided by law is more than six
months, the court may fix a sentence in excess of six months and provide that the offender be confined in a jail-type or treatment
institution for a period not exceeding six months. After completion
of this six-month period, the remainder of the sentence is suspended,
and the offender is placed on probation for a period not to exceed
five years.
In all instances where probation is granted the court has
the authority to revoke or modify any condition of probation or may
change the period of probation; however, the total period of probation
shall not exceed five years.
15.

Washington, Utah, Florida, and Iowa.
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Sentencing and Institutional Programs
Sentencing, incarceration, and parole are all integral parts
of a continuous correctional process. Regardless of how this process
is organized, 95 per cent of all committed offenders sooner or later
return to society, even if some return only for relatively short
periods of time. The separate components of the correctional process
should be coordinated to achieve maximum results with respect to the
protection of society and the rehabilitation of offenders, and, insofar
as possible, the same philosophy should underlie the total program.
Sentencing is the key to a successful corrections program.
Even if the institutions and parole department are staffed with
qualified, dedicated personnel and programs are aimed at rehabilitation,
the possibilities of success are minimized if the method of sentencing
used does not make it possible for the parole authority to release
an offender at the time that he is considered to be a good societal
risk. If he must remain in the institution for a longer period, the
effects of the program are diminished or perhaps even negated. If
he must be released from the institution before he is considered
ready, then the program has little chance of being helpful and
both society and the offender are losers.
Conversely, it is dubious that much can be accomplished by
a change in the method of sentencing if accompanying changes, as
needed, are not made or at least initiated in institutional programs.
In addition to a qualified parole board, correctional institutions
and facilities must have properly qualified and experienced professional
personnel on their staffs, not only to develop and emphasize
rehabilitation programs, but also to make evaluations and prepare the
pertinent data needed by the board in making its decisions.
As examples, some of the more important components of the
correctional program in this respect are: l) initial evaluation,
classification, and placement; 2) vocational training and education
programs; 3) counseling and testing; 4) psychiatric services; and
5) pre-parole planning and guidance.
During the past few years in Colorado, major advances have
been made in these areas at both adult correctional institutions,
and further improvements are planned.
Wisconsin's Correctional Program - An Example
Wisconsin's correctional program has received Rational
recognition. The following description of the Wisconsin program is
taken from a speech made by Sanger B. Powers, Director, Wisconsin
Division of Corrections.16
16.

"Wisconsin's Answer," a speech by Sanger B. Powers, Director,
Wisconsin Division of Corrections, presented to the Oklahoma
Health and Welfare Association, Oklahoma City, November 20, 1958.
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We believe that our basic responsibility
established by law and public policy is the
protection of society, for this is why institutions
are built, why provisions are made for probation
and parole services. We feel, however, that
society will receive maximum protection only
from a positive program focused on the treatment
of each offender as an individual -- one with
problems, a person who is frequently maladjusted
socially, mentally, physically, or spiritually
who might be characterized as socially ill.
Nationally something like 95 per cent of all
persons committed to institutions are released
through parole, conditional release, or discharge • • •
It should be obvious that if society is to
receive any long-term protection as the result
of an offender being taken out of circulation
and incarcerated for a limited period of time,
that protection must come from something
other than locking him up and throwing the
key away • • • Long-term protection can come
only through positive programs in institutions
and through probation and parole -- through
programs aimed at retraining rather than
restraining, through efforts to rehabilitate
rather than being content to restrict,
through programs geared to reformation
through a professionalized service rather
than mere repression •
• • • the job of an institution or a corrections
service is not to punish. Punishment might
properly he the function or aim of a court
in depriving a person of his liberty by
commitment to an institution, but· the,job of
the in st it u ti on . • • i s • • • to ma ke the
maximum efforts to train, retrain, educate,
guide and counsel, and through the use of
psychological and psychiatric and social
services, to get at and treat the causes,
the things responsible for anti-social or
criminal conduct.
We believe in the value of the maximum
use of treatment and rehabilitative services
Such services must be individualized, for
each offender differs from all others in
terms of aptitudes, attitudes, emotional
make up, cultural, and social background
and prior record •
• we are operating six institutions
and a statewide probation and parole service,
all of which are integrated and enmeshed
and designed to protect society through
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the restoration of people to useful living
at the earliest possible time consistent
with the protection of the public and the
readiness of each individual offender to
resume his place in the community. I am
not naive about all this business and I
am not seeking to give the impression that
we turn out only successes or that every
prisoner received is a hopeful person
interested in re-establishment of himself
in society • • • The great majority of
the offenders committed to our custody are not
hopeless • • • There may be people in prisons. • •
to whQm hope has been denied, but there are
few Lwho ari] hopeless.
Mr. Powers then went on to describe institutional programs
as follows:17
• • • a copy of the pre-sentence investigation
accompanies the offender to the institution
and is used by the institution in planning
a positive program for the offender • • •
Shortly after an offender is received • • •
he will appear before a classification
committee, which will determine the treatment
and training program for him • • • at this time • • •
the pre-sentence social history will be
supplemented and amplified by appraisals and
reports from the psychiatrist, psychologist,
director of education, supervisor of vocational
training, chaplain, director of recreation,
and the institutional social service worker
assigned to the specific case • • • complete
information is available to the cl~sslfication
committee which will permit them Lsif/ to make an
intelligent determination with respect to the
security classification, education, and vocational
training or work assignment, and type of
guidance or counselling necessary.
As an inmate progresses through an institution,
a social worker keeps close tab on his
progress and adjustment and his response
to the program set up for him. When the
prisoner is initially seen by the Parole
Board, the Board will have a report from
the social service department which is
up-to-date and which will supplement all
of the material previously referred to and
which is also utilized by the Parole Board.
Thus the Parole Board in making its decision
is able to use the pre-sentence social history,
17.

Ibig.
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all of the institution classification

material, and the up-to-date progress report
in determining the readiness for parole of
any particular applicant • • • Board members
are qualified by training and experience
to properly assess and appraise this type of
material, are conversant with the dynamics of
human behavior and are able to understand the
meaning and significance of the psychiatric
and psychological data which frequently bear
significantly on the question of readiness
for parole •
• • • during an offender's stay at an
institution he is seen at regular intervals
by the parole officer who will be his supervisor
upon release • • • Thus there is a continuous
link between the community and the offender,
between the offender's parole officer and the
institution, and the parole officer has
access to all of the institutional information
in an offender's record which will go with
the offender to the field when he is released
under parole supervision. This we feel makes
for an integrated and coordinated total
correctional process.
This description of the c?rrect!onal proce!~ was followed by
some comments on the costs of the Wisconsin program:
•.•• we do this in Wisconsin because we are
not a wealthy state and because we cannot
afford a program which does not provide for
adequate probation and parole supervision and
which does not provide society with the
protection afforded through the supervision
of offenders upon ;,ple_a~e from institutions • • •
As of November 1, Ll95§/ the Division of
Corrections had 8,120 persons under its
supervision. Of this number 3,018 were in
institutions while 5,102 were under supervision
in the field/Lon probation and parol!J • • •
63 per cent of the offenders • • • were in the
community under the supervision of a probation
and parole officer while only 37 per cent
were institutionalized • • • the average
weekly per capita cost o.f SY,Pervision
on probation or parole Lwa§/ $4.25 • • •
the average per capita cost of institutionalization • • •
approximates $37.50 per week. If the
5,102 persons presently being supervised on
probation and parole were in institutions
an extra $9,180,000 of ·state funds would be
18 •

lli,g .
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required • • • This added annual operating
cost of $9,180,000 does not include the
tremendous capital outlay necessary to
provide bed space in institutions for
an additional o,102 prisoners. At current
construction costs averaging $10,00U per
bed, this would represent a minimum added
capital outlay of $51 million • • • non~ of this
takes into consideration other ~hidden" costs
which would have to be reckoned with: l • • •
the e~onomic contribution of these 5,102
people to society in terms of productivity • • •
2 •.•• the approximate $16 million in wages of
these people are currently earning and spending
• • • 3 • • • the taxes being paid on this
$16 million • • • this loss would have to
be made up along with the added tax necessary
t2 keep these people confined • . • 4 • • •
Lthy cost to maintain the families of the
productive wage earners now • • • on
probation and parole.
So all in all we are really dealing with
staggering added costs if we were to consider
abandoning our program in favor of a program
which substituted institutionalization for
adequate probation and parole services.
And none of this reckons with the human
values involved, the effect on people of the
grinding routine and monotony of institution
life, particularly if the institution
program and staff are such that people are not
kept constructively occupied with programs
intelligently designed to retrain, re-educate,
reform, and return to useful living.
For these reasons Wisconsin does not feel
it can afford what on the surface might seem
to be a cheaper operation, but which would
actually be substantially more expensive. The
state does not want and cannot afford institutions
and institutional programs which do not do anything
· to rehabilitate, which do nothing to improve an
offender during his period of institutionalization.
We do not want people released on parole or by
discharge who are not ready for release.
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Difficulty in Measuring Success of Sentencing Practices and Institutional
Programs
Most correctional authorities agree that a program such
as Wisconsin's (described above) represents the most successful
approach as yet developed to sentencing, incarceration, and release.
Yet it is extremely difficult, even for correction officials in
states with such programs, to measure accurately the extent to which
their programs contribute to parole success. This is especially
true when comparisons are attempted. Several reasons why measurement
is difficult were cited in correspondence frf~ correction officials
in California, Wisconsin, and other states.
l) It is difficult to compare present results with results
in the state previous to adoption of the present program.
a)

Few records were kept formerly.

b) Very few offenders were released on parole previously,
and these were the ones most likely to succeed.
c) There have been changes in the nature and type of
crimes and criminals which make comparisons impossible.
2)

It is impossible to compare states because of:

a) differences in use of probation and parole (In
some states parole is not used extensively so that those who are
paroled are more likely to be successful. Use or nonuse of probation
has a great bearing on institutional population. First offenders
who perhaps should have been placed on probation are committed and
then ~roled with better chance for success than a two or three-time
loser.); and
b) regional and local differences in crime rates,
community attitudes, and related factors.
3) It is very difficult to measure parole success or to
determine accurately the reasons therefor.
a) The rate of success depends on how parole success is
defined and the length of time being considered. Should technical
violations be included or just new offenses? Should two, three, or
five years be used, or should the successful completion of parole regardless of length of time - be the criterion?
b) There are so many factors involved in each parole
success, and they vary from case to case, it is hard to tell precisely
which is the most important. Among these are: institutional programs,
time of release, family and community acceptance, employment, parole
supervision, and previous background and record.
19.

These responses were a result of a staff questionnaire sent to
selected states in April, 1960.
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Previous Proposals to Change

the Method of Sentencing in Colorado
1957 Parole Department Proposal
In 1957, legislation suggested by the Adult Parole Department
provided for statutory maximum sentences and no minimum, except that
the court could, if it so desired, set the minimum sentence· however
the minimum could not exceed one-third of the statutory maximum or 16
years, whichever was less. The court was also empowered to reduce a
minimum term at any time before expiration thereof upon the recommendation of the parole board, if the court was satisfied that such reduction
would be in the best interests of the public and the welfare of the
prisoner. This proposed measure made no change in parole board
composition nor did it provide for institutional transfer.
S.B. 188 (1959) and H.B. 42 (1961)

This proposal introduced in two different sessions was far
reaching in scope and would have made a drastic change in sentencing.
Under the provisions of this measure a three-member corrections and
parole authority would be established under civil service. The court
would determine guilt and commit to the authority. The court, if it so
desired, could set a sentence, but such sentence would be purely
advisory.
The parole and corrections authority would determine the
institution in which the offender would be incarcerated (penitentiary,
reformatory, state hospital) and would also have the authority and
responsibility for transferring offenders among the three facilities.
The authority would also have the responsibility for providing
psychiatric services and diagnostic facilities at the three institutions.
Authority members would be required to have a broad background
in and ability for appraisal of law offenders and the circumstances of
the offenses for which convicted
Members selected, insofar as
possible, should have a varied and sympathetic interest in corrections
work, including persons widely experienced in the fields of corrections,
sociology, law, law enforcement, and education.
Previously-sentenced offenders would have the choice of
coming under the jurisdiction of the proposed act or continuing to
serve their sentences under the statutes in effect upon the date of
sentence, with allowances for good behavior.
Discussion of S.B. 188 1959 and H.B. 42 1961). This
proposal wou d have estab ished one day to life sentences in all cases.
The parole and corrections authority would have both parole and admin-

istrative responsibility. The requirement that the authority provide
for both psychiatric services and diagnostic facilities conflicts with
institutional functions and programs and the general authority of the
Department of Institutions. Th;s overlapping could lead to unnecessary
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expense, duplication, and confusion of functions between the proposed
authority and the Department of Institutions, with its divisions of
corrections and psychiatric services.
While the authority would be required to classify each
offender and assign him to an institution, it would be required only to
interview him and study his case some time during the initial six months
of his confinement. The question arises as to what would be the
status and placement of the offender during the period (which might be
as long as six months) before the authority interviews him and reviews
his case. Further, there is no provision for the assistance of
professional personnel on the institutional staffs in making these
determinations.
It would be possible under the terms of the act for one
authority member to interview an offender and make recommendations concerning his status for consideration by the authority sitting en bane.
It would be far better if each authority member could have equal - opportunity to interview offenders and review cases prior _to determining
status or disposition. In addition to the possible overlapping of
functions with the Department of Institutions, the authority would be
given the administrative responsibility for the Adult Parole Division.
This change would increase the administrative confusion. No provision
is made, however, for giving the authority administrative control over
the correctional institutions. So if one purpose of the measure is to
create an independent correctional agency embracing all facets of the
correctional program, it falls short in this respect. Rather the
result would be a considerable amount of administrative confusion. The
authority would not have control of the correctional institutions but
would have the responsibility of establishing and administering certain
programs within the institutions as well as administration of the
Division of Adult Parole.

Three Possible Approaches to Sentencing
in Colorado: Some Implications
Three possible approaches to sentencing in Colorado were
subjected to further examination by the Criminal Code Committee. These
included:
1)

limitation on judicial sentencing discretion accompanied
by broader parole board authority similar to the practice
in California, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin;

2)

the sentencing alternative embodied in the 1958 federal
legislation; and

3)

the method of sentencing outlined in the Model Penal Code.

To determine how these approaches to sentencing might be
adopted in Colorado the following subjects were examined:
1)

administrative changes, staff needs and cost;
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2)

effect on other aspects of the judicial and law
enforcement processes;

3)

broad social implications; and

4)

possible statutory changes.

As a first step in making this analysis, these three
approaches to sentencing were defined more precisely in the form in
which they might be applied in Colorado.
l) Sentence Set by Statute.20
two variations:
a)

This approach was limited to

maximum and minimum sentences would be set by
statute; and

b)

maximum set by statute, court could impose minimum,
not to exceed one-third of the maximum. Good time
allowances would apply only against the maximum
sentence.
The parole board would have the authority to review and release
an offender after half of the minimum sentence is served. Offenders
not paroled prior to the expiration of their maximum sentences less
good time allowance could be released under parole supervision at that
time, such supervision to continue until the date of maximum sentence
expiration. Offenders released on regular parole could be kept under
supervision until expiration of their maximum sentence, unless released
sooner by the parole board.
2) Federal Sentencing Option. In sentencing an offender,
the court could choose among several options:
a) The court could designate the length of sentence within
the maximum prescribed by statute and also the minimum term which
must be served before an offender would become eligible for parole,
which term may be less than but could be no more than one-third
of the maximum sentence imposed.
b) The court could set the maximum sentence as prescribed
by statute, in which even the court could specify that the offender
would become eligible for parole at such time as the parole board
may determine.
c) The court could commit the offender to the custody
of the Department of Institutions for extensive study and evaluation.
Under this alternative, it would be considered that the ma~imum
statutory sentence has been imposed, pending the results of this
study and evaluation which would be furnished to the committing court
within three months, unless the court granted additional time to complete
the study (not to exceed three months). After the court receives the
department's report and recommendations, it could do one of several
things.

20.

Under all three approaches, the court would have the discretionary
authority to place offenders on probation as at present.
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i)

place the offender on probation;

ii)

affirm the maximum sentence already imposed and let the
parole board determine the date of parole eligibility;

iii)

affirm the maximum sentence already imposed and set
a date for parole eligibility which could be less than
but not more than one-third of the maximum; or

iv)

reduce the sentence already imposed and set a date
for parole eligibility which could be less than but not
more than one-third of the maximum.

(In Colorado, another option would be commitment to the
state reformatory, unless the reformatory commitment laws were changed.
The court could commit to the reformatory initially or after diagnosis
and evaluation by the Department of Institutions.)
3) Model Penal Code. All crimes would be divided into
several grades: felonies of the first degree, second degree, and
third degree; misdemeanors; and petty mi5demeanors, The court would
fix the minimum and maximum terms within the l111u.ts specified for the
grade of crimes within which the offense falls. The limits would be
higher for persistent offenders, professional criminals, and dangerous
mentally abnormal persons. The court would be prevented from imposing
what in effect would be a fixed sentence by the requirement that the
minimum could not be more than half of the maximum. The parole board
would determine parole release after the minimum sentence less any
good time allowance has been served.
There would be some limitations on the authority of the court
to impose an extensive consecutive sentence on an offender convicted
of several crimes in a single trial. On the other hand, the court
would have the discretionary authority to alleviate hardship in_a
particular case by entering a judgment of conviction for a lesser
degree of crime than the offense for which found guilty when, in view
of all the circumstances, the punishment would otherwise be too harsb.
Sentences for felony convictions would include, as a separate
portion thereof, an indefinite parole term of one to five years. A
parolee could be discharged from parole by the parole board any time
after one year and before five years.

Possible Costs Involved in Changing the Method of Sentencing
Full-time Parole Board. Many of the states in which
sentencing discretion is vested to a considerable extent in the parole
authority have full-time parole boards, and such boards are generally
recommended by correctional and parole officials. It would appear
that the adoption of either of the first two approaches to sentencing
outlined above would require a full-time professional parole board
in order to be successful. A full-time board would be less necessary
under the method of sentencing which follows the Model Penal Code, because the authority of the parole board would be more limited than in
either of the other two approaches.
-
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Full-time parole boards in other states vary in size from
three to seven members. Qualifications for board members vary, but they
usually include experience and training in one or more of the
following fields:
l}

parole and probation;

2}

law;

3}

law enforcement and/or corrections;

4}

psychology; and

5}

social work.

Colorado's present part-time parole board costs the state
approximately $10,000 per year. A full-time parole board in Colorado
might cost from $68,000 to $90,000 annually, depending on whether it
would be a three or five~member board. This cost estimate is based on
the following:
l}

Parole board members (annual salary, $12,000}
three board members
Administrative secretary
Legal stenographer
Clerk- typist
Supplies, travel expense, etc.

(two additional board members}
Total

$36,000
4,800
4,200
3,300
20,000
$68,300
24,000
$92,300

It might be pos~ible initially for a full-time board to use
the staff of the Adult Parole Division for clerical work, and thus
reduce the annual cost $7,000 to $8,000.
Diagnostic Center. If Colorado adopted the federal sentencing
program, a professionally staffed diagnostic facility would be needed
for offenders who might be referred by the courts for diagnosis and
evaluation. At least 1,200 offenders are sentenced each year to the
reformatory and penitentiary. (In addition, there are a large number
placed on probation, many of whom might be committed by the courts
for evaluation, should such a facility and service be available.}
Even if only 10 per cent of the committed offenders (plus the same
proportion of· potential grobati9ners) were referred f~r evaluation,
at least 180 to 200 violators would be 1nvuiveu, and it is likely
that this estimate is low. Even on the basis of three or four
commitments per week, a facility for 35 to 50 inmates would be needed
if most of them were to be kept for observation and evaluation for
the full 90 days provided in the federal system.

-
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It is very difficult to present even a faiily adequate
estimate of construction and operation costs for such a facility and
program. Many policy questions are involved such as, but not limited
to, the following:
1)

penitentiary?

Should the diagnostic facility be located near the

2) Should the penitentiary be responsible for overall administration and correctional services?
3) Should the reformatory and penitentiary be permitted
to send offenders already incarcerated to the center for evaluation
and study upon approval of the director of institutions, or should
the facility be limited to court referrals?

4) Should the center be operated in conjunction with a
facility for the criminally insane?

If the answers to the first two question~ are in the affirmative,
the costs would be considerably less, because it would be extremely
expensive to staff a small facility with a sufficient number of
correctional officers in addition to professional, clerical, and
maintenance personnel. Professional staff is very expensive and
extremely difficult to recruit; thus, it would appear more feasible
to share professional personnel, insofar as possible. This could be
accomplished by having such a diagnostic center attached either to the
penitentiary or to a special facility for the criminally insane,
although separated from it.
If the reformatory and penitentiary are allowed to send
inmates to the diagnostic facility for evaluation and study, it would
more than likely increase the size facility needed and perhaps the
number of professional staff members. On the other hand, it might be
quite shortsighted to have such a facility and not to ~se it as needed
as an ~djunct to the institutional rehabilitation program.
From the few examples cited above it can be seen that a
change in sentencing involves much more than statutory revision
or policy decisions which relate only to sentencing. These broader
implications should be considered: 1) in order to decide whether Colorado
should follow the federal system; 2) in order to present the General
Assembly with a comprehensive picture of the factors and costs involved
in adopting such an approach; and 3) in order to avoid potential·
difficulties through careful planning.
Cost estimates, as indicated above, are almost impossible
to make without basic policy decisions; however, construction might
cost at least $500,000, depending on whether inmate labor is used.
It would cost approximately $26,000 annually to employ a psychiatric
team (p~ychiatrist,clinic~l psychologist, and psyc~iatric social
worker) based on present civil service salary levels. It is doubtful
whether one team would be adequate, but the number of additional
professional employees needed would depend on whether professional
staff is to be shared and what the function of the diagnostic
center would include.
-
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Additional Institutional Staff. Under two of the three
sentencing approaches {excluding the Model Penal Code), it is likely
that additional professional staff would be required at the penitentiary
and reformatory within a short period of time, if not initia1ly.
These professional employees (psychologists, counselors, social
workers) would be necessary ·if the experience of other states
is indicative (Wisconsin,fo~ example), to. provide the full-time parole
board with information, analyses, and evaluations which it would
require as reference material in reviewing cases and making parole
determination.
Again it is difficult to make an accurate cost estimate,
but such additional personnel to the two institutions whether employed
by the institution or the Adult fiarole Division could easily cost
from $50,000 to $100,000 per year.
Summary. The cost estimates and related material presented
in this section indicate some pos~ible impacts of sentencing changes upon
institutional facilities, staffs, and programs. These are not all the
factors and costs involved, nor are the cost estimates to be considered
accurate; and further study is needed.
Broader Implications of Sentencing Changes
Judicial Functions. Under the first two suggested
approaches to sentencing, Judicial discretion would be limited. In
the first·proposal, judges would have the responsibility only to
determin~ guilt, sentence would be according to statute (although as
an alternative it is suggested that there might be a judicially
imposed minimum not to exceed one-third of the maximum). If changes
in sentencing followed the federal system, judges would. have more
assistance and options in the disposition of offenders, but they would
also be subject to certain limitations with respect to the imposition
of a minimum sentence. The method of sentencing embodied in the Model
Penal Code would leave the judge considerable latitude, but not as
much as at present, because statutory maxima and minima would not
only be determined by the type of crime but also by the severity of
the offense. Further, the court could not impose a minimum that
is more than one-half the maximum.
A comprehensive survey of the attitudes of district judges
towards sentencing and possible changes was made by the Legislative
Council Administration of Justice Committee, which discussed this
topic at its regional meetings. In its report to the General
Assembly, the Administration of Justice Committee summarized the
sentencing discussions at the regional meetings as follows:21
Two-thirds of the 27 district judges with
whom sentencing was discussed at the committee's regional meetings favored a change
in the method of sentencing. The other nine
21.

Judicial Administration in Colorado, Research Publication no. 49,
Colorado Legislative Council, 1960, p. 139.
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judges advocated retention of the present
judicial sentencing authority. Most of the judges
favoring change felt that the California
system had merit and recommended that the
maximum and minimum sentences be set by statute,
with the courts' function confined to a
determination of guilt. One district
judge advocated one day to life sentences in
all felonies, with the parole board to
determine release within this range. Another
district judge felt that the parole board
should be given the discretionary authority
to determine release at any time after six
months had been served. These judges were
unanimous in the opinion that a qualified
full-time parole board would be necessary to
make such a change in sentencing procedures
successful. Fixed statutory sentences were
favored rather than open-ended sentences to
limit the effect of arbitrary parole board
action, which might result in incarceration
of unjust length.
Several reasons were given by the district
judges in favor of adopting a system of statutory
sentencing. Some judges said that it is not
possible to determine at the time sentence is
imposed what the offender's possibility for
rehabilitation might be five to 10 years in the
future. It was pointed out that legal training
does not give judges special competence to
determine what to do with a man after he has been
found guilty. Even recognizing differences between
individual ca~es, several judges felt that
there was inequality in the imposition of
sentences and that the proposed change would
provide more opportunity for release on the
basis of an offender's prospects for a
successful return to society.
The judges who opposed a change in the method
of sentencing pointed out that the sentencing
judge is much more acquainted with the case
and the offender than any board would be after
reviewing the record and interviewing the
offender months or years after the crime had
been committed. In imposing sentence, these
judges said they took into consideration the
crime and extenuating circumstances as well as
the information developed through the presentence investigation.
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Attorneys and other judges with whom the committee discussed sentencing at the regional
meetings were also divided two to one on this
question; the reasons advanced for both positions
were very similar to those of the district judges.
Law Enforcement Officials. A change in sentencing which
would limit the courts' discretion might be looked upon by law
enforcement officers, especially district attorneys, as hampering
their efforts because, with fixed maxima and minima, elimination of
good time, and the placement of prison release determination in the
parole board, there is no way in which a lighter sentence can be
guaranteed to an offender for cooperation. The best that could be
promised is that a report on the offender's cooperation would be
included in tne material reviewed by the parole board and a
recommendation made for a snort minimum sentence bef or~ parole
eligibility.
That the possibility of such opposition to a change in
sentencing by law enforcement officials is not farfetched is
demonstrated by what happened in the state of Washington when the
statutory sentencing system was adopted in· 1934. For several years
district attorneys and sheriffs opposed the system and the parole
board. The crux of the opposition can be found in two questions
raised by the Washington State Association of Prosecuting Attorneys
in a meeting with the state parole board. "Why do the se nte nee s
you set vary so much from what we r~sommended?" "Why doesn't the
Board back our deals with inmates?"
After numerous conferences and
years of experience working with the new sentencing system, it became
generally accepted by law enforcement officers and prosecuting
attorneys, many of whom decided that the board knew more about the
offenders than they did and also asked how they could assist the
board by prepar1:§lg better statements of the crimes ·and their
investigations.
The foregoing comments are not intended as criticism of
prosecuting attorneys or law enforcement officers. Rather, its
purpose is to show the need for cooperation and the problems which
can result from the lack of communication. It is understandable that
law enforcement officials might become upset if they feel that their
efforts are being hampered because of restrictions placed upon them
through the adoption of a sentencing system which, unless explained,
is perceived as a means of rapidly returning dangerous offenders to
society.
Changes in Society's Approach to Crime. The first two
sentencing alternatives would give more legal sanction to the current
trend in the handling of criminals away from retribution, punishment,
and deterrence and toward emphasis on society's protection and
rehabilitation efforts. On the surface this may appear as a "get
soft" approach. Those who support this shift in emphasis argue that
22.
23.

Law and Contemporary Problems, "Sentencing by ~n Administrative
Board," Vol. XXIII, No. 3, Normans. Hayner, Duke University School
of Law,p. 481.
Ibig.
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the contrary is true because: 1) Release of an offender at the time
he appears to be best able to return to society successfully protects
society far more than if the is released after serving the required
amount of time, regardless of his chances to be a good citizen.
2) Parole supervision protects society and helps the offender to keep
from backsliding; release without supervision is far more dangerous.
3) If an offender has an incentive, he is more likely to try to face
reality and the real causes of his problems; such incentive is provided
if an offender knows the time of his release depends to a great
extent upon himself. There is little motivation if he knows he has to
serve a certain length of time anyway. 4) Focusing more attention
on the offender rather than concentrating on the crime committed makes
it possible to release offenders at the time they are considered
ready to be returned to society and to hold dangerous offenders as
long as the law will allow.
The problem, therefore, is not one only of equalizing
sentences for like crimes (although disparity has been demonstrated
by penitentiary statistics) but also to provide a sentence tailored
to a particular offender to the extent that through his own efforts
(with assistance) he can be released sooner if it is determined to be
safe to do so and can be held for the maximum period if it is in
society's best interest.
Both the California-Wisconsin-Washington method of
sentencing and the federal system are in line with this approach.
Equalization of sentences for like crimes is recognized bY imposition
of statutory maxima and by either statutory minima or limitations
on the length ot minimum sentence which may be judicially imposed.
(The court may request diagnostic assistance under the federal system
in considering carefully what is best for the offender and for society.)
Within these sentence limitations, there is no automatic formula to
guarantee the date of release, it is dependent upon the offender and an
evaluation of his chances of becoming a useful citizen.
The same remarks apply, but to a lesser extent, with
respect to the method of sentencing embodied in the Model Penal Code,
because the Model Penal Code places much more emphasis on the
severity of the crime in establishing maximum and minimum sentences,
provides for good time allowances, and allows the court to set both a
minimum and a maximum sentence, although the minimum cannot exceed
one-half the maximum.
Complexity of Problem
The subject of sentencing is an extremely complex one,
expecially when considered within the context of the total correctional
process. Consequently, the following questions should be considered
in reaching a decision on changes in present sentencing procedures:
l) What should be the basic approach to sentencing?
Assuming that protection of society is the major objective, how may
this best be achieved? Should the underlying philosophy (in addition
to society's protection) be rehabilitation, punishment, or retribution?
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How can these different approaches to sentencing be reconciled? Does
sentencing serve as a deterrent? If so, to what extent, and should
this be a prime consideration?
2) What should be the extent of judicial authority in
setting sentences? Should courts be limited to a finding of guilt?
Should sentences be set by statute? If so, should this apply to both
maxima and minima, or just one end of the sentence (which one)?
Should it be possible to release an offender before comP.Jetion of _his
minimum; on what basis and under what circumstances? If continuation
of judicial sentencing authority (at least to a limited extent) is
desirable, what would be a satisfactory combination of judicial and
board sentencing authority, not only with respect to the role of each,
but also in relationship to the basic approach to sentencing?
Are the offender's rights safeguarded under the methods of sentencing
being considered?
3) If greater responsibility is given to the parole board,
what should be the composition of the board (number, qualifications,
method of appointment, civil service), and should it serve on a fulltime basis?
4) What should be the relationship between the board and
the institutions (as to scope of authority, division of responsibilities, supervision)? Specifically, should the board play any role
or Dave any responsibility in initial classification, assignment,
placement, and transfer of offenders? If so, to what extent?
·5) To what extent should present institutional programs
be augme~ted or changed if the method of sentencing is changed? What
do the institutions now have in the way of professional personnel and
rehabilitation programs? What is needed and how far reaching should
changes be? What should be done if no changes are contemplated in
institutional programs?
6) Are the present statutory penalties for crimes satisfactory? If not, which ones should be changed? How should statutory
good time provisions be handled? What provision should be made for
offenders already committed?
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LICENSING AND REGULATION OF BAIL BONDSMEN
There are no prov1s1ons in the Colorado statutes regulating
bail bondsmen or prescribing the terms and conditions for the issuance
of bail bonds. Members of the iudiciary, the bar, and the press, as
well as the general public, have· been concerned over this lack of
regulation, primarily because of happenings in the Denver metropolitan
area in recent months.
Although there is presently more general concern, the lack
of regulation and control of bail bondsmen has been recognized as a
serious problem by judges and attorneys for a number of years. At
the March 18, 1960, Denver regional meeting of the Legislative Council
Administration of Justice Committee, the following allegations were
made about bail bondsmen:
1)

Many ex-convicts are in the bail bond business.

2)

Fees charged by many bail bondsmen are exorbitant.

3) It is not uncommon for a bondsman to request the court
to terminate bond after the fee has been paid on the grounds that the
alleged violator was a poor risk, even though this is not the case.
4) There is no way to prohibit possible'agreements between
bail bondsmen and attorneys.l

Regulatory Legislation in Selected States
The statutory regulation of bail bondsmen was surveyed in
seven states known to have such legislation as a guide to possible
legislative action in Colorado. These states included: Arizona,
Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New
York. A summary analysis of the bail bondsmen regulatory legislation
of each of these states is presented below.
Arizona
Arizona requires only that each professional bondsman (other
than a surety company) be registered with the clerk of the superior
court.
Connecticut
This act requires that each professional bondsman be licensed
by the state and includes other regulations.
Bondsmen Licensed. Any person who makes bail in five or more
criminal cases, whether for compensation or not, must be licensed.
l.

Judicial Administration In Colorado, Colorado Legislative Council,
Research Publication No. 49, December 1960, p. 1~4.
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Licensing Authority. The state police commissioner is charged
with the licensing and regulation of professional bondsmen.
Qualifications. Each applicant must make a sworn statement
which contains the following:
a list of assets and liabilities
applicant's fingerprints and photo
proof of sound moral character
proof of financial responsibility
statement that applicant has never been
convicted of a felony
The commissioner may deny or suspend a license if any of the
above are not truthfully provided.
License Fee.

The license fee is $100.

$5 fee; $100 to
Maximum Bond Fees. First $100 of bond
$5,000 -- five per cent of bond amount; over $5,000
2.5 per cent of
bond amount.
Annual Report. Each bondsman must submit an annual report
to the commission showing: 1) the number of bonds handled; 2) amount
of bonds; and 3) the fees charged.
Penalty. For violation of any of the above laws, sentence
may be $1~000 fine and/or two years in jail.
Florida
Florida's legislation is quite detailed and comprehensive
and also covers runners (who are leg men for professional bondsmen).
Bondsmen Licensed.
bondsmen, and runners.

The state licenses sureties, bail

Licensing Authority. The state treasurer is the designated
insurance commissioner and enforces the law regulating bondsmen and
runners.
Qualifications for Bondsmen. Each applicant for a license
must take an examination administered by the commissioner of insurance.
In addition, he must show the following qualifications:

~~
f)

21 years of age
citizen and resident for six months
experience in bonding business by previous employment or completion of correspondence course
high moral character
a detailed financial report
the rating plan the applicant will use (bond fees)

License Fee.

The license fee in Florida is $10.
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Annual Report.

Once a year the professional bondsman must

file a statement of his assets and liabilities and must list every
bond forfeiture.
Penalty. Any violation of law may be punished by $500 fine
and/or six months in jail.
Other. Several specific prohibitions are made in the law
pertaining to the conduct of bondsmen, including:
a)

Bondsmen may not advise employment of a
particular attorney.
Bondsmen may not solicit business in court.
Bondsmen may not pay any fee to a jailer,
attorney, policeman or public official.
No bond agency may hold itself out as a surety
company.

Indiana
Indiana has the most recent and most comprehensive legislation
among the states surveyed.
Bondsmen Licensed. No person shall act in the capacity of
bail bondsman or runner or perform any of the functions, duties or
powers prescribed for bail bondsmen or runners under the provisions of
this act unless that person shall be qualified and licensed as provided.
None of the provisions of the act shall prohibit any person or persons
from pledging security for a bail bond if such person or persons are
neither promised nor receive money or anything of value therefor.

a

Licensing Authority. The state insurance commissioner is
charged with the authority and responsibility for the licensing and
regulation of bail bondsmen and runners.
Qualifications for Bondsmen. The commissioner of insurance
may require from an applicant information concerning his qualifications,
residence, prospective place of business, and any other matters which
the commissioner deems necessary or expedient to protect the public
and ascertain the qualifications of the applicant. The commissioner
may also conduct any reasonable inquiry or investigation to determine
the applicant's fitness to be licensed or have his license renewed.
A deposit of from $10,000 to $25,000 as determined by the commissioner
is required before any licensed bondsman may write cash or security
bail bonds.
is $10.

License Fee.

The annual license fee (including renewals)

Annual Report. An annual detailed financial statement must
be filed under oath, and such statement shall be subject to the same
examination as is prescribed by law for domestic insurance companies.
On or before August 15 of each year, each bondsman must file a sworn
statement listing every bond forfeiture, amount of forfeiture and name
of court where the forfeiture is recorded, and the date of payment.
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Penalty. Violation of any prov1s1ons of the act is punishable
by a fine of not more than $500 or six months in jail or both.
Other. Several specific prohibitions are made in the law
pertaining to the conduct of bondsmen including:

a)
b)

C)
d)

e)
f)

g)

suggest or advise the employment of or name
for employment any particular attorney to
represent his principal;
pay a fee or rebate or give or promise anything
of value to a jailer, policeman, peace officer,
committing magistrate or any other person who
has the power to arrest or hold in custody, or
to a public official or employee in order to
secure a settlement, reduction, remission, or
compromise in the amount of any bail bond or
the forfeiture thereof;
pay a fee or rebate or give anything of value
to an attorney in bail bond matters, except
in defense of any action on a bond;
pay a fee or rebate or give or promise anything
of value to the principal or anyone in his
behalf;
participate in the capacity of an attorney at
a trial or hearing of one on whose bond he is
surety;
accept anything of value from a principal except
the premium, provided that he may be permitted
to accept collateral security or other indemnity
from the principal which shall be returned upon
final termination of liability on the bond; and
solicit business in or about any place where
prisoners are confined.

Massachusetts
Bondsmen are required to register but are subject to very
few regulations; they are regulated by the local courts.
Bondsmen Registered. All bondsmen, other than surety
companies, who make bond on five or more occasions must be registered.
Registering Authority. Each bondsman must register with and
be approved by the superior court (similar to Colorado's county court)
and be subject to the rules of the court.
Monthly Report. A 1959 amendment to the Massachusetts law
requires each bondsman to submit a monthly report to the chief judge
of each superior court showing the bail or surety, defendant's name,
offense charged, and fee charged on each case bonded for that month.
Penalty.

Any violation of Massachusetts law is subject to

$1,000 fine and/or one year in jail.
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New Hampshire
The law requires registration of all bondsmen and makes them
subject to limitations on the fees that may be charged.
Bondsmen Registered, All professional bondsmen who receive
compensation for making bail must register.
Registering Authority. The clerk of the superior court
registers and administers an oath of financial responsibility to each
bondsman.
Registration Fee.

The clerk of each superior court sets the

fee.
Maximum Fees. Professional bondsmen are prohibited from
charging more than five per cent of the amount of bail and in no instance
can charge more than $100 for a bond.
Penalty. Failure to comply with any of the above requirements
may result in a $100 fine or 30 days in jail.
New York
bondsmen.

New York has a rather rigid set of license requirements for

Bondsmen Licensed. Any person other than a surety company
who makes bond on more than two occasions within a two-month period
must be licensed.
Licensing Authority. The superintendent of insurance licenses
and regulates all professional bail bondsmen.
Qualifications. Each applicant must submit to a written
examination over any phase of the bonding business administered by the
superintendent of insurance. In addition, each applicant must show
proof of good character and reputation.
Qualification Bond. Each applicant must post a $5,000 bond
in order to do business in New York State.
License Fee. Examination fee of $5 and a license fee of
$25 is charged to applicants.
Other. The superintendent of insurance may suspend or revoke
such licenses for any "fraudulent or dishonest conduct" after due
notice and opportunity for hearing is given the licensee.

- 41 -

Suggested Legislation for Colorado
Proposed legislation for the regulation of professional bail
bondsmen in Colorado has been studied and considered favorably by the
Legislative Council Criminal Code Committee.
Analysis of Proposed Legislation
Following is an analysis of the major provisions of the
proposed legislation to regulate bail bondsmen and their key employees.
Licensing is limited to those bondsmen who operate in counties with
50,000 population or more because of the consensus of opinion that the
problem is confined primarily to metropolitan areas.
Professional Bondsmen, Solicitors, and Runners. Professional
bondsmen, soliciting agents, and runners, as defined in the act, would
be licensed. A professional bondsman is defined as any person who
shall furnish bail, whether for compensation or otherwise, in five or
more criminal cases per year in any court in counties having a
population of 50,000 or more, or any person who furnishes such bail
in criminal cases in any two or more counties, _one of which has a
population of 50,000 or more. A soliciting agent is defined as any
person who as an employee of a professional bondsman or as an independent
contractor shall solicit, advertise, or actively seek bail bond business
for· or in behalf of a professional bondsman. A runner is defined as
a person employed'by a professional bondsman to assist him: 1) in
presenting the defendant in court when required; 2) in the apprehension
and surrender of the~defendant to the court; or 3) in keeping the
defendant under necessary surveillance. Insurers as defined in the act
are exempt from this provision.
License Fee. The annual fee for a professional bail bondsman's
license would be $100. The annual license fee for soliciting agents
and runners would be $10.
Responsible Agency. The department of insurance is vested
with the authority and responsibility of licensing and regulation of
bail bondsmen, soliciting agents, and runners.
License Application and Requirements
A license applicant (whether for bondsman, soliciting agent,
or runner) must provide the following information on forms provided by
the insurance department: 1) full name, age, residence during previous
12 months, occupation and business address; 2) complete financial
statement; 3) whether he has ever been convicted of a felony or a
crime involving moral turpitude; 4) a set of fingerprints certified
by a law enforcement official .and a full face photograph; 5) evidence
of good moral character; and 6) such other information as the department may require. Each professional bondsman would be required to
post a qualification bond of $5,000 if he furnishes bail in less than
50 criminal cases. If he furnishes bail in more than 50 criminal
cases, the amount of the qualification bond would be $10,000.
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Reports. Each professional bondsman licensed under the
proposed act would be required to file a report under oath semi-annually
with the insurance department. These reports would be filed prior to
January 31 and July 31 of each year and would include: 1) the names
of the persons for whom the bondsman has become surety; 2) the dates
and amounts of the bonds issued and the courts in which such bonds were
posted; 3) the fee charged for each bond; 4) the amount of collateral
or security received from insured principals or persons acting in their
behalf; and 5) financial statements, other business activities, names
and addresses of soliciting agents and runners if any employed, and
any other information required by the department.
Restrictions on Licensing. No firm, partnership, association,
or corporation, as such, would be licensed. Licenses would also be
denied to: 1) any person convicted of a felony or any crime involving
moral turpitude; 2) any person not a resident of the state; 3) any
person under age of 21; and 4) any person engaged as a law enforcement
or judicial official.
License Denial, Suspension, and Revocation, If the department denies, suspends, revokes or refuses to renew any license, the
aggrieved person would be given the opportunity for a hearing subjec
to judicial review as provided in the administrative procedures act.

1

The insurance department would have the authority to deny,
suspend, revoke or refuse to renew a license for-a bondsman, soliciting
agent, or runner for the following reasons:
1) any cause for which the issuance of the license could
have been refused had it then existed and been known to the department;
2) failure to pose a qualified bond in the required amount
with the department during the period such person is engaged in the
business within this state, or if such bond has been posted, the
forfeiture or cancellation of such bond;
3) material misstatement, misrepresentation, or fraud in
obtaining the license;
4) misappropriation, conversion, or unlawful withholding of
moneys belonging to insured principals or others;
5) fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of the
business under the license;
6) willful failure to comply with, or willful violation of
any provisions of the act or of any proper order, rule, or regulation
of the department or any court;
7)

any activity prohibited in the act; and

8) default in payment to the court, should any bond issued
by such bondsman be forfeited by order of the court.
2.

Article 16, Chapter 3, Colorado Revised Statutes 1953 (1960 Perm.
Supp. ).
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Prohibited Activities and Penalties, It would be illegal for
any licensee to engage in any of the following activities:
1) specify, suggest, or advise the employment of any
particular attorney to represent his principal;
2) pay a fee or rebate, or to give or promise to give
anything of value to any law enforcement or judicial officer or employee;
3) pay a fee or rebate or to give anything of value to an
attorney in bail bond matters, except in defense of any action on a
bond, or as counsel to represent such bondsman, his agent, or employees;
4) pay a fee or rebate, or to give or promise to give
anything of value to the person on whose bond he is surety;
5) accept anything of value from a person on whose bond
he is surety, or from others on behalf of such person, except the fee
or premium on the bond, but the bondsman may accept collateral
security;

6) ,coerce, suggest, aid and abet, offer promise of favor,
or threaten any person on whose bond he is surety or offers to become
surety, to induce that person to commit any crime; and
7)

Colorado.

secure any bond with real property located outside of

·A licensee convicted of any of the activities listed above
would be ~uilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not more than
$1,000 or a jail sentence of not more than one year or both. Any person
who attempts or who acts as a professional bail bondsman, soliciting
agent, or runner and who is not licensed would be subject to the same
fine and imprisonment.
Text of Proposed Legislation
BILL NO.

BY

A BILL FOR AN ACT
RELATING TO BAIL, BAIL BONDS, AND BAIL BONDSMEN.
B.a.

ll Enacted b:t.

~

SECTION 1.

General Assembly Qf. 1.h..e. State Qf. Colorado:
Chapter 72, Colorado Revised Statutes 1953, as

amended, is hereby amended by the addition of the following NEW ARTICLE:
ARTICLE 22
Bail Bondsmen
72-22-1.

Definitions.

The following terms when used in this

article shall have the following meanings:
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(1)

"Department" shall mean the department of insurance.

( 2)

"Commissioner" sha 11 mean the commissioner of insura nee.

(3)

"Insurer" shall mean any domestic or foreign corporation,

association, partnership, or individual engaged in the business of
insurance or suretyship which has qualified to transact surety or
casualty business in this state.
(4)

"Professional bondsman" shall mean any person who shall

furnish bail, whether for compensation or otherwise, in five or more
criminal cases in any court or courts in any county having a population
of fifty thousand or more, as determined by the latest decennial federal
census,· during any one calendar year; or any person who furnishes such
bail in criminal cases in any two or more counties, one of which
has a population of fifty thousand or more.
(5)

"Soliciting agent" shall mean any person who, as an

agent or employee of a professional bondsman, or as an independent
contractor, for compensation or otherwise, shall solicit, advertise,
or actively seek bail bond business for or in behalf of a professional
bondsman.
(6)

"Runner" shall mean a person employed by a professional

bondsman for the purpose of assisting the professional bondsman in
presenting the defendant in court when required, or to assist in the
apprehending and surrender of the defendant to the court, or in
keeping the defendant under necessary surveillance.

Nothing herein

shall affect the right of professional bondsmen to have counsel or to
ask assistance of law enforcement officers.
(7)

"Obligor" shall mean any person, assoc1'at1·on , partnersh1°p ,

or corporation who shall execute a bail bond either as principal or
surety.
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72-22-2.

License reguired - enforcement.

(1) No person

shall act in the capacity of professional bondsman, soliciting agent,
or runner, as defined in 72-22-1, or perform any of the functions,
duties, or powers of the same unless that person shall be qualified
and licensed as provided in this article; provided that the terms of
this article shall not apply to insurers regulated under article 3,
chapter 72, Colorado Revised Statutes 1953, as amended.

Any person

other than a professional bondsman as defined herein may furnish such
bail as may be approved by the judge.
(2)

No license shall be issued except in compliance with

this article and none shall be issued except to an individual.

No

firm, partnership, association, or corporation, as such, shall be so
licensed.

No person who has been convicted of a felony or any crime

involving moral turpitude, or who is not a resident of this state, or
who is under twenty-one years of age shall be issued a license hereunder.

No person engaged as a law enforcement or judicial official

shall be licensed hereunder.
(3)

The department is vested with the authority to enforce

the provisions of this article.

The department shall have authority

, to make investigations and promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary for the enforcement of this article.
(4)

Each license issued hereunder shall expire annually on

January 31, unless revoked or suspended prior thereto by the department, or upon notice served upon the commissioner by the insurer or
the employer or user of any soliciting agent or runner that such insurer,
employer, or user has cancelled the licensee's authority to act for
or in behalf of such insurer, employer, or user.
(5)

The department shall prepare and deliver to each

licensee a pocket card showing the name, address, and classification
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of such licensee and shall certify that such person is a licensed
professional bondsman, soliciting agent, or runner.
72-22-3.
bond - forfeiture.

License requirements - application - qualification
(l}

Any person desiring to engage in the business

of professional bondsman, soliciting agent, or runner in this state
shall apply to the department for a license on forms prepared and
furnished by the department.

Such application for a license, or renewal

thereof, shall set forth, ~nder oath, the following information:
(a}

Full name, age, residence during the previous twelve

months, occupation, and business address of the applicant.
(b}

Complete financial statement.

(c}

Whether the applicant has ever been convicted of a

felony or a crime involving moral .turpitude.
(d}

Such other information, including, but not limited to, a

complet~ set of fingerprints certified to by an authorized law
enforcement official and a full face photograph, as may be required
by this article or by the department.
(e}

In the case of a professional bondsman, a statement

that he will actively engage in the bail bond business.
(f}

In the case of a soliciting agent or a runner, a

statement that he will be employed or used by only one professional
bondsman and that such professional bondsman will supervise his work
and be responsible for his conduct in his work.

Such professional

bondsman shall sign the application of each soliciting agent and
runner employed or used by him.
(2)

Each applicant shall satisfy the department of his good

moral character by furnishing references thereof.
(3)

Each applicant for professional bondsman shall be

required to post a qualification bond in the amount of five thousand
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dollars with the department, provided that any such professional
bondsman making application for license renewal, as herein provided,
who shall have furnished bail in fifty or more criminal cases shall
post such bond in the amount of ten thousand dollars.

The qualifi-

cation bond shall meet such specifications as may be required and
approved by the department.

Such bond shall be conditioned upon the

full and prompt payment on any bail bond issued by such professional
bondsman into the court ordering such bond forfeited.

The bond shall

be to the state of Colorado in favor of any court of this state,
whether municipal, justice of the peace, county, superior, district,
or other court.

In the event that any bond issued by a professional

bondsman is declared forfeited by a court of proper jurisdiction, and
the amount of the bond is not paid within a reasonable time, to be
determined by the court, but in no event to exceed ninety days, such
court shall order the department to declare the qualification bond of
such professional bondsman to be forfeited.

The department shall then

order the surety on the qualification bond to deposit with the court
an amount equal to the amount of the bond issued by such professional
bondsman and declared forfeited by the court, or the amount of the
qualification bond, whichever is the smaller amount.

The department

shall suspend the license of such professional bondsman until such
time as another qualification bond in the required amount is posted with
the department.

The suspension of the license of the professional

bondsman shall also suspend the license of each soliciting agent and
runner employed or used by such professional bondsman.
(4)

The department shall, upon receipt of the license

application, the required fee, and proof of good moral character, and,
in the case of a professional bondsman, an approved qualification
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bond in the required amount, issue to the applicant a license to do
business as a professional bondsman, soliciting agent, or runner, as
the case may be.
(5)

No licensed professional bondsman shall have in his

employ in the bail bond business any person who could not qualify for
a license under this article, nor shall any licensed professional
bondsman have as a partner or associate in such business any person
who could not so qualify.
72-22-4.

License fees.

Each license application and

application for license renewal to engage in the business of
professional bondsman shall be accompanied by a fee of one hundred
dollars.

Each license application and application for license renewal

to engage in the business of soliciting agent or runner shall be
accompanied by a fee of ten dollars.
72-22-5.

Semi-annual reports required.

Beginning January

31, 1964, each professional bondsman licensed under the provisions of
this article shall, under oath, report semi-annually to the department
on forms prescribed by the department.

The reports shall be made

prior to January 31 and July 31 of each year and shall contain the
following detailed information for the preceding calendar year:

(1)

The names of the persons for whom such professional

bondsman has become surety.
(2)

The date and amount of the bonds issued by such bondsman,

and the court or courts in which such bonds were posted.
(3)

The fee for each bond charged by such professional

(4)

The amount of collateral or security received from

bondsman.

insured principals or persons acting on behalf of such principals by
such professional bondsman on each bond.
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(5)

Such further information as the department may require,

including, but not limited to, residence and business addresses,
financial statements, other business activities, and the name and
address of each soliciting agent and runner, if any, employed or usedby such professional bondsman.
72-22-6.

Denial, suspension, revocation, and refusal to

renew license - hearing.

(1)

The department may deny, suspend, revoke,

or refuse to renew, as may be appropriate, the license of any person
engaged in the business of professional bondsman, soliciting agent,
or runner for any of the following reasons:
(a)

Any cause for which the issuance of the license could

have been refused had it then existed and been known to the department.
(b)

Failure to pose a qualified bond in the required amount

with the department during the period such person is engaged in the
business within this state, or, if such bond has been posted, the
forfeiture or cancellation of such bond.
(c)

Material misstatement, misrepresentation, or fraud in

obtaining the license.
(d)

Misappropriation, conversion, or unlawful withholding

of moneys belonging to insured principals or others and received in
the conduct of business under the license.
(e)

Fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of

the business under the license.
(f)

Willful failure to comply with, or willful violation of

any provisions of this article or of any proper order, rule, or
regulation of the department or any court of this state.
(g)

Any activity prohibited in 72-22-9 (1).

(h)

Default in payment to the court should any bond issued

by such bondsman be forfeited by order of the court.
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(2)

If the department shall deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse

to renew any such license, the aggrieved person shall be given an
opportunity for a hearing subject to judicial review as provided in
article 16, chapter 3, Colorado Revised Statutes 1953 (1960 Perm.
Supp.).
72-22-7.

Notice to courts - to the department.

(1) The

department shall furnish to all courts in this state the names of
all professional bondsmen licensed under the provisions of this article,
and shall forthwith notify such courts of the suspension, revocation,
or reinstatement of any bondsman's license to engage in such business.
No court shall accept bond from a professional bondsman unless such
bondsman is licensed under the provisions of this article and unless
such bondsman shall exhibit to such court a valid pocket card or license
issued by the department and the license of such bondsman shall not have
been suspended or revoked.
(2)

The clerk of each court of this state shall report to

the commissioner prior to January 31 and July 31 of each year the
name of each bondsman furnishing bail in such court and the number
of bonds posted and outstanding by each such bondsman.
72-22-8.

Maximum commission or fee.

No professional

bondsman shall charge for his premium, commission, or fee an amount
more than ten per cent of the amount of bail furnished by him.
72-22-9.

Prohibited activities - penalties.

(1) It shall

be unlawful for any licensee hereunder to engage in any of the
following activities:
(a)

Specify, suggest, or advise the employment of any

pdrticular attorney to represent his principal.
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{b)

Pay a fee or rebate, or to give or promise to give

anything of value to a jailer, policeman, peace officer, clerk, deputy
clerk, any other employee of any court, district attorney or any of
his employees, or any person who has power to arrest or to hold any
person in custody.
{c)

Pay a fee or rebate or to give anything of value to an

attorney in bail bond matters, except in defense of any action on a
bond, or as counsel to represent such bondsman, ·his agent, or employees.
(d}

Pay a fee or rebate, or to give or promise to give

anything of value to the person on whose bond he is surety.
(e)

Accept anything of value from a person on whose bond he

is surety, or from others on behalf of such person, except the fee or
premium on the bond, but the bondsman may accept collateral security
or other indemnity.
(f)

Coerce, suggest, aid and abet, offer promise of favor,

or threaten any person on whose bond he is surety or offers to become
surety, to induce that person to commit any crime.
(g}

Secure any bond with real property located outside this

(2)

Any licensee who violates any provision of subsection

state.

(1) of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon
conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not more than one thousand
dollars, imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year,
or both such fine and imprisonment.
(3)

Any person who acts or attempts to act as a professional

bondsman, soliciting agent, or runner as defined in this article and
who is not licensed as such under this article shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not
more than one thousand dollars, imprisonment in the county jail for
not more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment.
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72-22-10.

Penalty for violation of bond conditions.

Any

person charged with a criminal violation who has obtained, his release
from custody by having a professional bondsman, surety company, or
person other than himself furnish his bail bond, and who fails to
appear in court at the time and place ordered by the court, with intent
to avoid prosecution and trial shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and,
upon conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not more than one
thousand dollars, imprisonment in the county jail for not more than
one year, or both such fine and imprisonment.
72-22-11.

(l)(a)

Forfeiture - exoneration - continuance of bonds.

If there is a breach of condition of a bond, the court shall

declare a forfeiture of the bail.
(b)

The court may direct that a forfeiture be set aside,

upon such conditions as the court may impose, if it appears that
justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture.
(c)

By entering into a bond the obligor submits to the

jurisdiction of the court.

His liability may be enforced without the

necessity of an independent action when a forfeiture. has not been set
aside.

The court shall order the issuance of a citation directed to

the obligor to show cause, if any there be, why judgment should not
be entered against him forthwith and execution issued thereon.

Said

citation may be served personally or by certified mail upon the
obligor directed to the address given in the bond.

Hearing on the

citation shall be held not less than 20 days after service.

The

defendant 1 s attorney and the prosecuting attorney shall be given
notice of the hearing.
(d)

After entry of such judgment, the court may remit it

in whole or in part under the conditions applying to the setting
aside of forfeiture in paragraph (b) of this subsection.
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If a

bond forfeiture has been paid into the general fund of the county,
the commissioners thereof shall be notified of any application for
remission.
(2)

The obliger shall be exonerated as follows:

(1) When

the condition of the bond has been satisfied; or (2) When the amount
of the forfeiture has been paid; or (3) Upon surrender of the defendant
into custody before judgment upon an order to show cause, upon payment
of all costs occasioned thereby.

The obliger may seize and surrender

the defendant to the sheriff of the county wherein the bond shall be
taken, and it shall be the duty of such sheriff, on· such surrender
and delivery to him of a certified copy of the bond by which the
ohli9or is bound, to take such person into custody, and by writing
acknowledge such surrender.
(3)

In the discretion of the trial court and with the

consent of the surety or sureties, the same bond may be continued until
the final disposition of the case in the trial court or pending
disposition of the case on review.
SECTION 2.

Effective date.

This act shall become effective

on July l, 1963.
SECTION 3.

Safety clause.

The general assembly hereby

finds, determines, and declares that this act is necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety.
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COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
In district court criminal actions, statutory authority is
given the judge to appoint counsel for indigent defendants. 1 This
authority is permissive rather than mandatory, but if counsel is
appointed he receives a fee fixed by the judge and paid by the county
in which the case is tried. 2 There are no provisions for court-appointed
counsels in cases before county, juvenile, and municipal courts. The
method of providing counsel for indigent defendants in Colorado has
been criticized for several shortcomings: 1) Counsel is provided only
for district court defendants when there is often need for counsel in
other courts as well. 2) Usually counsel is not appointed until the
defendant is arraigned, and to prepare an adequate defense, counsel
should be appointed as shortly after arrest as possible. 3) The alleged
violator is entitled to the best possible defense, but often
inexperienced attorneys are appointed. 4) The present system does not
provide the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete
defense. 5) In some counties, the fees paid are too small for the work
involved in preparing an adequate defense. 6) In some of the larger
counties where the fees paid are more commensurate with the work
required, the total cost is too great for the services provided.
Other Methods of Providing Counsel
These criticisms have also been made of the assigned-counsel
system in other states. As a result, several alternate approaches to
providing counsel for indigent defendants have been developed. These
include the voluntary-defender s stem, the public-defender system, and
the mixed private-public system. 3
These systems may be described as follows: 4
The Voluntary-Defender System
Voluntary-defender organizations ... iar_g/ private,
non-governmental organizations representing
indigent defendants accused of crime. They may
or may not be affiliated with a civil legal aid
organization ...
The voluntary-defender system is characterized
by what may be termed the "law-office" approach
to the representation of the indigent defendant.
While the assigned-counsel system generally
results in a number of different lawyers being
assigned from time to time to represent indigent
1.
2.
3.
4.

39-7-29, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953.
Ibid.
Equal Justice for the Accused, Special Committee of the New York
City Bar Association and the National Legal Aid Association,
Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1959, p. 25.
Ibid., pp. 50-52.
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defendants, the voluntary-defender system creates
a law office which the court may assign to represent
any and all indigent defendants. These law offices
vary in size from the substantial organizations of
New York and Philadelphia to smaller offices such as
New Orleans. Nevertheless, under this system the
function of defending indigents is centralized in
a professional defense unit.
Voluntary-defender offices are privately controlled
and supported. Private control is usually achieved
through an independent governing body to which the
staff of the organization is responsible. Financial
support is sought either through independent efforts
to secure charitable donations or through participation in cooperative charitable efforts such as
the Community Chest. In some instances, both
methods are used.
The voluntary-defender system may utilize
trained, salaried investigators to assist its
legal staff. It may also be aided by volunteers
from private law offices or local law schools ...

The Public-Defender System
The public defender, like the public prosecutor,
is a public official. The former is retained by
the government to fulfill society's duty to see
that all defendants, irrespective of means, have
equal protection under the law; the latter is
retained by the government to serve society's
interest in law enforcement. Generally, whenever
there is a public-defender office, that office
represents all indigent defendants in those
courts in 'Nhich the public defender regularly
appears.
Public-defender systems vary in size from
large offices such as those in Los Angeles County
and Alameda County, California, to a single-lawyer
office such as the public defender in the New
Haven District in Connecticut. Some, such as
certain offices in California, have facilities for
investigation; others have only limited funds
and facilities.
The staff of public-defender offices may be
selected through civil service procedures,
appointed by the judiciary or the appropriate local
officials, or elected. On the whole, the legal
staffs of public-defender offices appear to be
relatively stable and in a number of instances
these staffs have developed the characteristics
of career services.

- 56 -

The larger public-defender offices receive
office facilities from the government. However,
.smaller public-defender offices often are
operated from the private law office of the
attorney serving as public defender.
Public-defender systems are financed by public
funds. In some instances, they are treated
in the same manner as other government
institutions and submit a yearly budget to
the proper appropriating body. Others operate
on a fixed retainer basis, the public defender
being paid a yearly salary or fee for his
services and being expected to finance his office
expenses from his compensation.
The Mixed Private-Public System
The cities of Rochester and Buffalo, New York,
have a mixed private-public system which is
unique in the United States.
Rochester has had for some time a Legal Aid
Society which is active in civil cases. In
1954, pursuant to an enabling statute, the
Legal Aid.Society requested and received from
the Board of Supervisors of Monroe County an
appropriation to establish a defender service to
function in the inferior criminal courts of
the county. A lawyer employed by the Society
has since performed this function.
Thus, Rochester furnishes counsel to the
indigent defendant in lower court criminal cases
within the organizational framework of a private
legal aid society and supports this system by
public funds. Buffalo has recently instituted
a similar program of operation.

Recommendations for the Defense of the Indigent in Colorado
In both the 1957 and 1959 sessions of the General Assembly~
a bill was introduced to establish a public defender system in
judicial districts with more than 50,000 population. A public defender
was to be appointed for each such district by the governor from
persons recommended to him by the district judge or judges. The
salaries set for public defenders were comparable to those for district
attorneys. In neither session was this measure approved by the
General Assembly.
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Permissive Public Defender System
In September, 1960, the Metropolitan Public Defender Committee was formed with its membership composed of representatives
from the Legal Aid Society, Denver Mental Health Association, League
of Women Voters, Catholic Welfare, American Civil Liberties Union,
and other organizations. After considerable study, this group
.
recommended legislation patterned after the Model Defender Act, which
was drafted by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association in
conjunction with the American Bar Association. This model act was
adopted in 1959 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws.
This legislation in slightly modified form was introduced
in both houses of the General Assembly in 1961 but was not adopted.
Supporters of the proposed measure still are of the opinion that this
legislation is a desirable step toward the adequate provision of
counsel for indigent defenders, and there are plans to submit this
proposal to the Forty-fourth General Assembly in 196B.
This legislation differs from the measures introduced in
1957 and 1959 in three important respects: 1) The act is permissive
rather than mandatory. 2) All counties, singly or in groups, may
establish a defender system, instead of limiting the office of public
defender to judicial districts of a certain size. 3) The public
defender would be authorized to represent indigent defendants charged
with crimes in county and municipal court, as well as in district
court. In addition, he would also be authorized to represent
juveniles in delinquency actions.
In those counties where the office of public defender is
established as permitted in this act, the county commissioners would
appoint the defender, set his salary, and provide adequate office space
and supplies. The commissioners would also determine the number of
additional professional and clerical staff members, prescribe their
method of appointment, and set their salaries. If a public defender
office were established on a multi-county basis, the county commissioners
of the several counties would make the appointment of the defender
jointly and devise a formula for sharing the expense of the office.
In the City and County of Denver, the bill provides that the public
defender would be appointed by the city council.
Even if the office of public defender is established, the
court would have the authority to appoint an attorney other than the
public defender in the same way as now provided by law in district
courts. If the defender were appointed, however, it would be his
duty to represent the indigent defendant and provide counsel at
every stage of the proceedings following arrest.
The proposed act also would permit the court to appoint a
representative of a local legal aid and/or defender organization as
counsel, if the county does not wish to establish the office.
Proponents of this measure feel that the permissive and
flexible provisions will make it possible for each local area to
adopt a system tailored to meet its own needs. Those areas which do
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not desire to take advantage of any of the permissive features of the
proposed legislation would continue to appoint counsel for indigent
defendants in district court criminal actions as already provided by
statute.
Text of Proposed Legislation
A BILL FOR AN ACT
RELATING TO PUBLIC DEFENDERS
Be It Enacted J2.y the General Assembly of the State of Colorado:
SECTION 1.

Definitions.

As used in this act, unless the

context clearly indicates otherwise:
(1)

The term "governing authority" shall mean the board of

county commissioners in the case of a county, and the city council in
the case of a city and county.
(2)

The term "county" shall include a city and county.

SECTION 2.

Permissive authority to establish office of

public defender - guaiification.

In any county the governing authority

may establish the office of public defender.

Any county may join with

one or more counties to establish one office of public defender to
serve those counties.

The public defender shall be a qualified attorney,

licensed to practice law in this state, and shall be appointed by the
governing authority.
SECTION 3.

Representation of ind iqent persons.

( 1) The

public defender shall represent as counsel, without charge, each
indigent person who is under arrest for or charged with committing a
felony, if:
(a)

The defendant requests it; or

(b)

The court, on its own motion or otherwise, so orders,

and the defendant does not affirmatively reject of record the
opportunity to be so represented.
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(2)

The public defender may represent indigent persons

charged in district or county court with crimes which constitute
misdemeanors, juveniles upon whom a delinquency petition has been
filed, and persons charged with municipal code violations as such
defender in his discretion may determine, subject to review by the
court, if:
(a)

The defendant, or his parent or legal guardian in

delinquency actions, requests it; or
(b)

The court, on its own motion or otherwise, so orders,

and the defendant, or his parent or legal guardian ~n delinquency
actions, does not affirmatively reject of record the opportunity to
be so represented.
(3)

The determination of indigency shall be made by the

public defender, subject to review by the court.
SECTION 4.

Term of public defender - assistant attorneys

and employees - compensation.

(1) The term and compensation of the

public defender shall be fixed by the governing authority.
· (2)

The public defender may appoint as many assistant

attorneys, clerks, investigators, stenographers, and other employees
as the governing authority considers necessary to .enable him to carry
out his responsibilities.

Appointments under this section shall be

made in the manner prescribed by the governing authority.

An assistant

attorney must be a qualified attorney licensed to practice law in this
state.
(3)

The compensation of persons appointed under subsection

(2) of this section shall be fixed by the governing authority.
SECTION 5.

Duties of public defender.

When representing

an indigent person, the public defender shall (1) counsel and defend
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him, whether he is held in custody or charged with a criminal offense,
at every stage of the proceedings following arrest; and (2) prosecute
any appeals or other remedies before or after conviction that he
considers to be in the interest of ju~tice.
SECTION 6.
defender.

Appointment of other attorney in place of public

For cause, the court may, on its own motion or upon the

application of the public defender or the indigent person, appoint an
attorney other than the public defender to represent him at any stage
of the proceedings or on appeal.

The attorney shall be awarded

reasonable compensation and reimbursement for expenses necessarily
incurred, to be fixed by the court and paid by the county.
SECTION 7.

Report of public defender.

The public defender

shall make an annual report to the governing authority covering all
cases handled by his office during the preceding year.
SECTION 8.
by counties.

Office space, equipment, etc. - expenses- sharing

The governing authority shall provide office space,

furniture, equipment, expenses, and supplies for the use of the public
defender suitable for the conduct of the business of his office.
However, the governing authority in any case may provide for an
allowance in place of facilities.

Each such item is a charge against

the county in which the services were rendered.

If the public

defender serves more than one county, expenses that are properly
allocable to the business of more than one of those counties shall be
prorated among the counties concerned, as shall be agreed upon by the
governing authorities of the counties concerned.
SECTION 9.

Absence of office of public defender.

If the

governing authority does not create the office of public defender, then,
at county expense, either:
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(1)

The services prescribed by this act may be provided by

a qualified attorney appointed by the court in each case and awarded
reasonable compensation and expenses by the court; or
(2)

The services prescribed by this act may be provided

through nonprofit legal aid or defender organizations designated by the
governing authority, which organizations may be awarded reasonable
compensation and expenses by the governing authority or courts.
SECTION 10.

Repeal.

39-7-29 and 39-7-31, Colorado Revised

Statutes 1953, are hereby repealed.
SECTION 11.

Short title.

This act may be cited as the

"Colorado Defender Act".
SECTION 12.

Effective date.

This act shall take effect on

July 1, 1963.
SECTION 13.

Safety clause.

The general assembly hereby

finds, determines, and declares that this act is .necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety.
Fees Paid Court-Appointed Attorneys
The last comprehensive survey of fees paid court-appointed
attorneys was made by the Legislative Council Administration of Justice
Committee. This survey covered calendar year 1958. At that time only
three judicial districts of the 12 for which data was compiled had
averaged court-appointed attorney fees of more than $100 (2nd, 17th,
18th districts). In five judicial districts (3rd, 7th, 8th, 15th,
16th), the average fee was less than $75.~
Many of the attorneys and judges who appeared before the
Administration of Justice Committee at its regional meetings complained
of the low fees paid but pointed out that the county commissioners
refused to allow larger amounts. The attorneys stated generally that
they tried to do an adequate job, even if the fees were not commensurate
5.

Judicial Administration in Colorado, Colorado Legislative Council,
Research Publication No. 49, December 1960, p. 151.
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6

with the work involved. However, many felt hat they lacked sufficient
time for investigation to do a thorough job.
Defendants Represented by Counsel in Criminal Cases
The Administration of Justice Committee found that one-fourth
of the defendants in criminal cases filed in the district courts in
1958 were not represented by counsel. In three judicial districts
{11th, 12th, and 14th), more than three-fourths of the defendants
were not represented by counsel, and there were three others {4th,
9th, and 16th) where counsel appeared for less than half of the
defendants. In contrast, there were five districts {2nd, 3rd, 8th,
15th, and 17th) where 88 per cent or more of the defendants had
attorneys. In one of these districts {15th), all defendants were
represented by counsel.?
Sixty per cent of the defendants represented by counsel had
court-appointed attorneys. This proportion variea from almost 80 per
cent in the 3rd District to 12.5 per cent in the 12th District. In
a number of cases in which no counsel appeared, the docket analysis
shows that a plea of guilty was entered on arraignment and that no
counsel was requested, Some criminal cases in which there was no
representation by counsel were dismissed at the request of the district
attorney without prosecution, and in a few instances the alleged
offender had not been apprehended or had been returned to prison for
parole violation rather than prosecuted on a new charge.B
Obstacles and Objections to Public Defender System
One of the major obstacles to adopting a public defender
system in most of the judicial districts is the small number of criminal
cases filed each year. Only eight judicial districts have more than
100 cr.iminal cases filed annually. Proponents of the public defender
system contend that the appointment of a part-time public defender and
assistants in these districts at salaries equal to those received by
the district attorney and his assistants would provide better defense
counsel at less cost. At the Administration of Justice Committee's
regional meetings, very few attorneys and judges in non-urban districts
wished to adopt the public defender system in their areas, although
conceding that perhaps such a system would work in Denver and the
surrounding counties. Expense and the small number of criminal cases
were cited as the reasons why a defender system would not be satisfactory
in rural areas.
There have also been objections to the adoption of the public
defender system in Denver and other metropolitan areas. Some judges
and attorneys feel that adequate defense is now being provided and at
less cost than through a public defender's office.

6.
7.
8.

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 152.
Ibid., p. 153.
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INCHOATE CRIMES
Inchoate, as defined by Webster, is an adjective meaning:
recently or just begun being in the first stages, or rudimentary.
Inchoate crimes are, therefore, not completed crimes but proposed
criminal acts in their initial stages. Included in this category are
attempted crimes and solicitation or attempted solicitation of others
to commit or assist in the commission of a criminal act. Colorado has
no general attempt or solicitation statutes, although many statutes
relating to a specific crime also contain a penalty for attempt or
solicitation. In considering possible general attempt and solicitation
legislation, the Criminal Code Committee has examined the legislation
and the supreme court cases related thereto of some of the states
which have recently revised their criminal codes, as well as the Model
Penal Code.

Attempt
Wisconsin
Wisconsin attempt legislation was selected for examination
because Wisconsin adopted a new criminal code in 1955 after six years
of work by legislative committees aided by the University of Wisconsin
Law School and the Wisconsin Bar Association. The new criminal code
has been in effect long enough so that a body of case law has
developed interpreting various provisions including the sections on
attempt. Following is the Wisconsin attempt statute:
Attempt Legislation. Whoever attempts to commit a
felony or a battery as defined by section 940.20 or theft as defined
by section 943.20 may be fined or imprisoned or both not to exceed
one-half the maximum penalty for the completed crime; except that for
an attempt to commit a crime for which the penalty is life imprisonment,
the actor may be imprisoned not more than 30 years.
An attempt to commit a crime requires that the actor
have an intent to perform acts and attain a result which, if accomplished,
would constitute such crime and that he does acts toward the commission
of the crime which demonstrate unequivocally, under all the circumstances,
that he formed that intent and would commit the crime except for the
intervention of another person or some other extraneous factor.
Post-1955 Wisconsin Supreme Court Cases on Attempt. There
are several post-1955 cases dealing with this general attempt statute
and matters relat~d to it. These cases are discussed separately below:
l)

State v. Carli, 2 Wisconsin 2d 429, 86 N.W.
2d 434 (1957). The defendant was charged
with mayhem and attempted mayhem, allegedly
committed by biting off the complaining
witness's ear during a bar room brawl. He
was convicted of assault with intent to do
great bodily harm, and on appeal he contended
that his conviction should be set aside on the
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ground that assault with intent to do great
bodily harm is not a lesser offense included
in a charge of mayhem. His conviction was
affirmed. From this case it would seem to
follow that by enacting a general attempt
statute making it a crime to attempt to
commit any felony, Wisconsin did not do away
with the doctrine allowing conviction of a
lesser included offense -- even in a case such
as this where there is not only a charge o(
the completed crime of mayhem but also a
charge of an attempt to commit mayhem.
2)

State v. Bronston, 7 Wisconsin 2d 627, 97
N.W. 2d 504 (1959). The defendant entered
a liquor store and struck the woman attendant
on the head with a wrench and then fled when
she regained consciousness and threw a bottle
of whiskey at him. The defendant was charged
with aggravated battery and attempted robbery
and was convicted of both by the trial court.
On appeal the supreme court reversed the
conviction of aggravated battery on the_
ground that the harm caused the injured woman
was not up to the statutory standard of "great
bodily harm" which must actually be caused
(not merely intended) in an aggravated battery
case. However, the supreme court directed the
trial court to enter a judgment of guilty of
an attempt to commit aggravated battery,
apparently on the theory that the attempt was
a lesser included offense. In addition, the
conviction of attempted robbery was sustained.

3)

State v. Damms, 9 Wisconsin 2d 183, 100
2d N.W. 2d 592 (1960) is destined to become
a leading case on the law of attempt in
Wisconsin. The charge was attempt to commit
murder in the first degree. Damms had held
a gun to his estranged wife's head and pulled
the trigger, but the gun had not fired because
it was not loaded. He had left the clip
containing cartridges in his car. Damms was
convicted in the trial court. On appeal the
chief issue was whether the fact that it was
actually impossible for Damms to commit murder
with the unloaded gun precluded convicting
him of an attempt to murder. The court felt that
this issue boiled down to whether the
impossibility of completing the target crime
because the gun was unloaded fell within the
statutory words, "except for the intervention
of ... some other extraneous factor." 100 N.W.
2d at 594.
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In holding that this requirement of the
statute was satisfied -- and thus holding
the fact that the gun was unloaded to be
an "extraneous factor," the court followed
the majority view that impossibility not
apparent to the defendant does not absolve
him of an attempt to commit an intended
crime. Said the majority of the court:
"An unequivocal act accompanied
by intent should be sufficient to
constitute a criminal attempt.
Insofar as the actor knows, he has
done everything necessary to insure
the commission of the crime intended,
and he should not escape punishment
because of the fortuitous circumstance
that by reason of some fact unknown to
him it was impossible to effectuate
the intended result."
The court rejected the defense argument
that because a subsection expressly stating
that impossibility brought about by mistake
of fact or law was not a defense was
eliminated during revision of the code, it
should follow that the legislature intended
impossibility to be a defense regardless of
the defendant's awareness. (Of course if
the defendant is aware that it is impossible
to complete the target crime, he does not
have the reguisite intent for an attempt
conviction.)
4)

State v. Dunn, 10 Wisconsin 2d 447, 103
N.W. 2d 36 (1960), involved a conviction
of attempt to murder where the defendant
had hidden in the back seat of his lover's
husband's car, and when the husband entered,
the defendant had pulled a cloth bag over
his face. Defendant also had with him some
wire with which he might have strangled the
husband. After a brief struggle the
intended victim escaped. The trial court's
judgment of conviction was affirmed on
appeal.

Law Review Comments.
Criminal Code has written:!

One of the draftsmen of the Wisconsin

Attempt requires acts toward the commission
of the crime which demonstrate unequivocally
that the actor had the intent to and would
commit the crime unless prevented.
1.

Platz, The Criminal Code, 1956 Wisconsin Law Review pp. 350, 364,
and 365.
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No 'assaults with intent' will be found among
the crimes defined in the code; such acts are
all covered by the general attempt statute
which applies to felonies and to two
misdemeanors, battery and (petty) theft.
'Attempt' is defined for the first time in the
law of this state, and in a more intelligible
fashion than by using such expressions as
'beyond mere preparation,' 'locus poenitentiae,'
or 'dangerous proximity to success.' By
avoiding such wording it is intended to
forestall any possibility of Wisconsin courts
fQllowing the New York case of People v. Rizzo
LThe defendant planned to rob a payroll messenger
but was apprehended while driving about looking
for the messenger, before locating him; and the
court reversed the conviction of attempted robbery
because there was no act tending to accomplish
_
robbery and coming sufficiently close to successdIn other words Wisconsin chose to make the test of attempt
turn on whether the defendant's conduct sufficiently demonstrated
dangerous propensities to justify punishimg him, rather than on how
close he came to success in accomplishing the target crime. This
rationale was considered by the Wisconsin committee more appropriate
to the purposes of criminal law to protect society and reform offenders
or at least isolate them where they could cause no harm.
The question of impossibility is not specifically covered
due to deletion of the provision in the 1953 code relating to that
subject. While it is clear under case law that the completed crime
need not be capable of accomplishment, as where the attempt is to pick
an empty pocket or to produce a miscarriage upon a woman who is not
actually pregnant, courts have refused to hold the actor guilty of an
attempt in some circumstances where the effort was doomed to failure,
as where one shoots at an inanimate object mistaking it for a man who
he intends to kill. In the writer's opinion, even without the deleted
provision the code definition of "attempt" does not require proof
that the completed crime was possible of accomplishment, since ''dangerous
proximity to success" is not an element. 2
Illinois
The new Illinois Criminal Code went into effect in January
1962. This code is an example of the most recent approaches to criminal
law revision. The language is simplified, sections are brief, and
many statutes were eliminated through general provisions with wide
application. The Illinois Criminal Code was the product of many years
of study by committees of the Illinois and Chicago bar associations.
There is no case law as yet because the code has been in effect for
less than a year. Following is the attempt provisions in the new
Illinois Criminal Code:
2.

Ibid.
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~8-4.

Attempt

(a) Elements of the Offense.
A person commits an attempt when, with intent
to commit a specific offense, he does any act
which constitutes a substantial step toward the
commission of that offense.
(b) Impossibility.
It shall not be a defense to a charge of attempt
that because of a misapprehension of the circumstances it would have been impossible for the
accused to commit the offense attempted.
(c) Penalty.
A person convicted of an attempt may be fined
or imprisoned or both not to exceed the maximum
provided for the offense at tempted: Provid,ed,
however,
(1)

that the penalty for attempt to commit
treason, murder or aggravated kidnapping
shall not exceed imprisonment for 20
years, and

(2)

that the penalty for attempt to commit
any other forcible felony shall not
exceed imprisonment for 14 years, and

(3)

that the penalty for attempt to commit
any offense other than those specified
in Subsections (1) and (2) hereof shall
not exceed imprisonment for 5 years.

Model Penal Code
The provisions of the Model Penal Code pertaining to attempt
are much more specific than those contained in the Illinois Code.
Following are the attempt provisions in the Model Penal Code:
Section 5.01.

Criminal Attempt

(1) Definition of attempt. A person is guilty
of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with
the kind of culpability otherwise required for
commission of the crime, he:
(a) purpose,ly engages in conduct which would
constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or
(b) when causing a particular result is an
element of the crime, does or omits to do
anything with the purpose of causing or with
the belief that it will cause such result,
without further conduct on his part; or
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(c) purposely does or omits to do anything
which, under the circumstances as he believes
them to be, is a substantial step in a course
of conduct planned to culminate in his commission
of the crime.
(2) Conduct which marbe held substantials~
yndgr-paragraph:]1}(c_-:-· Conduct shall not oe
held to constitute a substantial step under
paragraph (l)(c) of this Section unless it is
strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal
purpose. Without negativing the sufficiency of
other conduct, the following, if strongly
corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose,
shall not be held insufficient as a matter of
law:
(a) lying in wait, searching for or following
the contemplated victim of the crime;
(b) enticing or seeking to entice the
contemplated victim of the crime to go to
the place contemplated for its commission;
(c) reconnoitering the place contemplated for
the commission of the crime;
(d) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or
enclosure in which it is contemplated that the
crime will be committed;
(e) possession of materials to be employed
in the commission of the crime, which are
specially designed for such unlawful use or
which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor
under the circumstances;
(f) possession, collection or fabrication of
materials to be employed in the commission of
the crime, at or near the ·place contemplated
for its commission, where such possession,
collection or fabrication serves no lawful
purpose of the actor under the circumstances;
{g) soliciting an innocent agent to engage
in conduct constituting an element of the
crime.
(3) Conduct designed to aid another to commit
crime. A person who engages in conduct designed
to aid another to commit a crime which would
establish his complicity under Section 2.06 if
the crime were committed by such other person,
is guilty of an attempt to commit the crime,
although the crime is not committed or
attempted by such other person.
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(4) Renunciation of criminal purpose. When the
actor's conduct would otherwise constitute an
attempt under paragraph (l)(b) or (l)(c) of this
Section, it is an affirmative defense that he
abandoned his effort to commit the crime or
otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting renunciation of his criminal
purpose. The establishment of such defense does
not, however, affect the liability for the
attempt of an accomplice who did not join in
such abandonment or prevention.
Louisiana
The Louisiana Criminal Code was revised in 1942.
code attempt is defined as follows:
Section 27.

In this

Attempt

Any person who, having a specific intent to
commit a crime, does or omits an act for the
purpose of and tending directly toward the
accomplishing of his object is guilty of an
attempt to commit the offense intended; and it
shall be immaterial whether, under the
circumstances, he would have actually accomplished
his purpose.
Mere preparation to commit a crime shall not
be sufficient to constitute an attempt; but
lying in wait with a dangerous weapon with the
intent to commit a crime, or searching for the
intended victim with a dangerous weapon with
the intent to commit a crime, shall be sufficient
to constitute an attempt to commit the offense
intended.
An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of
the intended crime; and any person may be
convicted of an attempt to commit a crime,
although it appears on the trial that the crime
intended or attempted was actually perpetrated
by such person in pursuance of such attempt.
Proposed Attempt Legislation for Colorado
Present Colorado law has many gaps with respect to attempted
crimes. There are a number of statutes in which the commission of
a serious crime is punishable, but which provide no penalty for an
attempt to commit the crime. Because there are many instances of
attempts to commit serious crimes in which tre attempt is not a crime,
one whose criminal intent is shown in conduct falling short of
completing a crime, or whose attempted crime is aborted by alert police
work, legal impossibility, or an effective defense by the intended
victim, cannot be prosecuted. Examples of such anti-social conduct
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carrying no penalties under present Colorado law include attempted
larceny (not covered by crime of assault with intent to commit
larceny, for in most larceny there is no assault), attempted kidnapping,
attempted malicious mischief, attempted abortion on a woman not in
fact pregnant, attempted murder where there is no assault (as where
intended victim is asleep or unconscious), attempted robbery by acts
falling short of assault (as where defendant is arrested while lying
in wait for a bank messenger). Moreover, the case of People v. Dolph,
124 Colorado 553 (1951) holds that there is no common law crime of
attempt in Colorado because Colorado adopted the English common laws
as of 1607, a date prior to recognition of the common law crime of
attempt by the English courts. Professor Austin W. Scott of the
University of Colorado School of Law has done extensive research in
this area and has found that every state, except Colorado, has a
general statute covering criminal attempts.
Because some attempts are presently crimes, a new general
attempt statute should state whether its provisions for punishing those
attempts are in lieu of or merely alternatives to'the penalties already
provided. Otherwise, upon enactment of the general attempt statute,
present statutes should be amended to eliminate specific definitions
of attempt crimes.
Provisions of Suggested Statute. The suggested statute
generally follows the substantive definition of attempt contained in
the Model Penal Code. Added are several provisions adapted from the
codes of Illinois, Louisiana, California, and Wisconsin. This definition
is far more comprehensive than any contained in the recently adopted
criminal codes of other states. This more comprehensive definition
was used in order to try to cover problems which otherwise might require
case law determination.
The penalty provision generally follows that contained in
the Illinois code, but the maximum penalty for attempt would be onehalf of the penalty which would be applicable if the target crime had
been completed, subject to certain express limitations.
The text of the proposed attempt statute as reviewed,
amended, and approved by the Criminal Code Committee follows.
A BILL FOR AN ACT
RELATING TO CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
Be It Enacted .QY. the General Assembly of the State of Colorado:
SECTION 1.

Chapter 40, Colorado Revised Statutes 1953, is

hereby amended by the addition thereto of a NEW ARTICLE 25, to read:
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ARTICLE 25
Inchoate Crimes
40-25-1.

Criminal attempt.

(l)(a)

A person is guilty of

an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with th~ state of mind otherwise required for the commission of the crime, he:

(b)

Purposely engages in conduct which would constitute

the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to
be; or
(c)

When causing a particular result is an element of the

crime, does or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing or with
the belief that it will cause such result, without further conduct on
his part; or
(d)

Purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the

circumstances as he believes them to be, is a substantial step in a
course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.
(2)(a)

Such person's conduct shall not be held to

constitute a substantial step under paragraph (l)(c) of this section
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose.
Without negativing the sufficiency of other conduct, the following,
if strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, shall not
be held insufficient as a matter of law:
(b)

Lying in wait for, searching for, or following the

contemplated victim of the crime;
(c)

Enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim

of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission;
(d)

Reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission

of the crime;
(e)

Unlawful entry of a vehicle, into a structure, into

any enclosure, or onto any real property in which or on which it is
contemplated that the crime will be committed;
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(f)

Possession of items or materials to be employed in the

commission of the crime, which are specially designed for such
unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under
the circumstances;
(g)

Possession, collection, or fabrication of items or

materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the
place contemplated for its commission, where such possession,
collection, or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor
under the circumstances; or
(h)

Soliciting an accomplice or an innocent agent to

engage in conduct constituting an element of the crime.
40-25-2.

Conduct in aid of another.

Any person who engages

in conduct intended to aid another to commit any crime which would
establish his complicity under section 40-1-12 or 40-1-13, if the
crime were committed by such other person, is guilty of an attempt to
commit a crime, although the crime is not committed or attempted by
such other person.
40-25-3.

Defenses available - not available.

(1) When the

actor's previous conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt to
commit a crime, as defined in this article, it is a defense that he
abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its
commission, under circumstances manifesting the renunciation of his
criminal purpose.

The establishment of such defense shall not affect

the liability for the attempt of an accomplice who did not join in
such abandonment or prevention.
(2)

It shall not be a defense to a conviction of the crime

of attempt to commit a crime that:
(a)

Because of a misapprehension of the circumstances it

would have been factually or legally impossible for the accused to
commit the offense attempted; or
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(b)

Under the circumstances, the accused could not have

actually accomplished his purpose; or
(c)

The crime attempted or intended was actually perpetrated

by the accused.
40-25-4.

Multiple convictions.

No person shall be convicted

of both the perpetration of a crime and the attempt to commit that
crime where the acts constituting such attempt were part of the same
conduct constituting the completed crime.
40-25-5.

Penalties.

(l)(a)

A person convicted of an

attempt to commit a crime may be fined or imprisoned br both in the
same manner as for the offense attempted, but such fine or
imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half
of the longest term of imprisonment, or both, prescribed for the
offense attempted; provided that:
·(b)

If the offense attempted is punishable by death or

life impiisonment, such person shall be imprisoned in the state
penitentiary at hard labor for not less than one year nor more than
twenty years;
(c)

If the offense is an attempt to commit any felony

involving bodily injury of or an assault on any person, other than
one punishable by death or life imprisonment, the penalty shall not
exceed fourteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary;
(d)

If the offense is an attempt to commit any felony

other than those referred to in paragraphs (l)(b) and (l)(c) of this
section, the penalty shall not exceed five years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary; and
(e)

If the offense is an attempt to commit any misdemeanor,

the penalty shall not exceed six months imprisonment in the county
jail.
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SECTION 2.

Safety clause.

The general assembly hereby finds,

determines, and declares that this act is necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health, and safety.

Solicitation
Other States
The solicitation statutes of Wisconsin and Illinois were
surveyed as was the case law and law review comments on solicitation
in Wisconsin. In addition, the provisions of the Model Penal Code
on solicitation were examined.
Wisconsin. The new Wisconsin Criminal Code provides the
following on solicitation:
Whoever, with intent .that a felony be committed,
advises another to commit that crime under circumstances which indicate unequivocally that he has
such intent may be fined not more than $2,500 or
imprisoned not to exceed the maximum provided for
the completed crime, but in no event to exceed
five years, or both; except that for a solicitation
to commit a crime for which the penalty .is life
imprisonment the actor may be imprisoned not more
than 10 years.
There are no Wisconsin cases construing the solicitation
statute but there have been several law review comments. An article
by an assistant attorney general of Wisconsin states that the 1953
code as originally prepared had contained a general provision that the
inchoate crimes -- solicitation, conspiracy and attempt -- be punished
the same as the completed crime except that instead of life imprisonment
the maximum imprisonment should be thirty years. But the committee
which revised the code between 1953 and 1955 changed this penalty
provision for solicitation and attempt while leaving it intact as to
conspiracy. Thus, the code as enacted in 1955 provided for a
fine for solicitation of up to $2,500 or imprisortment.up to· the maximum
provided for the completed crime, but not exceeding five years, or
both. (For attempt, the code as enacted provides a fine or
imprisonment, or both, not to exceed one-half the maximum provided for
the completed crime. for conspiracy one may draw the maximum fine or
imprisonment, or both, provided for the complete crime.) The assistant
attorney general commented on the~e penalty changes as follows: "It
is difficult to explain this rearrangement of penalites, particularly
when it is considered that many attempts and solicitations under the
old law were state prison offenses while 'common law conspiracy' was
but a misdemeanor.
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"All of the inchoate crimes require more than a ~ criminal
intent. Solicitation requires advice to another to commit a felony
under circumstances which ind~cate unequivocally that the actor intends
that the felony be committed. "
These comments imply that solicitation and the other inchoate
crimes defined in the 1955 Wisconsin Code require a specific rather than
merely a general criminal intent. In solicitation this specific intent
is to induce or persuade the person solicited to commit the target
crime. The solicitation offense, of course, is complete where the
person solicited declines to commit the suggested crime.
It should be noted that the Wisconsin statute covers only
solicitation to commit felonies. At common law it was a misdemeanor
to solicit another to commit any felony, and furthermore was a
misdemeanor to solicit another to commit a serious misdemeanor which
may tend to a breach of the peace -- and perhaps to solicit any
indictable misdemeanor. The Wisconsin statute in ef£ect makes
solicitation a felony in many cases. This crime was never a felony
at common law. It is not a crime at all in Colorado today, except in
the case of specific offenses whose solicitation is expressly made
criminal.
The Wisconsin statute differs from the solicitation legislation
in several other states in that it covers the solicitation of all
felonies while the solicitation in these other states is limited to
enumerated offenses. For example, California restricts the crime of
solicitation to offenses involving bribery, murder, robbery, burglary,
grand theft, receiving stolen property, extortion, rape by force and
violence~ perjury, subornation of perjury, forgery or kidnapping.
Illinois. The Illinois Criminal Code defines solicitation
and provides the penalty therefore as follows:
§8-1.
(a)

Solicitation
Elements of the offense.

A person commits solicitation when, with intent

that an offense be committed, he commands,
encourages or requests another to commit that
offense.
(b)
Penalty.
A person convicted of solicitation may be fined

or imprisoned or both not to exceed the maximum
provided for the offense solicited: Provided,
however, that no penalty for solicitation shall
exceed imprisonment for one year.
Model Penal Code.
Code as follows:

3.

Solicitation is defined in the Model Penal

Ibid.
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Section 5.02.

Criminal Solicitation

(1) Definition of solicitation. A person is
guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with
the purpose of promoting or facilitating its
commission he commands, encourages or requests
another person to engage in specific conduct which
would constitute such crime or an attempt to commit
such crime or which would establish his complicity
in its commission or attempted commission.
(2) Uncommunicated solicitation.
It is
immaterial under Subsection (1) of this Section
that the actor fails to communicate with the
person he solicits to commit a crime if his
conduct was designed to effect such communication.

(3)
Renunciation of criminal purpose. ,It is an
affirmative defense that the actor, after soliciting
another person to commit a crime, persuaded him not
to do so or otherwise prevented the commission of
the crime, under circumstances manifesting a
renunciation of his criminal purpose.

Proposed Solicitation Legislation for Colorado
In Colorado, one who advises or encourages another to commit
a crime which the party thus solicited actually commits is guilty as
a principal and punished as if he had personally committed the crime
(40~1-7,40-1-8, 40-1-12, C.R.S. 1953). But there is no general criminal
statute in Colorado defining as a crime the solicitation of another to
commit a crime when the party solicited does not commit the offense.
Unsuccessfully soliciting another to commit a crime was not
well established as a common law offense in England until 1801. Since
that time it has been the accepted view that to solicit another to
commit a felony, or a serious misdemeanor tending toward a breach of
the peace, is a misdemeanor.
States which have recently adopted new penal codes all have
included a provision on criminal solicitation. The draftsmen of the
Model Penal Code concluded that solicitation is socially dangerous
enough to be considered a crime.
There are several present Colorado statutes defining the
solicitation of certain specific crimes as criminal and providing
penalites therefore. There are many gaps in the coverage of these
provisions, and there is wide divergence in the penalties provided.
Among crimes which may be solicited in Colorado without fear of penalty
are murder, rape, robbery, larceny, kidnapping and most other serious
crimes against the person.
Text of Proposed Legislation. In reviewing and approving
proposed general solicitation statute, the Criminal Code Committee
decided that this legislation should not apply in those instances of
solicitation presently covered by law. The text of the proposed general
solicitation legislation follows:
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A BILL FOR AN ACT

CONCERNING CRIMINAL SOLICITATION AND PUNISHMENTS THEREFOR
Be It Enacted !2.Y. the General Assembly of the State of Colorado:
SECTION l.

Criminal solicitation.

A person is guilty of

criminal solicitation if with the purpose of promoting or
facilitating its commission he commands, encourages, or requests
another person to engage in specific conduct which would constitute
such crime or an attempt to commit such crime, or which would
establish his complicity in its commission or attempted commission.
SECTION 2.

Uncommunicated solicitation.

It is immaterial

under section l of this act that the actor fails to communicate with
the person he solicits to commit a crime if his conduct was designed
to effect such communication.
SECTION 3.

Renunciation of criminal purpose.

It is a

defense that the actor, after soliciting another person to commit a
crime, persuaded him not to do so or otherwise prevented the commission
of the crime, under circumstances manifesting a renunciation of his
criminal purpose.
SECTION 4.

Corroborating evidence required.

No person shall

be convicted of criminal solicitation on the mere testimony of the
party allegedly solicited to commit a crime, but to support a
conviction there must be, in addition to or in lieu of testimony by
the party allegedly solicited, any of the following:
(a)

A confession by the accused;

(b)

Testimony of two witnesses, one of whom may be the party

allegedly solicited; or
(c)

Other evidence direct or circumstantial.
-
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SECTIONS.

Penalties.

(l)(a)

A person convicted of

criminal solicitation may be fined or imprisoned, or both, in the
same manner as for the offense solicited, but such fine or imprisonment
shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the
longest term of imprisonment, or both, prescribed for the offense
solicited; provided that:
(b)

If the offense solicited is punishable by death or life

imprisonment, such person shall be imprisoned in the state penitentiary at hard labor for not less than one year nor more than twenty
years;
(c)

If the offense is a solicitation to commit any felony

involving bodily injury of or an assault on any person, other than one
punishable by death or life imprisonment, the penalty shall not
exceed fourteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary;
(d)

If the offense is a solicitation to commit any felony

other than those referred to in paragraphs (1) (b) and (1) (c) of this
section, the penalty shall not exceed five years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary; and
(e)

If the offense is a solicitation to commit any

misdemeanor, the penalty shall not exceed six months imprisonment in
the county jail.
SECTION 6.

Applicability.

Where by the provisions of any

other la~ solicitation of specific conduct is included in the
definition of any felony or misdemeanor, and a penalty provided
therefor, such other law shall control and the provisions of this act
shall not apply.
SECTION 7.

Safety clause.

The general assembly hereby finds,

determines, and declares that this act is necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health, and safety.
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CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY (THEFT)

General Theft Statute
There are more than 50 Colorado statutes covering crimes
against property. These include among others: larceny of various kinds,
false pretenses embezzlement, forgery, extortion, blackmail, receiving
stolen property, and joy riding. Study of these statutes has indicated
that many of them are burdened with overcomplicated and highly
technical language. Further, they are scattered throughout all volumes
of the present Colorado revised statutes.
The simplification and codification of these statutes was
considered by the Criminal Code Committee to be a proper starting
point for an over-all revision and codification of the criminal statutes.
The practice in other states which have recently revised their criminal
codes has been to adopt a general theft statute which is sufficiently
broad in definition and application to make it possible to eliminate
most if not all of the previous specialized statutes relating to crimes
against property. For example, the general theft statutes in the new
Illinois criminal code cover larceny, false pretenses, embezzlement,
larceny by bailee, extortion, and blackmail. Fraud is covered in
the new Illinois code in the section on deception,and joy riding is
covered in the section on trespass.
If a general theft statute is to replace most if not all of
the existing specialized statutes, the definition must be carefully
worded so as to cover the gamut of property crimes. No matter how
carefully such a statute is drafted, it usually takes several years
of experience and case law from state supreme court decisions to
determine which property crimes, if any, are excluded. Consequently,
there is always the possibility that additional legislation might be
needed.
The Illinois code has been in effect for too short a time
for there to be any case law as yet. However, a considerable body
of case law has been developed in several other states which have
adopted general theft statutes in recent years.

Experience in Other States
The simplified general theft statutes and related case law
in several states were studied. These statutes, related court cases,
and comments for two states (Louisiana and Wisconsin) which are of
particular help in further study of this subject in Colorado are
presented below:
Louisiana
In 1942, Louisiana adopted a new penal code which greatly
simplified the substantive criminal law of that state. One of the most
extensive changes was in the theft area where pre-1942 Louisiana statutes
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had been a confusing morass of highly detailed and frequently overlapping statutes which all too often had been given overly technical
restrictive interpretation by the courts. The Louisiana State Law
Institute, charged by the legislature with responsibility of preparing
a draft code, sought to consolidate statutes, simplify language, and
close loopholes by eliminating technicalittes. All property crimes
were reduced to 25 sections organized under three main classifications.
In 1948 one section was repealed, reducing the total to 24 sections.
General Theft Statute.

§

67.

Theft

Theft is the misappropriation or taking of anything
of value which belongs to another, either without the consent of the
other to the misappropriation or taking, or by means of fraudulent
conduct, practices or representations. An intent to deprive the other
permanently of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation or
taking is essential.
Whoever commits the crime of theft, when the misappropriation
or taking amounts to a value of one hundred dollars or more, shall be
imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than ten years.
When the misappropriation or taking amounts to a value
of twenty dollars or more, but less than a value of one hundred
dollars, the offender shall be fined not more than three hundred
dollars, or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more
than two years, or both.
When the misappropriation or taking amounts to less than
value of twenty dollars, the offender shall be fined not more than
one hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or
both. In such cases, if the offender has been convicted of theft once
before, upon a second conviction he shall be fined not less than one
hundred dollars nor more than two hundred dollars, or imprisoned
for not less than six months nor more than one year, or both. If
the offender in such cases has been convicted of theft two or more times
previously, upon any subsequent conviction he shall be fined not less
than one hundred dollars nor more than three hundred dollars, or
imprisoned for not less than six months nor more than two years, or
both.
When there has been misappropriation or taking by a number
of distinct acts of the offender, the aggregate of the amount of the
misappropriations or takings shall determine the grade of the offense.
Several points should be noted in reading this statute.
Most important is the first paragraph, which in two brief, simple.
sentences defines the substantive elements of all the crimes previously
defined by multitudinous special provisions on various type~ ot larceny,
embezzlement, and obtaining by false pretenses. The important elements
are:
(a) a "misappropriation or taking . . • without the consent" of
the owner or by practicing on him "fraudulent conduct, practices or
representations;" (b) "intent to deprive the other permanently"
of his property -- i.e., the classical specific intent requirement
of larceny; and (c'Tproperty subject to theft -- here defined in
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the broadest possible terms as "anything of value." The draftsmen
avoided lanouage which had s~ttled technical meaning in the case law
of larceny. There i~ also apparent elimination of the "asportation"
requirement and of the traditional restriction of the theft crimes
to "chattels" or "personal property."
Reporter's Commen~s on General Theft Statutes. Serving
as reporters, and therefore as the actual draftsmen of the code, were
three law professors, one each from the law schools of Tulane,
Louisiana State, and Loyola. After completion and adoption of the
code, these reporters prepared explanatory notes on each new section.
These comments on the general theft section, abridged to eliminate
matters of no special interest or utility to Colorado, are as follows: 1
Gene!al purpose of section: This section has the
effect of combining the traditional offenses
of larceny, embezzlement, and obtaining by
false pretenses. In spite of the tremendously
complicated nature of the problem as a
matter of historical development, there seems
to be absolutely no reason why today the
fundamental notion that it is socially wrong to
take the property of another, in any fashion
whatsoever, cannot be stated as clearly and
simply as it has been above. There is eminent
theoretical and practical authority for this step • • •
Technical common law distinctions abolished:
Louisiana has not defined larceny by statute, but
has looked to the common law for its definition. • •
The common law restricted the concept in a
number of ways which seem unnecessary • • •
For instance, only personal property, not real
property or 'fixtures,' might be the subject
of larceny. This rule caused absurd
distinctions between standing trees and trees
which have been cut • . • and also caused the
e na c t me n t of . • . s pe c i a 1 st a tut e s • . • on
stealing plumbing and electric fixtures.
At common law, also, electricity, gas, etc.,
and many animals were not 'property' and
subjects of larceny • . • In Louisiana
(as in Colorado today) special statutes have
been enacted to take care of this defect • • .
Accordingly, in the'theft' section of the
code, very broad language has been used:
'anything of value which belongs to another,'
which is intended to eliminate all of the
common law distinctions and to include all
of the objects mentioned above. The word
'property' was not used, since it might be
1.

Louisiana Revised Statutes, Reporter - Comments following 14:67
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narrowly construed and have read into it all
of the traditional dogmatic distinctions as
to those things which might be the 'subject of
ownership.' By saying, 'which belongs to
another' the way is clear for the court to
interpret this broadly in the popular sense
of that phrase, and not as synonymous with the
technical legal term 'property.' This intended
broad meaning of 'anything of value which
belongs to another' is made clear in the code
itself in the definition section.
Larceny and 'embezzlement' mer9ed: One of the
most important single changes made by the 'theft'
section is the combination of what was 'larceny'
and what was 'embezzlement.' This was
accomplished by the elimination of the element
of common law larceny known as 'a trespass in
the taking' or 'taking out of the possession'
was originally a requirement, so that a
misappropriation by one lawfully in possession
was not larceny. This fact alone led to
the enactment of statutes denouncing a new
offense, 'embezzlement,' which included a
taking by one in 'possession' who necessarily
could not 'take out of the owner's possession.'
• • • The important factor is clearly the
misappropriation, and the matter of who has
possession (which involves the further
refinement of 'custody' as distinguished
from 'possession') seems entirely immaterial.
This phase of the section, of course,
represents an innovation in the Louisiana
criminal law • • . It is a reform
which has been instituted in a number of states,
however, and one which has been urged earnestly
by authorities in the field generally • • •
'Asportation' and consent of owner: There are
other problems in connection with the law of
larceny at common law about which it does not
appear to be necessary to set out details in
the code. Obviously, in particular cases,
there may be some question as to whether there
has been sufficient 'asportation' of the
stolen thing in the common law sense.
The slightest 'asportation' or misuse of
anything belonging to another should be
sufficient, but in any case it would be a
question for the court to decide whether the
offender's activity was sufficient to amount
to a 'taking.' So also of the question of
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the owner's consent: if he was not aware
of the taking, or if he turned over the
thing knowingly but unwillingly, clearly
the taking would be 'without his consent.'
Again the court must determine, in particular
cases, whether the circumstances fall within
the legislative language.
Embezzlement: Some observations should be
made about the former concept of 'embezzlement,'
which is merged in the crime of 'theft.'
As indicated above, embezzlement as a
separate offense from larceny is a historical
accident. Generally speaking it involved
a misappropriation by one lawfully 'in
possession,' usually by ~eason of the
offender's holding a position of trust and
confidence. Under this section, which
provides that anyone can commit theft of
anything, all of the acts which formerly
amounted to 'embezzlement' will be 'theft'
under the code and much statutory material and
many historical distinctions eliminated.
It will no longer be necessary, for instance,
to try to enumerate every conceivable
type of fiduciary relationship in particular
• • • Whether the offender was in 'possession'
or had 'custody,' etc., will clearly be immaterial.
Obtaining by false pretenses: This section
concerns itself also with the offense of
obtaining by false pretenses, but it is
stated broadly to include much more than that
traditional offense • • • •
Originally 'obtaining by false pretenses'
was accomplished in the English law only by the
use of false weights, measures, and 'tokens,'
but it has been extended by statute in most
jurisdictions to include a great variety
of conduct . . . . In general, it consists
of depriving someone of property (of various
descriptions in various statutes) under
circumstances in which the owner intends to
relinquish ownership, not merely 'possession'
or 'custody.' Thus a type of consent is
secured and larceny does not result. • ••
It is a consent affected by the vice of
fraud, however, • • • The analogy to civil
fraud was not complete, however, because
the concept as it exists in Anglo-American
law included only false 'pretenses' or
'representations' about present or past facts.
• ••
Inducing another to part with his property by
means of representations or promises as to
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future events was not included • • • • By not
including this latter concept in the definition
of 'theft,' it is intended to produce
identity of meaning between civil and criminal
fraud. Whenever the situation is such that
the transaction between the parties could be
avoided because of fraud, the defrauder
is guilty of theft.
The phrase 'anything of value which belongs
to another' is particularly necessary here •
• • • The word 'taking' also has been used
advisedly, rather than 'obtain,' since the
only significant consideration is whether
someone lost, not whether the offender or
anyone else gained by 'obtaining.'
In1ent: No matter what approach was used
with reference to the problem of intent in
the code, it was necessary to include a
spec i a 1 men ta 1 e 1e me n t a s an e s se n ti a 1 in
this section's definition. It is well .
established that an intent to deprive the
owner permanently of his property is a
necessary element in any 'stealing' crime .

. .

Case Law and Law Review Comments. The 1942 Louisiana Code
has been cited in at least 29 Louisiana appellate court opinions and
at least 28 articles or comments in the Tulane Law Review and the
Louisiana Law Review. Some of these cases and law review articles
are of particular interest to Colorado.
One of the earliest Louisiana Supreme Court interpretations
of the criminal code was a theft case in which the defendant launched
a five-pronged attack on the constitutionality of the theft provision
in particular and the code in general. In this case the defendant
was prosecuted under an information charging simply, "the theft of
an automobile, of the value of • • • ($1,200) • • •
The defendant attacked the code and the theft provision
as unconstitutional on these grounds:

1)

their effect was to deprive the defendant of
liberty without due process because, "he has not
been charged with any specific crime";

2)

they violate the Louisiana Constitution by
embracing more than one subject and being broader
than their titles (Cf. Colo. Const. Art. V, § 21,
imposing the same restrictions on legislation
as those contained in the Louisiana Constitution);

3)

they violate the Louisian~ Constitution by seeking to
revise and amend articles of the code merely by reference
without fully reciting all sections being affected;
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4)

they derive from an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to draft statutes to the State
Law Institute: and

5)

they make changes in the substantive law of crimes so
drastic as to be outside the power of the legislature
acting without an express authorization by constitutional
amendment.

The Louisi~na Supreme Court rejected all five defense
theories and upheld the constitutionality of the theft provision and
the code itself.
In answer to the defense contention that the legislature
could not constitutionally combine in one theft definition the separate
crimes of larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses, the supreme
court said:2
Clearly the legislature could define such crimes
as were intended to be covered by the criminal
code, and in so defining them, could group all
offenses of the same character in a single
article, as was done in defining the crime of
'theft' in article 67. By such a definition
the legislature sought to denounce under the
single heading of 'theft' all of the crimes
that it considered constituted the culpable
taking of anything of value belonging to
another, whether such taking was without the
consent of the owner, commonly known as larceny
or the taking with his consent, as is the case
in confidence games, embezzlement, and false
pretenses. This is in accordance with the
modern trend, followed in numerous states,
of simplifying the law by discarding ancient and
outmoded forms and redefining offenses to
prevent confusion and injustices.
In a law review article one of the Louisiana code's
draftsmen stated that most of the defendant's constitutional objections
in the Pete case were "far-fetched" and had never cau ed any concern
among proponents of the code. Nevertheless, he said: 3
There was one basis of attack on the code's
validity, however, which was more to be
feared • • • The all too familiar requirement
under the Louisiana Constitution that a
legislative act must have but one object and

2.
3.

State v_, Pete, 206 La. 1078, 20 So. 2nd 368.372 (1944).
Morrow, "The 1942 Louisiana Crimina 1 Code in 1945: A Sma 11 Voice
from the Past, 11 19 Tulane Law Review· 483, 485 (1945).
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that its title must be 'indicative of such
object' had always been a source of concern during
work on the code. (Cf. Colo. Const. Art. V, § 21.)
The Louisiana Law Institute accepted the
recommendation of the draftsmen that as simple
a title as could be devised should be employed,
and the wisdom of this step has been thoroughly
vindicated by·the decision· in the Pete case.
When the new criminal code definitions of crimes were
adopted in 1942, the legislature also amended the Code of Criminal
Procedure by specifying simplified forms which could be followed in
informations and indictments. In State~- Pete, the information
followed the new statutory form precisely by charging, "the theft of
an automobile, of the value of • • • ($1,200) • • • the property of
Gordon's Drug Store, Inc. "
The defendant attacked the information as invalid on
the grounds (a) that it failed to charge any recognized crime in
that it failed to state the element of intent to deprive the owner
of his property permanently, and (b) that it violated the defendant's
constitutionally guaranteed right to be fully appraised of the charge
against him.
The Louisiana Supreme Court dealt with contention
(a) by noting that the information followed the form set out in the
new statute and that the form was adequate. In rejecting contention
(b), the court stated that another provision of the Code of Criminal
Procedure protected the defendant's right to a bill of particulars
where appropriate, and held that the latter provision adequately
prot cted his constitutional right to fair notice of the charge against
him. 4
When the special simplified form of charging theft,
as prescribed by the 1942 amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure
was not followed, and it was not clear from the indictment which of
the prior crimes consolidated in the new theft statute had been
charged, the supreme court upheld a trial court's action in quashing
the indictmsnt on the ground it failed sufficiently to charge a crime,
and fell short of satisfying the constitutional requirement that the
accused be informed of the nature of the accusation. It was held not
sufficient merely to charge the crime in the language of the statute
defining the crime -- as under the pre-1942 code procedure -- for under
the prior law each criminal statute specifically defined a single
crime -- whereas the 1942 theft statute combined several crimes in one
general statute. 5
A 1948 Louisiana Supreme Court opinion noted that under
the present code a theft from the person is not always a felony as
under prior Louisiana law. The prior statute, like the present Colorado

4.
5.

State y_. Pete, Q_Q_. cit.
State y_. Kendrick,203 La. 63, 13 So. 2nd. 387 (1943).
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statute, 40-5-2 (6) Berm. Supp. 1960, had declared it a felony to
steal from the person of another without regard to the value of the
property stolen, The new code provision makes theft from the person
a felony only where it involves property of such value that the theft
would have been a felony if not from the person.6
In another case the defendants were charged with theft
allegedly committed by taking and hauling away 20 steel rails. When
taken, the rails were integral parts of a highway bridge across a
stream. One defendant was in the scrap iron business and had a market
for the rails. The defendants contended that since the rails were
affixed to realty they were not property subject to theft. Such a
contention would have been sound if the charge had been common law
larceny, for that crime could be committed only by taking and carrying
away the personal property of another with intent to deprive him
permanently ot it. This common law requirement was strictly enforced
and therefore most American jurisdictions adopted soecial statutes
declarinq the stealing of fixtures to be larceny
(e.g., Colo. Rev.
Stat. 40-5-7, 40-5-8- .fI95~7). The Louisiana court held, as the code's
draftsmen clearly intended, that the .broad phrase "anything of value"
was intended to eliminate such common law subtleties and embrace all
possible objects of theft within a single, simple phrase. 7
The meaning of "anything of value" was involved in a
case in which an attorney was charged with theft allegedly committed
by fraudulently inducing a client to sign a 20 per cent contingent fee
contract. The question was whether the 20 per cent interest thus
acquired in the client's case, a tort claim, was "anything of value"
within the theft statute. The court held that the tort cause of action
was not within the phrase, "anything of value," because a cause of
action has no present value as distinguished from mere potential
value. 8
Prior to the 1942 Louisiana Criminal Code, one who
obtained property by false representations as to future facts was
not criminally responsible under Louisiana law. The new 1942 theft
provision defined the false pretenses type of crime broadly to include
any taking by "fraudulent conduct, practices or representations."
A used car dealer was charged with theft in acquiring
three cars. He obtained the cars in exchange for a draft payable two
days after the date of purchase, knowing at the time of purchase
that he did not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the draft.
His defense to the theft charge was that the· draft constituted merely
a promise to pay in the future and therefore he committed no theft
at the time he acquired the cars. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that
the defendant had committed theft within the new statute even though his
actions amounted to a mere misrepresentation of future facts. The cour
felt that this was "fraudulent conduct" within the new code provision.

9

6.
7.
8.

9.

State y. Ambrose, 34 So. 2nd 883 (1948).
St~te v. Mills,214 La. 979, 39 So. 2d. 439 (1949).
State
Picou,236 La. 421, 107 So. 2d. 691 (195~). This interpretation was critized as being unreasonably restrictive in a law
review article, 19 Louisiana b~ Review 872 (1919).
State v. Dabbs, 228 La. 960, 84 So. 2d. 601 (1956).

v.
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Wisconsin
The 1955 Wisconsin Criminal Code, which took effect
July l, 1956, has consolidated into its Chapter 943 nearly all crimes
against property. This chapter is subdivided into the three main
types of property offenses under the headings of "Damage," "Trespass,"
and "misappropriation."
Under the subdivision "Damage" are set out five sections
defining property crimes which cover causing physical injury to property, malicious mischief, and arson.
Under the subdivision "Trespass" are set out five sections
dealing with property crimes which cover unlawful entry into or upon
another's property, including burglary; entering locked motor vehicles;
and trespass to land or dwellings.
The major subdivision of property crimes, which contains
seventeen sections, is "Misappropriation." This subdivision sets out
definitions of the theft type offenses, of various forms of obtaining
property by fraud, forgery, bad checks, extortion, and robbery. In
addition it contains the section 011 receiving stolen property.
The following discussion will deal only with the
Wisconsin statutes a,10 case law on property crimes ot "Misappropriation."
It will first treat separately the general "Theft" provision (§ 943.20)
then set out the stxteen other statutes covering specific forms of
misappropriation.
General Theft Statute. The 1955 Wisconsin Criminal Code
defines the er ime of "Mi sappropr ia tion" in the form of "Theft" in three
subsections. The first subsection in four paragraphs defines the conduct
punishable as theft; the second subsection defines the four key terms
used in the section; and the third subsection sets out the penalties
which apply to various forms of theft:
~ 943. 20

Theft.

(l) Whoever does any of the following may
be penalized as provided in subsection (3}:
(a) Intentionally takes and carries away,
uses, transfers, conceals, or retains
possession of movable property of another
without his consent and with intent
to deprive the owner permanently of
possession of such property.
(b) By virtue of his office, business or
employment, or as trustee or bailee, having
possession or custody of money or of a
negotiable security, instrument, paper
or other negotiable writing of another,
intentionally uses, transfers, conceals,
or retains possession of such money,
security, instrument, paper or writing
without the owner's consent, contrary
to his authority, and with intent
-
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to convert to his own use or to the use
of any other person except the owner. A
refusal to deliver any money or a
negotiable security, instrument, paper or
other negotiable writing, which is in
his possession or custody by virtue of
his office, business or employment, or
as bailee, upon demand of the person entitled
to receive it, or as required by law,
is prima facie evidence of an intent
to convert to his own use within the
meaning of this paragraph.
(c) Having a legal interest in movable
property, intentionally and without consent,
takes such property out of the possession
of a pledgee or other person having a
superior right of possession, with intent
thereby to deprive the pledgee or
other person permanently of the possession
of such property.
(d) Obtains title to property of another
by intentionally deceiving him with a false
representation which is known to be false,
made with intent to defraud, and which does
defraud the person to whom it is made.
"False representation" includes a promise
made with intent not to perform it if it
is a part of a false and fraudulent scheme.
(2)

Definitions.

In this section:

(a) "Property" means all forms of tangible
property, whether real or personal,
without limitation including electricity,
gas and documents which represent or
embody a chose in action or other
intangible rights.
(b) "Movable property" is property whose
physical location can be changed, without
limitation including electricity and gas,
documents which represent or embody
intangible rights, and things growing on,
affixed to or found in land.
(c) "Value" means the market value at the
time of the theft or the cost to the victim
of replacing the property within a reasonable
time after the theft, whichever is less,
but if the property stolen is a document
evidencing a chose in action or other
intangible right, value means either
the market value of the chose in action
or other right or the intrinsic value of
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the document, whichever is greater.

If the thief gave consideration for, or
had a legal interest in the stolen
property, the amount of such consideration
or value of such interest shall be
deducted from the total value of the property.
(d) "Property of another" includes property
in which the actor is a co-owner and property
of a partnership of which the actor is a
member, unless the actor and the victim
are husband and wife.
( 3 ) Pe n a 1 tie s • Pe n a 1 t i e s for v i o 1 a t ion
of this section shall be as follows:
(a) If the value of the property does
not exceed $100, a fine of not more than
$200 or imprisonment for not more than six
months or both.
( b) If the value of the property exceeds
$100 but not $2,500, a fine of not more
than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than
five years or both.

(c) _ If the value of the property exceeds
$2,500, a fine of not more than $10,000 or
imprisonment for not more than 15 years or
both.
(d) If the value of the property is less
than $2,500 and any of the following
circumstances exist, a fine of not more than
$5,000 or imprisonment for not more than
five years or both:
1.

The property is a domestic animal; or

2.

The property is taken from the person
of another or from a corpse; or

3.

The property is taken from a building
which has been destroyed or left
unoccupied because of physical
disaster, riot, bombing or the
proximity of battle; or

4.

The property is taken after physical
disaster, riot, bombing, or the
proximity of battle has necessitated
its removal from a building.

(Note: Subsection (1) (b) was amended by
Wisconsin Law 1959 c. 193 which added the final
clause of the first sentence, reading "or
to the use of any other person except the owner.")
-
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Case Law. Several cases have construed the new
general theft provision of the 1955 Wisconsin criminal code,
but only one is significant in determining the meaning of the 1955
statute.
In this case, the defendant appealed a conviction on
several counts of larceny and burglary of gasoline service stations.
The prosecution's case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence.
This evidence showed that when the defendant was arrested in his car,
the auto contained several tools which had been taken from burglarized
service stations. Moreover, other property taken during the burglaries
was found hidden under and about the cottage where the defendant lived
alone. The defendant, who twice had been convicted of other felonies,
did not testify, nor did other witnesses testify in his behalf.
On appeal of his conviction by a judge without a jury,
the defendant contended that the evidence that the stolen merchandise
was found in his sole possession was insufficient to support a conviction. In UP£8lding the conviction, the majority of the Wisconsin
court declared:
Mere possession of stolen property raises
no inference of guilt, but Wisconsin from
early times has followed the rule that
unexplained possession of recently stolen
goods raises an inference of greater or
less w~ight, depending upon the circumstances
that the possessor is guilty of the
theft and also of burglary if they were
stolen in burglary. Such inference
being in the nature of a presumption of
fact calls for an explanation of how the
possessor obtained the property • • •
The nature of the possession of the
stolen goods is important, whether it
is open and unconcealed and whether
the goods are such as the person found
in possession thereof would probably be
possessed of in an unlawful way. This
is what is meant by an inference of
greater or less weight depending upon
the circumstances.
Since the defendant had failed to rebut the "presumption
of fact" by explaining sufficiently his possession of the recently
stolen items, the presumption remained sufficient to support his
conviction.

10.

State v. Johnson, 11 Wisconsin 2d 130, 104 N.W. 2d 379 (1960).
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Law Reyiew Comment.
code's authors wrote:

In a 1956 article, one of the

A major achievement of the code is the
drawing together of the crimes of larceny,
larceny by bailee, embezzlement, obtaining
property by false pretenses and the
confidence game into a single offense
labeled "theft." The old crimes are
not as fully amalgamated as they were in the
1953 draft, since the various ways in
which "theft" can be committed correspond
roughly to the old crimes and many of
their distinguishing characteristics
are preserved. Yet most of the ditticulties
which have been encountered in the past
are eliminated. The reduction in the
number of statute sections is alone a
great boon; yet the law is much more
fully stated in fewer words than in
the previous statutes. And the inclusion
of "promissory" fraud will make it possible
to deal with a class of swindles which
have heretofore gone unpunished because
a promise made with intent not to pertorm
it was not a "false pretense" under the
old law. The code sentence changing
the rule is, "'False representation'
includes a promise made with intent
not to perform it if it is a part of
a false and fraudulent scheme." The
italicized clause will prevent any
tendency to prosecute ordinary breaches
of contract.
The concept of theft of services has been
dropped, except if they are obtained by
putting a slug in a coin box (s 943.22),
which is a minor part of the problem.
Why, one may ask, if it is theft to
obtain property by false pretenses, is
it not equally reprehensible by like
means to get someone to perform labor?
A later article points out that§ 943.20 (l) (a)
contains an ambiguity. That is, the sentence may be construed to
mean that the act prohibited by it always includes a "taking." This
would result by reading the series as one following "takes and" -thus arriving at the result that one who "takes and carries away,"
11.

Platz, "The Criminal Code," 1956 Wisconsin Law Review, 350, 374,375.
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"takes and uses," "takes and transfers," etc., commits the forbidden
act. Yet the sensible and plainly intended meaning seems to be one
which would limit the requirement of "taking" to cases where one
"takes and carries away." This would include the classic cases of
common law larceny where there was a trespass in the taking together
with an asportation. Thus the prosecution would not have to prove a
taking when it is alleged that this subsection was violated by use,
transfer, concealment or detention of another's property. This
ambiguity could have been avoided by a different drafting technique. 12
Professor Baldwin pointed out in his article that the
term "property" as defined in§ 943.20 (2) (a) was intended to bring
the broadest possible range of subjects within the theft provision.
Such a broad definition of "property" (in some recent statutes the
term used is "anything of value") makes it possible to eliminate
numerous sections, each enacted to bring within the ambit of property
subject to larceny a particular form of property or evidence of
property not subject to larceny at common law. Even items which are
contraband may be subject to larceny if within this broad definition.
Services and labor are not included in "property." But any tangible
thing is made subject to theft, "including negotiable notes, commercial
paper, and the like. 11 13
In theft the thing misappropriated must be the property
"of another." Professor Baldwin noted that the definition of "property
of another" (found in ! 939.22 (28) ) is:
"property in which a person
other than the actor has a legal interest which the actor has no right
to defeat and impair, even though the actor may have a legal interest
in the property." Thus, he asserts, property which has been abandoned
is not the subject of theft, for it is not the property "of another."
But the term includes, "property in which the actor is a co-owner and
property of a partnership of which the actor is a member, unless the
actor and the victim are husband and wife." Note that although a
spouse may not steal property co-owned with the other spouse alone,
there may be theft of property co-owned by the thief, his spouse, and
a third person. Moreover a spouse may be convicted for theft of
property solely owned by the other spouse.14
Even though abandoned property may not be the subject
of theft in Wisconsin, property merely lost may be. The mere finding
of lost property is not a crime, but if the finder retains the property
with required criminal intent theft may be committed. Conviction of a
finder would require a showing that the finder knows or by reasonable
efforts could learn the identity of the owner and the finder purposely
omits taking reasonable measures to restore the p~operty to its
owner. The criminal conduct in this instance is an omission to act
after lawful conduct gives rise to a duty to act. The new section
has eliminated the common law rule that to hold a finder of lost
property guilty of larceny with respect.to.that property it was
necessary to find that he had a criminal intent at the time of finding
in order to make his initial taking trespassory.

12.
13.
14.

Baldwin, "Criminal Appropriation in Wisconsin -- Part I," 44
Marquette Law·Review 253, 256 (1961).
Ibid.
Ibid.
-
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The mental element requisite to theft under§ 943.20 (1)
(a) requires both (1) that the act be done "intentionally" and
(2) that it be done "with intent to deprive the owner permanently of
possession • • • " The first requirement is satisfied by showing that
the defendant knew the property belonged to another and that his
actions with respect to the property were without the owner's consent.
The second requirement is the traditional element of common law laiceny
and could be negatived by the defendant's showing that he intends to
return the property. An intention to return the propert~ however,
does not preclude conviction of theft in the nature of embezzlement
under§ 943.20 (l} (b). Moreover, § 943.23 defines as a separate
theft offense the operation of a vehicle without he owner's consent,
without regard to intent to deprive permanently.

15

Professor Baldwin also made several other comments on the
meaning intent of the Wisconsin geoeral theft statute which shows
the intent of the code's drafters: 10
The act required to support a conviction under

943.20 (1) (b) is an intentional "use, transfer,

concealment or retention" of the kind of property
covered. Such acts amount to "dealing with
property as if it were the actor's own. It is
the purpose of the criminal code to proscribe
such a conflict with the right of the true
owner. Wisconsin case law has established
that the .test is not the benefit to the
defendant, but the use by him of another's
property. Thus if a defendant uses the
property of "O" for the benefit of a
third party, "X," rather than for the defendant's
own benefit, he may nevertheless be
convicted.
The mental element under§ 943.20 (1) (b) is guite
different from that required by§ 943.20 (1) \a).
Under (1) (b) the intent is "to convert to
his own use or to the use of any other person
except the owner." Because the property
covered by (1) (b) is peculiarly susceptible
to loss by theft, the law accords it special
protection by (1/ (b) generally and by
eliminating the defense of an intent
to repay or return it later. Thus the
bank teller who surreptitiously "borrows"
money from his employer -- intending to repay
it from huge anticipated profits in a racetrack
venture -- may be convicted. This is in
accord with prior law in Wisconsin as
e 1 sewhere.

15.
16.

Ibid.
Ibid.
-
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LAlthough fraud is not ex~ressly stated as an
element of the§ 943.20(1J(b) offense, it was
required by the prior Wisconsin code provision
and the cases thereunder.? • • . fraud is still
required and a mere civiT conversion of the
property would not suffice for conviction under
( l ) ( b ) • "The e l em en t of fr a u d wa s rec it e d in the
prior law and in cases because of the natural
unwillingness of courts to make an ordinary
breach of contract the basis for criminal liability."
Thus mere conversion is not enough without showing
it was an intentional conversion; mere use is not
enough without showing it was an intentional use.
The jury must consider all the facts and circumstances before finding that there was an
intentional conversion or use. Thus the mental
element is recited 11 in a manner more precise, but
no different in effect, than the common law."
Confusion arising from the phrase 'fraudulent
and felonious' is eliminated.
Subsection (1) (c) proscribes the conduct of
a person who having a legal interest in movable
property, takes it out of tne possession of
another with superior right of possession.
He must act witn intent to defeat the other's
interest in the property, or must believe
that his act will effect a permanent
deprivation of another of a superior right
of possession.
An illustration of how this section might
work is supplied by a Minnesota decision,
State y. Cohen
(196 Minn. 39, 263 N.W.
922 (1935) }. The defendan·t was the owner of
a Hudson seal fur coat which was delivered to
the complainant, a furrier, for alterations.
A fictitious name was given by the owner's
husband at the time of delivery, and
when the coat was ready the defendant refused to
pay. The furrier refused to deliver the
coat without payment, and there matters stood
for several weeks. After repeated efforts to
get paid the furrier took the coat to the
defendant's home. The defendant took the
coat for the announced purpose of trying it
on before a mirror; the furrier was left
waiting at the door. The defendant in
response to repeated requests refused to pay
for the alterations or return the coat to
the furrier. On this evidence, the court
sustained a conviction for larceny on the
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ground that the evidence could disclose an
intention to deprive the furrier of his lien,
Hence a person can be guilty of larceny where
the object taken is his own property if
another has a superior right to possession,
and if the taking is intended to result
in a deprivation of that right.
The requisite act under~ 943.20 (1) (c) is a
taking of unauthorized control by taking
possession. The common law is in accord
because of the definition given to property
"of another." "Of another" has referred
to possession rather than to title or
ownership.
Subsection 943.20 (1) (d) covers the common
law crime of obtaining property by false
pretenses. Here the theft is accomplished
by deceit, as distinguished from theft by
stealth -- the classic case of larceny.
Hence, the element of trespass, a requisite
of common law larceny, is not present. Absent
also is the lawful possession or custody
present in • • • embezzlement.
To be guilty under (1) (d), the defendant
must have acquired title to another's property.
"This requirement is a carry-over from the old
law which required that the victim relinquish
property intending to transfer not only
possession but title also. Accordingly,
a person might or might not be guilty of a
crime if he obtained the property b¥ a false
promise, depending on whether he obtained title
to the property or only possession of it.
The crime of false pretenses required that
the actor obtain title to the property." But
this does not mean that to be convicted one
must have obtained absolute or clear title;
any title obtained by fraud is voidable.
Generally acquisition of bare legal title is
the means of violating this subsection, but
even that is not required in Wisconsin •
.{rhi~7 requirement refers to obtaining title
to property. Hence it is not criminal under
this subsection to induce another to render
personal services by false representation,
or to induce another to extend credit.
Criminal liability, if any, must be founded on
other sections of the code or statutes.
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Another requisite of the
943.20 (l) (d) crime
is that the victim must have been in fact
deceived. If he was deceived, the fact that
he was utterly careless or very stupid and that
a reasonable man would not have been deceived
is no defense. In addition to the fact of
deception there must be a showing that the
victim was deprived of his property as a
result of the deception, but the facts
misrepresented need not have been the sole
matter on which the victim,relied.
Subsection (l) (d) has substantially enlarged
the crime of theft through false pretenses by
including as a false representation sufficient
to support conviction, a promise made with
intent not to perform it if it is a part of
a false and fraudulent scheme. The general
rule, previously followed in Wisconsin, was
that a misrepresentation as to a future act
or fact was insufficient. The promise of
future action must be made with intent not
to perform it.
The mental element under (1) (d) is an intention
to deprive the owner of title. Thus an intent to
return the property is a defense. Moreover,
the defendant must deceive his victim
"intentionally" by a representation "known"
by defendant to be false, and there must be
an "intent to defraud."
Value of the property lost by theft is to be
determined, under the Wisconsin code, according
to the rules set out in § 943.20 (2) (c).
Generally the value to be taken is the lesser of
(a) market value at the time of the theft, or
(b) cost of replacement within a reasonable
time after the theft. If the thing taken is
a document evidencing a chose in action
or intangible right, its value for purposes of
theft is the greater of the document's
intrinsic value or the market value of the
chose or right it represents. The value of
any consideration given by the thief or of any
property interest he had in the item is to be
deducted. The fact that the property is
contraband does not preclude its having a
market value, but it is to be considered
in establishing what the market value is,
for illegality of the victim's possession
certainly affects usefulness and salability.
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Proposed Le9islation for Colorado

The foregoing discussion of general theft statutes in two
of the states in which they have been adopted indicates some of the
problems involved in application and interpretation. For this reason,
further study and consideration of proposed general theft legislation
is needed and no recommendation is being made at this time by the
Criminal Code Committee.
Text of Proposed Legislation
The Illinois criminal code was followed in preparing proposed
general theft legislation for consideration by the Criminal Code
Committee for the following reasons:
1) The Illinois code follows the Model Penal Code quite
closely, so that benefit is obtained not only of the thinking of the
American Law Institute, but also of the six years of intensive study
and work by the combined Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations'
Joint Committee to Revise the Illinois criminal code.
2) Following the Illinois code will retain, for whatever
benefit it may have, the historical tradition of Colorado statutory
law being based upon Illinois law.
3) Following a code already enacted in a heavily populated
state should make available, at an early date, numerous court interpretations of the code's provisions.
4) The Illinois code seems the best model, simply because
of its great clarity of expression, simplicity of terminology,
logical organization, and unification of the several kinds of crimes
conceptually within individual subdivisions of the code.
This proposed legislation was designed to provide a starting
point for further study and not as a final product for adoption. Much
research is needed to determine its effect on present Colorado substantive law.
The text of this preliminary proposal follows:
Section 1:

Theft.
A person commits theft when he knowingly:

a ) Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of
the owner; or
b) Obtains by deception control over property of the owner;
or
Obtains by threat control over property of the owner; or
Obtains control over stolen property knowing the property
to have been stolen by another, and

~~

1)

Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the
use or benefit of the property; or
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Section 2:

2)

Knowingly uses, conceals or abandons the property
in such manner as to deprive the owner permanently
of such use or benefit; or

3)

Uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing
such use, concealment or abandonment probably
will deprive the owner permanently of such use
or benefit.

Penalty.

A person first convicted of theft of property not from the
person and not exceeding $150 in value shall be fined not to exceed
$500 or imprisoned in a penal institution other than the penitentiary
not to exceed one year, or both. A person convicted of such theft a
second or subsequent time, or after a prior conviction of any type of
theft, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary from one to 5 years. A
person convicted of theft of property from the person or exceeding
$150 in value shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary from one to 10
years.
Section 3:
An indictment or information charging the crime of theft is
sufficient if it alleg·es that the defendant committed theft by
unlawfully dealing with the property of another.
Section 4:

Theft of Lost or Mislaid Property.

· A person who obtains control over lost or mislaid property
commits theft when he:
a)
Knows or learns the identity of the owner or knows, or
is aware of, or learns of a reasonable method of identifying the
owner, and
b) Fails to take reasonable measures to restore the property
to the owner, and
c) Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or
benefit of the property.

Penalty.
A person convicted of theft of lost or mislaid property
shall be fined not to exceed $500 or double the value of such property,
whichever is greater.
Section 5:

Theft of Labor or Services ..2! Use of Property.

a) A person commits theft when he obtains the temporary use
of property, labor or services of another which are available only
for hire, by means of threat or deception or knowing that such use is
without the consent of the person providing the property, labor or
services.
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b) Penalty.
A person convicted of theft of labor or services or use of
property shall be fined not to exceed $500 or imprisoned in a penal
institution other than the penitentiary not to exceed one year, or
both.
Section 6:

Offender's Interest in the Property.

a) It is no defense to a charge of theft of property that
the offender has an interest therein, when the owner also has an
interest to which the offender is not entitled.
b) Where the property involved is that of the offender's
spouse, no prosection for theft may be maintained unless the parties
were not living together as man and wife and were living in separate
abodes at the time of the alleged theft.
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CRIMINAL INSANITY

Brief History and Discussion of Criminal Insanity Tests and Procedures
Early English Tests
Insanity was not a defense to a criminal charge in England
until the fourteenth century. Prior to that time the mentally
incompetent were held fully accountable for their criminal acts. 1
In 1724, a leading case established the ''Wild Beast Test" to be
applied by the jury in drawing a line between mental illness serious
enough to constitute a defense in a criminal case and that which
would not. In that case, the trial judge instructed the jurors as
follows: "It is not every kind of frantic humor or somefuing unaccountable in a man's actions that points him out to be such a madman as to
be exempted from punishment; it must be a man that is totally deprived
of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing,
no more than an infant, than a brute, or wild beast, such a one is
never the object of punishment; therefore I must leave it to your
consideration, whether the condition this man was in, as it is
represented to you on one side, or the other, doth show a man, who
knew what he was doing, and was able to distinguish whether he was
doing good or evil, and understood what he did." 2
In 1812, in the murder trial of one Bellingham who suffered
under a delusional mental disorder causing him to believe that the
government owed him large sums of money and who shot and killed a
treasury official who refused to pay him, the "right and wrong" test
was set out in the following words (which seem to eliminate consideration
of a mere insane delusion): "If such a person were capable, in other
respects, of distinguishing right from wrong, there was no excuse for
any act of atrocity which he might commit under this description of
derangement ... The single queston was whether, when he committed the
offense charged upon him he had sufficient understanding to distinguish
good from evil, right from wrong, and that murder was a crime not only
against the law of God, but against the law of his Country."
M'Naghten's Rule
The most important English case on criminal insanity is the
M'Naghten Case.
Daniel M'Naghten labored under an insane delusion
that he was being harassed by personal enemies, including Sir Robert
Peel. In that condition he shot and killed Sir Robert Peel's private
secretary, believing him to be Sir Robert. In his murder trial, the

1.
2.
3.

Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense (1954) p. 53.
Arnold's Case, 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724).
Weihofen ~ c i t . p. 58.
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defendant submitted medical evidence that he was affected by morbid
delusions robbing him of self-control and leaving him without an
appreciation of right aad wrong. The jury found him not guilty on
the ground of insanity.
The public clamor at the acquittal of one
who had killed such a popular figure and had attempted to take the
life of Sir Robert Peel caused the House of Lords to submit five
questions concerning the existing law on the defense of insanity in
criminal trials to the fifteen judges of England. Two of the questions
dealt with cases in which defendants labored under insane delusions.
In answer to those questions the judges declared that one suffering
an insane delusion must have his act judged as if the facts with
respect to which the delusion existed had been real. "For example,
if under the influence of his delusion he supposed another man to be
in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man,
as he supposes, in self defense, he would be exempt from punishment.
If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury
on his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such
proposed injury, he would be liable to punishment. 11 5
The second and third questions asked the judges what instructions might be given a trial jury regarding the test of insanity. In
reply, the judges stated that "The jury ought to be told in all cases
that every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient
degree of reason and to be responsible for his crimes, until the
contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that, to establish a
defense on a ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at
the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act that he was doing, or if h~ did know it
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. • . . 110
The "right and wrong" test has been amplified by explaining
that the knowledge of right and wrong refers to such knowledge with
respect to the very act charged, rather than knowledge of right and
wrong in the abstract. Furthermore it refers not only to knowledge of
legal right and wrong, but also knowledge of moral right and wrong. 7
The M'Naghten Rule has been severely criticized by both legal
and medical authorities. Professor Weihofen has summarized the most
significant criticisms as follows:
1) The concepts of 11 right 11 and "wrong" are ethical or moral
concepts and have no proper place in a scientific or legal test of
mental disorder. Society's moral standards of right and wrong change
from one era to the next, as certainly our morals have changed somewhat
5ince 1843 when the M'Naghten Case opinion was written. A legal test
of insanity based on a moral standard of right and wrong lacks the
precision that such a test should have.
2) The "right and wrong" test was based on psychopathological
notions which are now dated and fail to conform to present day
psychiatric conceptions. The test over-values the intellectual factor

4.
5.

6.
7.

10 Clark and Fin. 200 (1843)
Weihofen, .2.E· £it. ,p. 61.
Ibid.
Ibid.·
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and ignores the role played by the emotions in personality disorders.
Modern psychiatry emphasizes the importance of the emotional rather
than the intellectual genesis of crime. Moreover, the test ignores
the role of the unconscious, since it predated the work of Sigmund
Freud by ~O years. The concept of attenuated responsibility is not
recognized, and the psychopathic personality is entirely ignored.
3) The "right and wrong" test provides a defense only for
those whose mental disorder affects the cognitive or intellectual
phase of the mind and makes no allowance for disorders causing deficiency
or destruction of will power. Thus one who has no control over his
instinctive urgings and impulses because of mental deterioratio_n would
not be accorded the defense of insanity because he would be able to
understand the wrongness of his act, aithough unable to resist
performing it. 8

British Royal Commission
In 1953 the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment
recommended substituting for the M'Naghten Rule the following test:
"The jury must be satisfied that, at the time of committing the act,
the accused, as a result of a disease of the mind or mental deficiency
a) did not know the nature and quality of the act orb) did not know
that it was wrong or c) was incapable of preventing himself from
committing it. 11 9 The effect of this, of course, would be to add to
the present M'Naghten test that "irresistible impulse" test. A
majority of the Royal Commission would have preferred to eliminate the
M'Naghten test entirely and substitute the simpler test, to be
determined by the jury, "Whether at the time of the act the accused
was suffering from a disease of the mind or mental defici5ncy to
such a degree that he ought not to be held responsible."
Irresistible Impulse
The M'Naghten test is still used in England and Canada. In
the United States the M'Naghten formula is the sole test of criminal
responsibility in most states and in nearly all of the others it is
the main test but is supplemented by.,the ''irresistible impulse" test.
Colorado is one of the minority of states recognizing both tests. The
leading Colorado case, Ryan y. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 Pac. 756,
(1916), established the dual standard still followed in this state.
The language of the Ryan case has been adopted in statutory form
together with a legislative mandate that this form be used in instructing
the jury in any case where insanity is claimed as a defense.

Ibid. ,p. 66.
Ibid. ,P• 67.
10. Ibid.

8.
9.
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Colorado Statutes
Colorado law provides, "The applicable test of insanity in
such cases shall be, and the jury shall be so instructed: a person who
is so diseased in the mind at the time of the act as to be incapable
of distinguishing right from wrong with respect to that act, or being
able so to distinguish, has suffered such an impairment of mind by
disease as to destroy the will power and render him incapable of
choosing the right and refraining from doing the wrong,· is not account•
able; and this is true howsoever such insanity may be manifested,
whether by irresistible impulse or otherwise. But care should be
taken not to confuse such mental disease with moral obliquity, mental
depravity, or passion growing out of anger, revenge, hatred or other
motives, and kindred evil considerations, for when the act is lnduced
by any of these causes the person is accountable to the law." 1
Durham Rule
In 1954 the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, which until that date had adhered to a combination
M'Naghten - irresistible impulse test of insanity similar to that
now used in Colorado, decided to simplify· the legal test of insanity
so that the trier of fact would be free to consider all pertinent
testimony from relevant scientific di ciplines. The court criticized
the right and wrong test as follows:

2

The fundamental objection to the right-wrong
test, however, is not that criminal irresponsibility
is made to rest upon an inadequate, invalid or
indeterminable symptom or manifestation, but that
it is made to rest upon~ particular sympton.
In attempting to define insanity in terms of a
symptom, the courts have assumed an impossible
role, not merely one for which they have no
special competence. As the Royal Commission
emphasizes, it is dangerous to abstract particular
mental faculties, and to lay it down that unless
these particular faculties are destroyed or gravely
impaired, an accused person, whatever the nature of
his mental disease, must be held to be criminally
responsible .... In this field of law as in others,
the fact finder should be free to consider all
information advanced by relevant scientific disciplines.
Moreover, the same court criticized the "Irresistible Impulse"
test as carrying "the misleading implication that 'diseased mental
conditions' produce only $Udden, momentary or spontaneous inclinations
to commit unlawful acts. 11 13 The court illustrated its point that a

11.

12.
13.

39-8-1, C.R.S. 1953.
Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862, 872 (D.C. Gire. 1954)
Ibid.
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diseased mental condition may bring about or cause criminal action
which is recognized as wrong and yet is not the result of the sudden
impulse, by quoting from the findings of the Royal Commission: "In
many cases . • . this is not true at all. The sufferer
for example) experiences a change of mood which alters the whole of his
existence. He may believe, for instance, that a future of such
degradation and misery awaits both him and his family that death for
all is a less dreadful alternative. Even the thought that the acts he
contemplates are murder and suicide pales into insignificance in
contrast with what he otherwise expects. The criminal act, in such
circumstances, may be the reverse of impulsive. It may be coolly and
carefully prepared; yet it is still the act of a madman. This is
merely an illustration; similar states of mind are likely to lie
behind the criminal act when murders are committed by persons who
suffer from schizophrenia or paranoid psychoses due to disease of the
brain."
Summarizing, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
declared: "We find that as an exclusive criterion the right-wrong test
is inadequate in that a) it does not take sufficient account of psychic
realities and scientific knowledge, and b) it is based upon one symptom
and so cannot be applied in all circumstances. We find that the
"irresistible impulse" test is also inadequate in that it gives no
recognition to mental illness characterized by brooding and reflection
and so relegates acts caused by such illness to the application of the
inadequate right-wrong test. We conclude that a broader test should
be adopted. 11 14
the court then declared a new test of criminal insanity for
the District of Columbia: "It is simply that an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the product of mental
disease or mental defect." Further elucidating the terminology of
this test, the court declared: "We use 'disease' in the sense of a
condition which is capable of either improving or deteriorating. We
use 'defect' in the sense of a condition which is not considered
capable of either improving or deteriorating and which may be either
congenital, or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a
physical or mental dise~se.15
Without purporting to formulate an instruction appropriate
or binding in all cases, the court stated that any instruction under
the new test should in some way convey to the jury the sense and
substance of the following: "If you the jury believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused was not suffering from a diseased
or defective mental condition at the time that he committed the
criminal act charged, you may find him guilty. If you believe he was
suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition when he
committed the act but believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the act
was not the product of such mental abnormality, you may find him guilty.
Unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt, either that he was not

l4.
15.

Ibid.,p.874.
Ibid., p. 875.
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suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition, or that the
act was not the product of such abnormality, you must find the accused
not quilty by reason of insanity. Thus, your task would not be
completed upon finding, if you did find, that the accused suffered
from a mental disease or defect. He would still be responsible for
his unlawful act if there was no causal connection between such mental
abnormality and the act. These questions must be determined by you
from the facts which you find to be fairly deducible from the testimony
a n d the ev id enc e i n th i s ca s e . " 16
New Hampshire and Maine
The test laid down by the Durham case is strikingly similar
to the test which has been in effect for over 80 years in New Hampshire
and which was established in State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870). The
same basic test has been adopted by-statute in Maine.
Criticism of Durham Rule
In a recent article, a professor of psychiatry severely
criticized the Durham rule. He pointed out that the M'Naghten rule
requires that the jury be told that a man is to be presumed sane until
the contrary, i.e., his insanity, has been proved to their satisfaction.
"This is a doctrine of responsibility and one which places the burden
upon the defendant to establish a defense, not the court to prove him
sane. 1111
Doctor Scher added: "To my mind the Durham rule contains
several questionable aspects, some of which have been discussed
elsewhere. The ambiguity of the terms "product", "mental disease",
and "mental defect" has been remarked upon. One area which has perhaps
not received sufficient ·attention is, I believe, the negative approach
in the.charge to the jury, which instead of asking them to pass on
whether the defendant has adequately demonstrated his defense of
insanity, reverses this situation. The jury is given the burden of
determining 'the act was not the product of • . . mental abnormality.
beyond a reasonable doubt--:--W- This reversal of the roles whereby the
burden is thrown to the jury to accept the plea, places the jury in a
very difficult position indeed. It is difficult enough for the
psychiatrist as expert to make such a determination and undoubtedly
impossible for the jury to do so. Neither psychiatrists nor jurors
can be mind readers or antegnosticians. Furthermore, much as I would
not wish to state it, I think that we must face the fact that there
are psychiatrists, like many another in our society, who see their
testimony as something to merchandise, rather than something to be
expended only with the greatest of caution and censure. 11 18
Doctor Scher appears to suggest that the insanity issue be
tried by a panel of medical experts rather than by a jury. This
suggestion involves the serious question ot whether the right of trial

16.
17.

18.

Ibid.
Scher, "Expertise and the Post Hoc Judgment of Insanity",
Northwestern Law Review (1962).
Ibid.
- 107 -

by jury would be denied. Under Doctor Scher's proposal, a person who
successfully pleaded insanity would be sentenced to treatment for an
undetermined period until his recovery could be certified by a competent
board of qualified psychiatrists.19 This would of course raise a
question whether one could be "sentenced" after having been found
not guilty by reason of insanity. Doctor Scher would obviate this
problem by holding the insane defendant legally responsible but merely
substituting psychiatric treatment for imprisonment. (Serious
constitutional problems are obvious.)
Model Penal Code
In 1955 the American Law Institute published a tentative
draft of the proposed provisions of the Model Penal Code relating to
the test for mental disease or defect which would exclude responsibility
for crime:20
1) A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a
result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capactiy either to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.
2) The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated
criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
The Model Penal Code test {in the first paragraph at least)
follows closely the Durham test. The words "substantial capacity"
are intended to provide a certain amount of leeway for a psychiatrist
called upon to testify. Thus, it would not be necessary for a
psychiatrist to find that a defendant claiming insanity was, at the
time of the act, entirely incapacitated to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or conform that conduct to law.
The portion of the test concerning capacity'to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct deals, as does the "right and wrong"
test, with the cognitive aspect of mental illness. The portion
pertaining to capacity to "conform his conduct" to the requirements
of law deals with the "volitional" aspect of mental illness. The
phrase "irresistible impulse" is not used, for it tends to imply that
there must be suddenness or spontaneity in the urging to commit the
criminal act and tends to eliminate very common cases accompanied by
brooding or reflection where the defendant is, nevertheless, not a
free agent.

19.
20.

Ibid.
Model Penal Code, Proposed Final Draft No. 1, The American Law
Institute, Philadelphia, Pa., April 24, 1961, p. 4.
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This test really amounts to a simplification and modernization
of the present combination of "right and wrong" and "irresistible
impulse" tests. The draftsmen intended that, in applying the
11
Volitional11 aspect of the test, the fact finder must make a distinction
between incapacity to conform one's conduct to legal standards and mere
indisposition to do so. Obviously it is not intended that the latter
be excused.
Psychopathic Personality. Paragraph 2) of the Model Penal
Code's test is designed to exclude from the concept of "mental disease
or defect" the cases commonly known as "psychopathic personality" or
"sociopathic personality." This follows the recommendation of the
British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in its 1953 report
which noted that psychopathy "is a statistical abnormality; that is to
say, the psychopath differs from a normal person only quantitatively
or in degree, not qualitatively; and the diagnosis of psychopathic
personality does not carry with it any explanation of the causes of
the abnormality."
There is considerable dispute among American psychiatrists
on the question whether or not psychopathy should be considered a
mental disease. Some leading psychiatrists have strongly criticized
paragraph 2) as making it possible for the wealty psychopath to rely
on the defense of insanity but rendering the defense inaccessible to
the psychopath without sufficient funds to obtain private psychiatric
examination. This criticism is based on the opinion that it is
possible to find through psychiatric testing and examination some
mental disease or defect in nearly every psychopathic personality, in
addition to the mere abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal
conduct.
Paragraph 2) has been adopted by statute in Maine as a
modification of the statutory Durham rule in effect there. In addition,
the Maine statute excludes drug addicti~~ and alcoholism from the
definition of mental disease or defect.
All of the psychiatrists
who partici!ated in drafting the Model Penal Code provision repudiated
paragraph 2 ~ The criticisms of this paragraph have been summarized
as follows: L.
Then why not do what the American Law Institute
recommends ... and exclude the sociopath an~ his
ilk from the benefits of mental irresponsibility?
The answer is that such special restrictive
clauses aimed at excluding certain specified
categories of individuals from exculpation
simply do not make any psychiatric sense. They
are as arbitrary and capricious as excluding
defendants with red hair or blue eyes or Negro
blood from the benefits of the law of criminal
responsibility. They define by legislative fiat
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what is and what is not a psychiatric condition.
Further, they grossly discriminate against the
defendant who is poor. In practically any case
where the crime itself, or alcoholism or drug
addiction is supposedly tn~ only evidence of
mental disease, a skilled, competent and interested
psychiatrist who spends sufficient time could
discover other manifestations of mental abnormality sufficient to exculpate under the A.L.I. or
Maine rules. But the routine case, superfluously
examined by court appointed psychiatrists devoting
a wholly inadequate time to the study of the
defendant, would seldom end in acquittal. It
costs a good deal of money for a defendant to
engage psychiatric experts to make a full study
of his case. The defendants who have such money
would have no difficulty in demonstrating to
the trier of fact that their behavior was not the
only thing that troubled them. In all likelihood,
defendants without such funds would be routinely
passed by as II sane. 11 Thus a type of economic
discrimination, which is bad enough under our
present rule of M'Naghten would become much worse.
Currens Case
On May 1, 1961, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit laid down a new test of insanity in the case of United
States~- Currens, 290 F. 2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961). Currens had been
convicted of violating the Dyer Act by interstate transportation of a
stolen automobile. He had pleaded "not guilty'' and also "not guilty
becau~e of insanity." At the trial, the_ psychi'atrist who had examined
him on behalf of the government described Currens as a "sociopathic
personality possessing an emotional instability reaction but that he
knew the difference between right and wrong but would not adhere to
the right." Doctor Bowers, the psychiatrist, examining wo~ld not say that
Currens was subject to irresistible impulses which caused his criminal
behavior but stated rather that he reacted without due regard for
consequences and that his illegal and antisocial conduct was repetitive
and an outgrowth of his type of personality. Doctor Bowers testified
that it was his opinion that Currens' theft of the car, . . . was the
result of Currens' sociopathic personality and that a person with such
a personality cannot be considered to be 'a mentally healthy person'.
When asked if the 'sociopathic condition' was itself a mental disease,
Doctor Bowers replied, "We consider it under the classification of
mental illness but we do not consider them (persons possessing psychopathic personalities) in the legal sense 'insane•.23
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The defendant's attorney asked the court to charge the jury
using the test of insanity approved in the Durham case. The trial
court, however, refused this request and charged the jury according
to the M'Naghten test and the II irresistible impulse" rule. The jury
found the defendant guilty.
Insanity Defense for Psychofiaths. Chief Judge Biggs of the
Third Circuit faced the question whet er the defense of insanity should
in all cases be made unavailable to the psychopath or sociopath. After
reviewing the psychiatric literature and noting the conflict of opinion
among psychiatrists whether or not a psychopath can be considered a
victim of mental illness, the court noted that the chief objection to
including psychopaths among those entitled to raise the defense of
insanity as sum es a particular definition of psychopathy: 11 the term
psychopath comprehends a person who is a habitual criminal but whose
mind is functioning normally." The court continued, "Perhaps some
laymen and, indeed some psychiatrists, do define the term that broadly;
and insofar as the term psychopathy does merely indicate a pattern of
recurrent criminal behavior we would certainly agree that it does not
describe a disorder which can be considered insanity for purposes of a
defense to a criminal action. But, we are aware of the fact that
psychopathy, or sociopathy, is a term which means different things to
experts in the fields of psychiatry and psychology. Indeed, a confusing
wealth of literature has grown about the term causing some authorities
to give up its use in dismay, labeling it a "waste basket category. 11 24
The court concluded, however, that there were "two very
persuasive reasons why this court should not hold evidence of psychopathy
as insufficient, as a matter of law, to put sanity or mental illness
in issue. First, it is clear that as the majority of experts use the
term, a psychopath is clearly distinguishable from one who merely
demonstrates recurrent criminal behavior. 11 25
Chief Judge Biggs noted that a leading authority, Doctor
Winfred Overholser, superintendent of Saint Elizabeth's Hospital in
the District of Columbia, and his staff, have taken the unequivocal
position that sociopathy is a mental disease. Moreover, Chief Judge
Biggs noted, in 1952 the American Psychiatric Association altered its
nomenclature to remove sociopathic personality disturbance and psychopathic personality disturbance from a non-diseased category and place
them in a category of "mental disorders 11 .26
Chief Judge Biggs also relied heavily on Doctor Hervey
Cleckley's definition of psychopathic or sociopathic personality.
Cleckley rules out those cases in which social standards are rejected
only in respect to some one particular kind of behavior: for example,
alcoholism or deviant sexual behavior in a person otherwise adapted to
social demands. He also rules out those cases in which delinquency
and crime have been adopted as a positive way of life - in which the
person is an enemy of society but is capable of being a loyal and
stable member of a delinquent gang. There remains a group characterized
by a diffuse and chronic incapacity for persistent, ordered living of
any kind. These are, in Cleckley's point of view, the true psychopathic
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personalities. They need not be diagnosed negatively, by exclusion
of other possibilities. They constitute a true clinical entity with
a characteristic pattern of symptoms.27
From his review of the medical authorities Judge Biggs
concluded that in many cases the term "psychopath" is applied by medical
experts to persons who are very ill indeed. Thus, he asserted, "it
would not be proper for this court in this case to deprive a large
heterogeneous group of offenders of the defense of insanity by holding
blindly and indiscriminately that a person described as psychopathic
is always criminally responsible. 11 28
The Third Circuit's second reason for refusing to hold that
psychopaths are sane as a matter of law is that the term itself is too
indefinite. Rather the court felt, "in each individual case all the
pertinent symptoms of the accused should be put before the court and
jury and the accused's criminal responsibility should be developed
from the totality of his symptoms. A court of law is not an appropriate
forum for a debate as to the meaning of abstract psychiatric classifications. The criminal law is not concerned with such classifications
but with the fundamental issue of criminal responsibility. Testimony
and arguments should relate primarily to the subject of the criminal
responsibility of the accused and specialized terminology should be
used only where it is helpful in determining whether a particular
defendant could be held to the standards of the criminal law. 11 29
Noting that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
has applied the Durham test to all types of mental illness, including
psychopathy or sociopathy, the court held that the question whether a
particular sociopath is insane within the meaning of the law is a
question .of ultimate fact for the jury. In the instant case, the court
concluded that there was sufficient evidence on which a reasonable
jury might find that Currens did not possess the requisite guilty mind
when he committed the alleged crime.
Criticism of M'Naghten Rule. Next, addressing attention to
the question of the proper test of insanity in a criminal case, the court
traced the history of the M'Naghten rule and concluded that it was
actually over 375 years old, having first been published "in a year in
which belief in witchcraft and demonology even among well educated men
was widespread. 11 30 Summarizing, the court concluded that the M'Naghten
is also unworkable for many reasons, among them the following:
One who violates a criminal law will be held responsible even in
instances where he may believe his act to be morally right. For
example, one who is sane as to most matters but suffers under a delusion
as to a particular matter might well be found sane under the right and
wrong test of M'Naghten. Our institutions for the mentally ill today
contain many patients who are fully cognizant of the difference
between right and wrong.
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the basic aims, purposes and assumptions of the criminal law." 36
Criminal law is based on the assumption that a person has the capacity
to control his behavior and choose his own course of conduct. Thus,
Judge Biggs said, "where there exists a reasonable doubt whether a
defendant possessed capacity of choice and control there is a reasonable
doubt whether he possessed the necessary guilty mind to justify conviction.
An adequate test of insanity should make clear to the jury that the fact
that a defendant was suffering from a mental disease is not determinative
of his criminal responsibility in and of itself, but is significant
only in so far as it indicates the extent to which he lacked normal
powers of control and choice when the allegedly criminal conduct was
committed. In other words the test must provide the jury with a verbal
tool by which it can relate the defendant's mental disease to his total
personality and by means of which it can render an ultimate social and
moral judgment."37
The court found the Durham formula failed to meet these
requirements. Under the Durham test, the prosecution has the burden
of proving that the act committed was not the product of a mental
disease or defect. "The test stresses, to the complete exclusion of
all other considerations, a possible causal connection between the
mental disease with which the defendant is afflicted and the act which
he committed. When considering this test it is natural to think of
the mental disease as a distinct vital force in the defendant's mind.
producing some acts but not others. In so far as it has this effect,
the test is, in much the same way as the M'Naghten rule, subject to
the criticism that it wrongly assumes that the mind can be broken up
into compartments, one part sane and the other part insane. Moreover,
the test, limited as it is to a supposed causal connection between
mental diseases and criminal acts omits the most important step in
deciding the issue of criminal responsibility, namely that of determining
the total mental condition of the defendant at the time he committed the
act, and providing the jury with a standard by means of which an ultimate
social and moral judgment can be rendered."38
0

The following formula was then adopted as the test for insanity
in the Third Circuit: "The jury must be satisfied that at the time of
committing the prohibited act the defendant, as a result of mental
disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law which he is alleged to have violated."39
This test borrows heavily from the first paragraph of the
Model Penal Code test. However, the court deleted the phrase "to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct." A footnote to the opinion
explains the court's feeling that this deleted phrase would "overemphasize the cognitive element in criminal responsibility and thus
distract the Jury from the crucial issues while beinq little more than
surplusage. 114
Moreover, the court expressed its full agreement with the
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Model Penal Code test's second paragraph, excluding from the definition
of "mental disease or defect" abnormalties manifested only by repeated
criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
To assist trial courts, the opinion formulated the following
jury charge which would have been acceptable in the Currens case: 4 1
If you the jury believe beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant, Currens, was not suffering
from a disease of the mind at the time he committed
the criminal act charged, you may find him guilty.
If you believe that he was suffering from a disease
of the mind but believed beyond a reasonable doubt
that at the time that he committed the criminal
conduct with which he is charged he possessed
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law which he is alleged to have
violated you may find him guilty. Unless you
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Currens
was not suffering from a disease of the mind or
that despite that disease he possessed substantial
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements
of the law which he is alleged to have violated,
you must find him not quilty by reason of insanity.
Thus, your task would not be completed upon finding,
if you did find, that the accused suffered from
a disease of the mind. He would still be responsible
for his unlawful act if you found beyond a reasonable
doubt that at the time he committed the act, the
disease had not so weakened his capacity to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law which he
is alleged to have violated that he lacked substantial
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements
of that law. These questions must be determined by
you from the facts which you find to be fairly
deducible from the evidence in this case.
Critique of Currens Test
Dr. Bernard L. Diamond, a California psychiatrist, has
recently published a critique of the Currens formula. Doctor Diamond
asserts that both the Durham rule and the Currens rule are far superior
to the M'Naqhten and "irresistible impulse'' tests. Furthermore he
states: 42
Currens is superior to Durham, if for no other
reason, than because it omits the troublesome
'product' clause of both the Durham and the New
Hampshire rules. Criminal b 7havior is_not the
"product" of mental disease in the strict ca~se
and effect relationship that the law would like
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There is no reason why the law should be wedded to the state
of psychological knowledge in 1843. These rules cannot "be rationally
justified except by a process of interpretation which distorts and
often practically nullifies them • • • • " Judge Biggs then quoted
from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's testimony before the British Royal
Commission, "The M'Naghten rules are in large measures shams. That
is a strong word, but I think that the M'Naghten rules are very difficult
for conscientious people and not difficult enough for people who say,
'We'll just juggle them•. 11 31
Judge Biggs then asked: "How, conceivably, can the criminal
responsibility of a mentally ill defendant be determined by the answer
to a single question placed on a moral basi 9 ? 113 2 He concluded that all
that the M'Naghten rules accomplish is to put the testifying psychiatrist
in a verbal straight jacket.33
Furthermore, the court voiced the criticism that the "rightwrong" test places the psychiatrist in a position where he must state
a moral judgment and cannot avoid usurping, to some extent at least, the
function of the jury. The court noted that many European nations have
adopted legal rules relating to criminal responsibility of offenders
suffering from mental disorder or weaknesses which bear no relation to
the "right and wrong" test. The administration of criminal justice in
those countries has not suffered by these improvements. Finally, the
court concluded that the M'Naghten rules are not only unfair to the
defendant but are dangerous to society, because instead of resulting
in the isolation and treatment of those who are dangerously mentally
ill until such time as it is safe for society to release them, the
present rules result in imprisonment of these persons for definite
periods after which they are released and frequently commit criminal
conduct in the very community where they have been thrown back "untreated,
and uncured. 11 34
Formulation of Modern Test. The Currens opinion next dealt
with the problem of formulating a modern test of criminal insanity for
jury trials. First, said the court, an effective test must make it
possible for the experts to present the entire picture of the defendant,
including all of his symptomatology, before the court and to allow a
full explanation. "The way must be cleared in any case, in which the
mental condition of the defendant is at issue, for the psychiatrist to
explain the condition of the defendant to the jury in understandable
terms. 11 35 Second, an adequate test must provide the jury with a
standard or formula by means of which it can translate the mental
condition described by the psychiatrist into an answer to the ultimate
question of whether the defendant possessed th~ necessary guilty mind to
commit the crime charged. The test must make it possible "to verbalize
the relationship between mental disease and the concept of 'guilty mind'
in a way which will be both meaningful to a jury charged with the duty
of determining the issue of criminal responsibility and consistent with
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to believe. The vast majority of mental illnesses
result in no criminal behavior of any kind. But
certain psychological abnormalities in certain
individuals so affect the motivational, ideational,
and volitional psychology of those individuals
that, under special environmental circumstances,
aggressive, destructive, or immoral anti-social
behavior occurs. In most of these instances the
psychiatrist can say with probability, but never
with certainty, that if it were not for the mental
illness, the overt act would not have occurred.
The essential phrase of Currens, 'lacked substantial
capacity to conform,' should, I think, be much
simpler for both the psychiatric expert and the lay
juror to ponder over. Further, it provides an
opportunity for the expert to describe any aspect
of the defendant's psychology that he thinks may
have some relevancy to his capacity to conform,
whether it is a lack of knowledge of the wrongfulness of his act, or of its nature and quality, as
required under M'Naghten or whether it is the
defect of volitional control specified by the
irresistible impulse test, or the "product"
relationship of Durham.
Currens is thus more inclusive than any other
previous rule of responsibility. This will make
Currens more appealing to those who believe the
·existence of mental illness of any kind should be
given the fullest possible consideration in a
criminal trial. But for all those who believe
that mental illness and what they regard as the
fantasies of psychiatrists and humanist reformers
already receive more attention than what they
deserve in our courts of law, Currens will be a
threat and vigorous opposition is to be expected.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
recently expressed its views on the various proposed legal tests of
insanity as follows:43
It is sufficient to say here that_ if the issue
were now before us /comprising this particular
panel of the Eighth-Circui!7, which it is not,
we would hesitate to reverse a case where the
trial court had employed instructions on insanity
which this court has heretofore approved and
henceforth we would be loath, indeed, to reverse
where, as here, the trial court has used instructions,
whether based theoretically on a M'Naghten variation
or on the test set forth in the Model Penal Code . . •
or on that form revised as suggested by the Third
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Circuit in Currens, or whether couched in still
other language, if the charge appropriately
embraces and requires positive findings as to
three necessary elements, namely the defendant's
cognition, his volition, and his capacity to
control his behavior. If those three elements-knowledge, will and choice--are emphasized in
the court's charge as essential constituents of
the defendant's legal sanity, we suspect that
the exact wording of the charge and the actual
name of the test are comparatively unimportant ...
Court Decisions and Tests in Other Jurisdictions
Since the Currens decision, the highest appellate courts of
Maryland and Pennsylvania have expressly rejected the suggestion that
the "right-wrong'' test be abandoned in their respective jurisdictions
in favor of the Durham rule or the Currens standard.44
New Hampshire. Since 1870 New Hampshire courts have applied
a simple test requiring the jury to find only whether or not the
defendants at the time of the allegedly criminal act had a mental
disease, and if so whether that act was a product of his disease.
Within that test an uncontrollable, insa·ne impulse to commit the act
would render the act a product of mental disease.45
Alabama. In 1887 the Alabama Supreme Court declared that the
"right and wrong" test had been repudiated by modern and advanced
authorities, both legal and medical. The Alabama court then laid down
these inquiries to be submitted to the jury: 4 6
First. Was the defendant at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, as matter of fact, afflicted
with a disease of the mind, so as to be either
idiotic, or otherwise insane? Second. If such be
the case, did he know right from wrong, as applied
to the particular act in question? If he did not
have such knowledge, he is not legally responsible.
Third. If he did have such knowledge, he may nevertheless be not legally responsible if the two
following conditions concur: 1) If, by reason of
the duress of such mental disease, he had so far
lost the power to choose between the right and
wrong, and to avoid doing the act in question, as
that his free agency was at the time destroyed;
2) and if, at the same time, the alleged crime was
so connected with such mental disease, in the
relation of cause and effect, as to have been the
product of it solely.
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1J.liD2.J~. The new Illinois criminal code insanity test
based on the Model Penal Code, The Illinois Code section follows:

17

6-2. Insanit1,
(a) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at
the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or mental
defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law.
§

(b) The terms "mental disease or mental defect" do not include
an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
Vermont.
follows:48

In 1957 Vermont adopted a new test of insanity as

~ 4801.
Test of insanity in criminal cases. The test when
used as a defense in criminal cases shall be as follows:

(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks adequate capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
The terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. The terms "mental disease or defect" shall include
congenital and traumatic mental conditions as well as disease.
(2)

Virgin Islands.
declares:4~

The new Virgin Islands Code of 1957

All persons are capable of committing crimes or offenses
except-(4) Persons who are mentally ill and who committed the act
charged against them in consequence of such mental illness . • .

(This provision was suggested to the
the V.I. Code by Chief Judge Biggs of the U.S.
Third Circuit. Note, however, that when Chief
Currens opinion he did not adopt for the Third
he had recommended to the Virgin Islands.)

47.
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Advisory Committee on
Court of Appeals for the
Judge Biggs wrote the
Circuit this test which

Illinois Revised Statutes. c. 38, ~ 6-2 (1961).
)
V~rmont Statutes Annotated, Title 13, § 4801 (1958.
Virgin Islands Code, 14 § 14 (1957).
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Cause for Concern in Colorado
There has been much recent concern in many jurisdictions,
as shown in the previous section, over the tests, definitions, and
procedures for determining criminal insanity. This concern has been
shared in Colorado for several reasons: First, there has been
constant criticism over the continued use of the M'Naghten and
irresistible impulse tests. Second, there has been a general feeling
that a plea of no{ guilty by reason of insanity is offered in many
cases only as a delaying tactic. Third, it is believed generally that
many such pleas are made and that often criminals escape capital
punishment or lengthy imprisonment by being found insane. Fourth, a
finding of'not guilty. by reason of insanity might lead.to almost
immediate release, because the state hospital at Pueblo may find an
alleged offender sane and the jury finds him insane. He is committed
to the hospital where he has already been considered sane, so he is
released. Fifth, there is a need for a special institution for the
criminally insane and potentially dangerous offenders.
Insanity as a Defense
The apparent general public impression that many alleged
offenders are avoiding "punishment" by making a successful plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity is not borne out by a study of the use and
success of this plea in genver District Court during the five years
from 1957 through 1961. 5
.
The statistics in this study cover the criminal indictments
and informations for murder, burglary, larceny, forgery, and rape filed
in the Denver District Court. These figures are based upon the number
of indictments and informations filed and not upon the number of cases.
(For example, a single case may involve three defendants, each separately
charged with larceny and larceny by bailee. This situation would be
counted as one case and six counts of larceny.)
MURDER

Charges
Insanity plea
Defense withdrawn before trial
Insanity issue submitted to jury
Found insane and committed to
hos pi ta l

so-:

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

Total

14
6
2
4

24
8
2
6

33

24
7
4

26
8
2
6

121
41
14
27

3

4

6

3

5

21

12
5
7

3

These data were presented to the Criminal Code Committee at its
September 21, 1962 meeting by Dr. Hans Schapire, Chief of
Psychiatric Services, Department of Institutions, and were
taken from a research paper prepared by a Denver University law
student.
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RAPE 51

Charges
Insanity plea
Defense withdrawn before trial
Insanity issue submitted to jury
Found insane and committed to
hospital

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

Total

28
l
l

35
3

26
l

34
3

138
10

l

0

0

2

l

2
l

15
2
2
0

4

0

2

l

l

0

4

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

Total

118

134

185

8
4
4

6
6
0

4
4
0

349
26
19
7

499
26
17
9

1,285
70
50
20

3

0

0

6

6

15

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

Total

248
18
15

317
14

341
26
22

310
30
21

407
21
11

4

9

9

l, 623
109
78
30

6

LARCENY 52

Charges
Insanity plea
Defense withdrawn before trial
Insanity issue submitted to jury
Found insane and committed to
hos pi ta l

BURGLARY53

Charges
Insanity plea
Defense withdrawn before trial
Insanity issue submitted to jury
Found insane and committed to
hos pi ta l

3

9
5

3

3

4

6

7

23

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

Total

33
l
l

58

74
5
4

76
16
10

101

0

7
7
0

l

6

8
4
3

342
37
26
10

0

0

0

3

2

FORGERY 54

Charges
Insanity plea
Defense withdrawn before trial
Insanity issue submitted to jury
Found insane and committed to
hos pi ta l
51.
52.

53.
54.

Included statutory rape, but not assault to commit rape, indecent
liberties, or unnatural copulation.
Included larceny by bailee and larceny of mortgaged property, not
conspiracy to commit larceny or petty larceny.
Did not include conspiracy to commit burglary, attempted burglary
or breaking and entering a motor vehicle.
Did not include no account check charges or conspiracy to commit
forgery.
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As shown by these tables, insanity was used as a defense in
murder 33.8 per cent of the time. It was withdrawn 34.l per cent of
the time. ·rt was successful 17.3 per cent of the time.
Insanity was used as a defense in rape 7.3 per cent. The
defense was withdrawn 60 per cent of the time. It was successful 2.8
per cent of the time.
Insanity was used as a defense in larceny 5.4 per cent. The
defense was withdrawn 71.4 per cent of the time. It was successful
1.1 per cent of the time.
Insanity was used as a defense in burglary 6.8 per cent.
The defense was withdrawn 71 per cent of the time. It was successful
1.4 per cent of the time.
Insanity was used.as a defense in forgery 10. 7 per cent.
The defense was withdrawn 70 per cent of the time. It was successful
1.4 per cent of the time.
These percentages seem to indicate that, except in murder
cases,this defense is used infrequently and is rarely successful when
based on the total number of indictments and informations filed.
Perhaps the infrequency of the plea is the reason why the public
believes the opposite, because when the defense is used the newspaper
coverage is usually"complete and perhaps this may be what creates the
erroneous impression.

Criminal Code Committee Meeting, September 21, 1962
At the September 21, 1962 meeting of the Criminal Code
Committee, several psychiatrists discussed the problems connected with
present criminal insanity procedures. Dr. John MacDonald assistant
director, Colorado Psychopathic· Hospital,the -following remarks:
1) A major problem is that psychiatrists are not asked to
give a medical opinion about a defendant's mental condition, but are
asked to give an opinion as to whether the defendant knew right from
wrong, which is a moral concept and not subject to verification by
medical standards.
2) The present tests used in Colorado are inadequate as is
the Durham rule. Perhaps, the best test devised thus far is Currens.
3) No person who has shown anti-social tendencies should be
release from custody until he is no longer a danger to society. In
this connection, there is a great need for research on how to treat the
psychopathic offender.
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4) Trial attorneys try to lump all of an alleged offender's
irrational actions together, so that the jury may be given an unbalanced
picture of the person being adjudged. This practic~ often leads to
acquittal on the grounds of insanity. Conversely, many alleged offendexs
who are severely psychotic are found to be sane by juries because of
their appearance and deportment in the co~rtroom.
5) Colorado needs a separate and adequately staffed facility
for the criminally insane.
Dr. James Galvin, Director of Institutions, aareed with Dr.
MacDonAld on the nee~ for a separate facility for the criminally insane.
Dr. Galvin also said that under the present circumstances the M'Naghten
rule probably works as well as anything else. He added that he would
prefer having the determination of sanity made by a three-judge panel,
if such procedure would be constitutional.
Dr. Hans Schapire,_Chief of Psychiatric Service~, and Dr. Mark
Farrell, psychiatric consuitant, Colorado State Penitentiary, both
stressed the need of a separate facility for the criminally insane.
Dr. Farrell recommended the creation of a full-time parole board and
the adoption of a one day to life indeterminate sentence for all
offenders. Dr. Schapire Ufged the adoption of the Massachusetts statute
which allows the court to have any person examined and evaluated who
is charged with a crime of violence or who has a history of aggressive
anti-social behavior and crime. Both of them agreed that present
procedures were not satisfactory, but had no specific suggestions on
the test which should be used or the procedures which should be
followed.
Recommendations for Colorado
Several recommendations, some including drastic changes in
present procedures, have been made for changes in the present procedures
for determining criminal insanity.
Elimination of Plea
Following is the outline of a proposal presented to the
Criminal Code Committee by Senator Edward J. Byrne at its October 11,
1962 meeting.
The statutory plea of ''not guilty by reason of insanity"
would be repealed and the common law plea of "not guilty by reason of
insanity" would be specifically abolished by statute. Instead there
would be the following statutory provision:
a grand
because
conform
to have
offered
to form

"No information shall be filed or an indictment returned by
jury wherein the defendant at the time of the alleged offense
of mental disease or defect lacked substantial capacity to
his conduct to the requirement of the law which he is alleged
violated, provided that evidence of mental condition may be
in a proper case, as bearing upon the capacity of the accused
the specific intent essential to constitute a crime."
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When an information is filed or an indictment returned,
the defense may make a motion to quash as provided in 39-7-7,C.R.S.,
19~3,on the grounds that the information or indictment should not have
been filed because the defendant had a mental disease or defect and
lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirement
of the law which he is alleged to have violated. Following the motion
to quash but prior to a hearing on the motion, the court would commit
the defendant (as at present) for observation and evaluation.
After the period of observation and evaluation, a hearing
would be held on the motion to quash the information. A three-judge
panel would preside at this hearing, and there would be no jury. The
three judges would be designated by the departmental justice of the
supreme court upon petition from the presiding judge in the district
where the case is to be tried.
It would be the duty of the defense attorney to put the
question in issue in the first instance by offering evidence to show
that the defendant was mentally diseased or defective to the extent that
he substantially lacked capacity to conform his conduct to the requirement of the law he is alleged to have violated. It would then be the
function of the district attorney to prove that the defendant was
competent within the above definition at the time of the alleged
offense.
The psychiatrists who examined the defendant and other
professional witnes~es, if -desired by the court, would be required to
give expert testimony regarding the defendant's mental condition. The
test to be used in the special proceedings on the motion to quash is the
same as the Currens rule:
"The •• •Lcour_!_7 must be satisfied that at the time of
committing the prohibited act the defendant, as a result of mental
disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law which he is alleged to have violated."
If the court finds that the defendant was not mentally
diseased or defective within the test as defined, the motion would be
denied, and the prosecution could proceed on the information. If the
court determines that the defendant was suffering from mental disorder
which resulted in his lacking capacity to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law, the court would quash the indictment or
information, enter one of the two following findings, and commit the
defendant to the director of institutions:
1)

mentally diseased and not accountable for the crime as

charged; or
2)

mentally defective and not accountable for the crime as

charged.
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After rece1v1ng the patient, the director of institutions
would be required to study and evaluate him and place him in the
appropriate state institution. Such person would remain in the custody
of the state until such time as he or the director of institutions shall
petition the committing court for release. Such petition would include
a complete report on the patient's current condition and would set forth
specific -information on why the patient may be considered a safe risk
back in society. The petition would be heard by another three-judge
panel, and this panel would have the authority to engage psychiatrists
to make an independent study. If the petition is rejected, there would
be a time limitation before another petition could be presented.
If the patient is released, the court would still have
the authority (in its discretion) to exercise supervision over the
patient for a maximum of five years. The court could (in its discretion)
make an arrangement with the state department of institutions or any
other public agency to provide such supervision under the court's
direction or to assist the court in providing such supervision.
Comments. By abolishing the plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity, the constitutional need for a jury trial on the question may
be eliminated. The proposed procedures, while generally similar to
those used now, differ in several important respects. The M'Naghten rule
and "irresistible impulse" would be eliminated as tests and would be
replaced by a test which: 1) is more in keeping with modern psychiatric
thought; and 2) does not include the moral question of right and wrong.
The psychiatrists testifying at the special proceeding would not be
straight-jacketed by outmoded rules and definitions; therefore, they
would have a chance to offer a freer expression of their findings.
The commitment procedure would assure that a person who is
found to be mentally diseased or defective would not be set free. The
procedure for release provides adequate safeguards for society, while
at the same time affording a defendant a means for release, so his rights
are protected. The court's authority to extend supervision after
release is an added safeguard for society.
Research is currently underway to determine the constitutionality of Senator Byrne's proposal. The main questions to which
answers are sought are:
1)

Can the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity be

abolished?
2) Under the procedures outlined in this proposal, can a
jury trial be elimiflated?
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Modification of Present Procedures
Representative Roy Romer and Representative Roland Mapelli
have also presented several recommendations concerning criminal
insanity procedures to the Criminal Code Committee. These include
the following:
1)

A maximum security unit designed specifically for the criminally
insane should be constructed as soon as possible.

Explanation: The present facility for the criminally_
insane at Pueblo is only a temporary answer and is not an adequate
"maximum security'' facility. The more dangerous of the criminally
insane now have to be confined at the penitentiary in Canon City.
The number of escapes from Pueblo in the past few years is evidence
of the need for this unit. It should be a separate unit designed
spec~fically for the criminally insane, incorporating the necessary
facilities required for adequate security and treatment.
2)

An individual committed to the Colorado State Hospital as being
criminally insane should not be released.until (1) he is determined
to be restored to sanity, and (2} until it is also determined
that he is no longer a danger to society.

Explanation: Under present procedure, a person may be
found to be insane by a jury and committed to the State Hospital at
Pueblo to be held there until he is restored to sanity, even though
the psychiatrists at the hospital have already testified under oath
that the individual is now sane. Therefore, when his release is
requested, the hospital must certify that he is sane and he may be
released within a short time even though there has been no significant
change in his mental condition. Yet the person, though legally sane,
may by medical standards be a menace to society because of a mental
disease or mental disorders which do not amount to legal insanity.
The public would be better protected if the institution were permitted
to hold the individual not only until he is determined to be restored
to sanity but also until it is determined that he is no longer a
danger to society. The present procedures relating to the confinement
of sex offenders may serve as a guide. A person given an indeterminate
sentence for a sex offense may be held by the institution until the
parole board determines that it is safe to release him on parole.
Consideration should be given to the establishment of some similar
"review board'' for those committed as criminally insane. On request
for a person's release, this board would evaluate not only the question
of ''legal insanity" but also would evaluate the evidence concerning
other mental disorders, not amounting to strict legal insanity, but
which may cause the person to be a danger to society.
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The board would then report to the court whether or not it
is safe to release the individu~l an parole or otherwise.· Prematu1
release of the criminally insane could be lessened and the public
given better protection under this changed procedure. A similar
recommendation has been made by a study commission in California to
the Qovernor and legislature of that state.
3)

The legal definition of what constitutes criminal insanity should
be modified or clarified to permit the psychiatrist to testify
accurately in the area of his professional competence, namely,
the medical or mental condition of the accused and the degree of
his mental illness or disorder, thus leaving to the jury the moral
question whether in light of this evidence the accused should or
should not be held responsible for this act.

Explanation: The combined efforts of the medical and legal
professions should be enlisted to develop more adequate standards to
assist the jury in its deliberations. These standards or the legal
test, should clearly separate the role of the psychiatrist (to testify
concernin~ the degree of mental illness or disorder) and the role of
the jury {to determine the moral question of whether the accused
shall be held accountable).
4)

A panel or commission of competent psychiatrists should be
established from which the court could appoint one or more
psychiatrists, depending on the nature of the case, to report
concerning the accused's sanity, with procedures which would
permit the psychiatrists appointed in a particular case to
adequately share with each other the information and facts upon
which they base their opinion of sanity and which would permit
the appointed psychiatrists to have adequate access to police
files and other information relevent to this determination.

Explanation: Under present procedures, a part of the reason
for the great divergence of psychiatric opinion in any one case is
due to the fact that the various psychiatrists that testify do not
have available to them the same information or facts concerning the
case. The court-appointed psychiatrists often have access to more
complete information than do the defense psychiatrists, for example.
With better sharing of the information concerning the accused and the
circumstances surrounding the crime between and among the psychiatrists
who testify, the wide variance in the opinion of the various psychiatrists
should be reduced. The establishment of such a commission or panel of
competent psychiatrists, and its use by the court, might cut down on the
number of psychiatrists hired independently by the accused, although this
alternative would still be available to the defense.
5)

An accused should be denied bond, if the plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity is entered, until that issue is determined.

Explanation: By the nature of the plea, the accused is
contending that he is not responsible for his actions and is asking
for commitment and observation until such time as there shall be a
judicial determination of his sanity. Therefore, it is dangerous to
subject society to the risk of this individual until the question of
his sanity is d~termined.
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6)

There has been considerable discussion concerning the pros and

cons of changing the burden of proof so that an accused who
claims to have been insane at the time of the crime would have
the burden of proving his insanity rather than to have the state
prove his sanity beyond reasonable doubt. This suggested change
raises constitutional questions that should be investigated
in order that further discussion of this proposal will fully
consider the problem of protecting the constitutional rights
of the accused and of protecting the public. The attorney
general has been asked to comment on the constitutional questions
involved in this question.
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ROBBERY AND NARCOTICS VIOLATIONS

AND INCARCERATED OFFENDERS
Introduction

The Criminal Code Committee appointed a five-member subcommittee in July 1961 to study robbery and narcotic offenses and the
characteristics of convicted robbers and narcotics violators. 1 This
subcommittee was charged with the responsibility of developing
factual material on the following:
l) incarcerated offenders -- previous record, use of
alcohol and narcotics, family background, education and employment,
mental condition, and related matters;
2)

number of unsolved offenses; and

3) number of offenders before the courts and disposition
of their cases, including dismissal, probation, and sentence.
This information was desired by the Criminal Code Committee
as background for considering statutory changes related to robbery
(particularly aggravated robbery) and narcotics violations.
The characteristics of incarcerated offenders convicted of
various degrees of robbery and narcotics violations were summarized
from an analysis of the case histories of all offenders in these
categories in the state penitentiary. The data on unsolved cases and
offenders- before the courts were compiled from questionnaires sent
by the subcommittee to selected ·police departments, district attorneys,
probation departments, and courts.
The subcommittee made its ·report.to the C~iminal Code Committee on September 22, 1961 and the chairman of the subcommittee
reported the following findings:
1) The courts in Colorado are performing their jobs well.
In particular, sentences have been heavy for aggravated robberies.
2) In many cases, the aggravated robber graduates from
burglary to his present offense.
3) Probation has been granted sparingly, if at all, to
aggravated robbers, and probation has been quite successful in these
cases, although for some the time on probation has been too short
to determine the results.
4) There is a particular problem with the aggravated robber
who recognizes that he can realize more money from taking narcotics
than emptying the till in drug store holdups. He is usually not a
user but sells the narcotics he acquires through robbery to a pusher.
1.

Members of the subcommittee were:
Representative Robert Eberhardt,
chairman; Senators Edward J. Byrne and Paul Wenke; and Representatives Frank Evans and John Kane.
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5) The living pattern among the various categories of
robbers and narcotics violators is quite similar. These men are
usually young -- in their twenties; have limited or no occupational
skills; dull normal I.Q.'s and an eighth grade education or less;
poor military service records, if any; and almost all have been
characterized as having deep-seated emotional problems, making adjus
ment to society difficult and offering a very poor future prognosis.

1-

In accepting the subcommittee report, the Criminal Code
Committee decided unanimous~y that it should be included in the
committee's final report to the General Assembly.3 Accordingly, the
subcommittee's.report is presented ·below.
Characteristics of Incarcerated Offenders
Armed Robbers
As a rule, the armed robber is young -- between 20 and 22
years of age. In approximately 65 per cent of the cases, his ethnic
background is Anglo, as opposed to Negro, Spanish-American, Indian, or
combinations thereof. If he is a member of a minority group, that
group is more likely to be Spanish-American than Negro. As for
marital status, the probability of his being single (with no marriage
history) is strong (10 cases out of 17). Cases of divorce or
separation are few (two out of 17). If he does have children, the
number ranges from one to three.
Seldom is the armed robbery which led to his present
incarceration his initial offense or arrest. If he does have a police
record, the number of entries (e.g., previous arrests) is likely to be
four. On the average he has committed one felony and one juvenile
offense. However, in nearly half the cases, there is no juvenile
record, and in 29 per cent of the cases, no history of previous felony
convictions can be found.
The intelligence quotient of the armed robber is likely to
fall within the "dull normal" range (90-92). Rarely does his I.Q.
exceed 105, and in 14 per cent of the cases it is below 70.
Educational achievement appears to be closely related to the degree
of intelligence. On the average, the armed robber has completed eight
grades, and only in isolated instances has he continued his education
beyond ninth grade. From a vocational standpoint he is poorly equipped
for life; occupational skills, as such, are strikingly absent. In
approximately 65 per cent of the cases, he has been employed as a
laborer, and the incidence of short-term employment is quite high (71
per cent). In half of the cases he has not served in the armed forces,
and where there is a record of military service, the discharge, in
only one out of two cases, is honorable.

2.
3.

Legislative Council Criminal Code Committee, Minutes of September
22, 1962.
Legisla\ive Council Criminal Code Committee, Minutes of October
27, 1962.
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In practically all cases the armed robber is emotionally
disturbed. The chances are three out of four that he has been
identified as a neurotic or psychopathic personality. In a number of
instances, his "reality ties 11 are strained; he can withstand pressure
or stress only to a point, and beyond this point he lashes out at the
world. In effect, he translates his inner conflicts into aggressive,
antisocial acts. Perhaps some correlation can be established between
emotional disturbance and home environment. It is interesting to note
that in more than half of the cases, the environment in which the
inmate was reared can be classified as "poor. 11 On the other hand,
the number of 11 900d" home environments should not be minimized (five
out of 17 cases). Surprisingly enough, perhaps, 44 per cent of the
11
poor" home environments are ones in which the marital union remained
relatively intact (both parents} during the inmate's childhood and
adolescence. On the average he has three siblings.
The armed robber is probably a moderate or "social'' drinker.
In only 12 per cent of the cases can his consumption of alcoholic
beverages be regarded as ''heavy," and in slightly less than 25 per
cent of the cases, use of alcohol is excessive only on occasion. There
are no instances of alcoholism. In addition, the armed robber is
seldom a narcotics user (only five cases out of 17}. Where a drug is
used, the chances are excellent that it is marijuana.
Aggravated Robbers
While it is difficult to draw a picture of an aggravated
robber which covers all offenders incarcerated for this crime, certain
generalities may be made and a composite picture of the most usual
characteristics may be developed.
The composite aggravated robber is likely to be young -between 23 and 27 years of· age. In more than one-half the instances,
he is Anglo rather than a member of a minority group. If he is a
member of a minority group, the chances are almost two to one that he
is a Spanish-American rather than a Negro. He is most likely to be
single -- either never having been married or is presently divorced.
If he does have married status, the chances are one in two that the
marriage is common law. It is also unlikely that he has any children
(if married}. If he does have children, it is usually only one.
His intelligence quotient is around 95 or dull normal; only
rarely will he have an I.Q. of more than 110. Rather than an I.Q.
above 95, he is more likely to have one between 75 and 95. His
educational attainment reflects very much his I.Q. Generally, he
will be found to have completed the 8th grade. Seldom has he attended
high school, and the chances are one in three that he left school somewhere between the third and eighth grades. His occupational skills
or lack thereof are about on a par with his I.Q. and educational
attainment. Generally, he has no occupation or has been employed only
as a laborer. It is very unlikely that he worked very long at one
job or for one employer. Either he has never been employed, or his
work experience has consisted of a number of unskilled jobs at low
pay for short periods of time. His military history approximates the
same pattern. If he has been in service (and less than one in two
.
have}, he will probably have been discharged for the good of the service,
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under conditions other than honorable, or have received a dishonorable
discharge. While he may have received an honorable discharge, his
military record shows a number of minor violations and perhaps a court
martial or two.
His ability to stay out of trOJble in civilian life is no
better than it was in military service. He probably has had one
previous felony conviction. The chances are also good that he has a
juvenile record. In addition. he has been arrested at least four
times for investigation, drunkenness, vagran~y, or some other misdemeano:r.
All in all, he has had contact with law enforcement officials for one
reason or another at least seven times.
From the foregoing it would appear that the composite
aggravated robber has not learned from experience and has had considerable trouble adjusting to society. He has not been very successful
at those things upon which our society places high value, such as
educational achievement, occupational skills, steady employment, and
satisfactory military service. It should come as no surprise that he
has a considerable number of emotional problems, some of which are
very serious and some of which make him potentially very dangerous.
Being unable to compete and gain recognition on society's terms, he
seeks another way to achieve gratification of his needs and to gain
status. Often, he takes out his frustrations through assault on others
and feels his weapon is an equalizer in his battle against society.
The chances are 50-50 that he has been identified as a psychopathic
personality, although he may exhibit either neurotic or psychotic
tendencies as well. He is unsure of himself and has little respect
either for himself or his fellow man. But he is not even successful
in the.role he has .chosen to play. His crimes are not well thought out,
even those involving considerable violence and large sums of money.
More often than not, the amount of money involved is small. His
emotional problems may have been identified as far back as his first
arrest or his first commitment, but no one has done anything about it.
He has been without help for so long that the prognosis is very
dubious.
He is likely to drink, although moderately in 50 per cent of
the cases. If he is a heavy drinker, his drinking has usually been
involved in his criminal activity. He drinks to compensate for his
inability to get along, takes on false courage, acquires a weapon, and
sets forth to redress grievances. It is much less likely that he uses
narcotics. If he is a narcotics user, it is probable that he only uses
marijuana, although in a number of instances he has been a user both of
marijuana and heroin. In only a few cases will he both drink and use
narcotics. Usually in these circumstances, he is a moderate drinker.
There are a few instances, however, where he is both a heavy drinker
and a "main liner." It is in these few instances that psychiatric
evaluation indicates an extremely troubled and potentially dangerous
pyschopathic personality.
He is more likely to come from a poor home environment, usually
from a broken home. It is surprising, however, how often his home
background is either good or average, the same being true of the
family's financial situation. He probably has three siblings. A
family background with five or more brothers or sisters is not unusual
but not as prevalent as might be expected. It is interesting to note,
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too, that usually he is the only one in the family to have gotten into
trouble repeatedly with the law. In most cases, his brothers and
sisters have made some kind of an adjustment and accept society.
They may also have emotional problems, but these problems have not
brought them as often in conflict with society.
Narcotics Violators
The narcotics violator tends to be a man in his late twenties
(28 to 30 years of age). In approximately eight cases out of ten, he
shares membership in a minority group: Spanish-American, 44 per cent;
Negro, 37 per cent; and Indian, one per cent. He is likely to have
some matrimonial record: either. he is legally married or involved in
a common-law relationship (26 cases out of 70); or· he is divorced
or separated (22 cases). The average number of children born to the
inmate and his partner is one.
Among narcotics violators, 93 constitutes the average I.Q.,
and in 16 out of 56 cases the degree of intelligence falls below 90.
It should be noted, however, that in 27 per cent of the cases, the
intelligence quotient lies somewhere between 100 and 110. It would
appear that very low intelligence is partially offset by scores in the
"bright normal" category. The I.Q. of the composite narcotics violator
is an index to his educational attainment -- a median of nine grades.
In only scattered instances has he earned a high school diploma, or
the equivalent thereof (three out of 69 cases). In 18 cases his
education has not extended beyond the seventh grade. His employment
record tends to be sketchy; in the majority of cases he has worked as
a laborer, and as a rule, jobs are of short duration. As for service
in the armed forces, no history can be found in 42 cases. Where the
inmate has served in a military branch, the discharge, in more than
half the cases, is one of the following types: honorable, with a
court martial or courts martial record (three cases); conditions other
than honorable (six); dishonorable or "bad conduct" (two); and
undesirable (two).
Serious emotional problems are common among narcotics
violators. The personality of the violator, in one out of three cases,
is marked by a psychopathic disorder. As might be suspected, he is
very likely to use drugs in some form (56 out of 70 cases), especially
marijuana l31 cases), and frequently he is addicted to narcotics
(26 cases). As for alcohol, moderate consumption is the rule. Only
four per cent of narcotics violators are alcoholics.
In more than half the cases (33 out of 65) the home
environment can be characterized as "poor." There appears to be some
correlation between the "one-parent" home and an undesirable environment.
In 29 per cent of the cases the environment can be described as "good."
The median number of siblings is four.
In nearly all cases the narcotics violator has run afoul of
the law prior to his present offense. The chances are almost one out
of two that he has a juvenile record, and in approximately 69 per cent
of the cases there is a history of felony convictions. Of those 48
inmates with prior felony records, 14 (or 29 per cent) have commit!ed
a previous felonious act involving the possession or use of narcotics.
-
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In each case of narcotics violation, the individual involved
was charged with "possession of narcotics" or "possession of narcotic
drugs." Nothing else (such as use of drugs) was specified. However,
other information reveals that at least five of the violators who
used drugs were also peddlers of narcotics.
Simple Robbery
The robber is likely to be an individual in his middle
twenties (25 to 27). In the majority of cases the ethnic background
is Anglo (54 per cent), as opposed to Spanish-American (31 per cent)
and Negro (15 per cent). As for marital status, the probability of
his being single (with no marriage record), or divorced or separated,
is strong (66 per cent). In 40 out of 123 cases he is either legally
married or involved in a common law relationship. Where children have
been born to the inmate and his partner, the number ranges from one
(in 26 cases) to five (in three cases).
Among robbers 94 is the median intelligence quotient, and
in only two cases out of 92 does the level of intelligence fall within
the II superior" range ( above 120) . However, 35 inmates are clustered
in the 100-120 bracket. It appears that scores of "normal," "bright
normal, 11 and "superior·" are balanced against scores below 91. The
I.Q. of the composite robber serves as a clue to his educational
achievement -- usually eighth grade. In 32 cases out of 122, his
education has been discontinued at the end of seventh grade, or before.
Yet, it is noteworthy that six inmates have completed twelve grades,
and that two have attended one year of college. Because of lack of
occupational skills, the robber is ill-equipped for life; in only 20
to 25 per cent of the cases does he possess what could be labeled a
"skill." No occupation can be listed in 18 of the 123 cases, and in
52 of the remaining 105 cases, he has been employed as a laborer. Jobs,
in the majority of cases (57 per cent), have been on a short-term
basis, although 21 per cent have a record of relatively steady employment.
·
As for membership in the armed forces, no service history
can be found in 57 cases out of 121. Where the inmate has served in
a military branch, the discharge, in 84 per cent of the remaining 64
cases, is one of the following types: honorable, with a court
martial recordt or violation of the 104th Article of War (11); honorable,
inaptness (twoJ; convenience of the government (two); unsuitability
(two); conditions other than honorable (17); dishonorable or "bad
conduct" ( 12); and undesirable (six).
In most cases the behavioral pattern of the robber points
to emotional disturbance. In 51 cases out of 111, a psychopathic
disorder characterizes his personality; and in 29 cases he has been
identified as neurotic. Only in nine cases is there no evidence of
emotional problems. It would appear that the robber's emotional
condition can be related, in part at least, to the type of home
environment in which he was raised. In 57 of 121 cases, the environment
can be classified as "poor. 11 Of these homes 18 were headed by one
parent. On the other hand, 44 of the home environments can be
described as "fair," and 20 as "good." On the average. the inmate has
three to four siblings.
-
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The robber, in 108 out of 122 cases, consumes alcoholic
beverages. In nearly half of these cases (108), such consumption is
moderate, but in 27 cases, the drinking is heavy, with 11 identified
as alcoholics. As a rule, the robber refrains from the use of
narcotics (93 cases in 122). If a drug is used, the chances are
excellent that it is marijuana alone, or marijuana combined with other
narcotics (e.g., heroin, morphine, dilaudid).
Rarely is the robbery for which he is now serving time the
inmate's first offense or arrest. On the average he has collided with
the law eight previous times (i.e., prior arrests, juvenile offenses,
felonies). The average number of felony convictions is one; juvenile
offenses, one. In only 19 of 122 cases has he been convicted of a
felony or felonies in the same category as the present offense.
Summary of Questionnaire Responses 4

Narcotics
The questionnaire responses indicate that narcotics
violations are not a serious problem anywhere but Denver, although
they have been on the increase in Pueblo. Westminster was the only
other metropolitan area city to report a narcotics violation. Only
three cities (Denver, Aurora, and Pueblo) reported aggravated robberies
involving narcotics, with Denver having both the highest number and
incidence. There were fewer aggravated robberies involving narcotics
in 1960 than in 1959, but the increase during the first half of 1961
indicated that 1961 would be the highest of the three years. Of the
total aggravated robberies reported, 6.5 per cent involved narcotics.
Aggravated Robberies
The number of aggravated robberies reported by eiggt cities
increased from 516 in 1959 to 555 in 1960 (or 7.5 per cent).
The
largest increase was in Pueblo -- from nine to 26 (or 188.9 per cent).
Denver's aggravated robberies increased from 482 in 1959 to 497 in
1960 (slightly more than three per cent).
It was estimated that Denver
would have almost 600 aggravated robberies or almost a 20 per cent
increase over 1960. A large increase was anticipated in Aurora and
a decrease in Pueblo, with no significant change in other cities.
The incidence of aggravated robbery (number per 100,000
population) for the eight cities was 69.2 in 1959 and 74.5 in 1960.
Denver had the highest incidence followed by Aurora, Westminster, and
Grand Junction. Slightly more than 40 per cent of those arrested for
aggravated robberies in Denver were released without charges during
the two and a half years covered in the study.6 Westminster was the
only other city with releases.
4.

5.

6.

Replies from police departments, district attorneys, courts and
probation departments.
Aurora, Denver, Englewood, Fort Collins, Golden, Grand Junction,
Littleton, µueblo, and Westminster.
Denver was also the only city to have narcotics violators released
without charge -- (54.4 per cent in two and a half years).
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Over-all, almost 59 per cent of the aggravated robberies
reported were unsolved in 1959, 1960, and the first half of 1961.
Westminster had the highest proportion unsolved (83.3 per cent),
followed by Grand Junction (77.7 per cent), Fort Collins (66.6 per
cent), Denver (59.8 per cent), and Aurora (52.4 per cent).
Aggravated Robbers Before the Courts
It is difficult to make a precise analysis of aggravated
robbers before the courts because of variations in the charge as
indicated on the court dockets. 40-5-1, C.R.S. 1953, defines three
different kinds of robbery: a) armed robbery -- weapon, no injury,
death, or violence; b) aggravated robbery -- injury, assault, violence
in connection with the robbery; and c) robbery -- all other. Charges
are filed, however, and cases docketed to include four categories -simple robbery having been added. From the examination of penitentiary
case histories, it appears that many inmates incarcerated for
robbery committed crimes which were more likely within the definition
of armed or aggravated robbery. There is also no apparent difference
between robbery and simple robbery.7 It is also possible that charges
on some defendants may have been reduced prior to filing, so that an
analysis of charges reduced after filing may not present an accurate
or complete picture.
With these reservations, the following findings were made:
1) During the two and a half year period, charges were
reduced in at least 28 per cent and perhaps as many as 36 per cent of
the cases.8
2)
the cas~s.8

Charges were dismissed in approximately 12 per cent of

3) The highest proportion of dismissed charges for judicial
districts with a significant number of cases was the 1st, followed by
the 10th, 17th, and 2nd.
4) The highest proportion of reduced charges during the two
and a half years was in the 2nd District (Denver), followed by the
17th, 10th, and 1st.

Narcotics Violators Before the Courts
Almost 20 per cent of the charges of narcotics violations
were dismissed, not including those charges dismissed before filing.
In the 1st District, 36 per cent of the cases were dismissed; in the
10th District, 18 per cent were dismissed; and in the 2nd District,
17 per cent were dismissed.
7.
8.

For example, Denver's criminal docket shows that in 1959 only 13
aggravated robbers were docketed and 105 robbers; in 1960 the
totals were 18 aggravated robbers and 128 robbers.
The proportion may have been higher after action was taken in the
sizeable number of cases which had been filed in 1961, but were
still pending at the time the questionnaires were returned.
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In only 15 per cent of the cases were charges reduced.
Again the 1st District had the highest proportion of cases in which
charges were reduced (36 per cent}, followed by the 17th (25 per cent)
and the 2nd (13 per cent).
Probation
It appeared from the limited information available, that
probation is granted sparingly to aggravated robbers and narcotics
violators and that there are surprisingly few instances of probation
violation, although many of these probationers have not finished
their terms of probation and have considerable time left, so that it
is likely that the number of violations would increase.
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NARCOTICS CONTROL
Colorado's statutes on narcotics offenses and control were
last amended in 1960 when much more severe penalties were adopted and
addiction was made a misdemeanor offense. Despite these recent
changes, narcotics legislation was included among the subjects listed
in Senate Joint Resolution No. 14 (1961) for study by the Criminal
Code Committee. The Criminal Code Committee began consideration of
narcotics problems at its March 9, 1962 meeting at which time the
committee heard from William B. Eldridge, American Bar Foundation,
who was staff director for the foundation's recently published study
entitled Narcotics and the Law, A Critique of the American Experiment
in Narcotic Drug Control. A summary of Mr. Eldridge's discussion of
narcotics problems follows:l
Scope of Study
After the joint committee of the American Bar Association
and the American Medical Association completed its report on narcotics
control and problems, it recommended five additional research projects.
Two of these were medical, two were legal, and the other was
sociological,which dealt with education. The two legal research
proposals were given to the American Bar Foundation for its consideration.
They were extremely large, sweeping proposals, and the foundation did
not feel at the time that the areas were well enough defined or that
money or personnel were available to go into them to the degree that
these two proposals suggested. So it was decided to take these
projects piecemeal and try to provide some useful information to the
people concerned about narcotics control.
It's an area which is ripe with division and dissension among
the people who espouse one method or another for controlling narcotics,
and the most clearly defined area and the sharpest division occurs
over the effectiveness of current policies. Consequently, the study
was directed primarily at an empirical examination of the administration
of narcotics drug laws throughout the United States to determine how
well they are working, i.e., leaving aside for a moment all questions
of humanity, sociology and everything else -- do they work?
Seven states and the District of Columbia were selected for
intensive study and the laws of all the states were examined. New York,
Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, Missouri, California, New Jersey, and
the District of Columbia were examined in depth, including the reports
of all the agencies that could be contacted and interviewed in those
states. In addition to this, of course, the staff talked extensively
with Federal Narcotics Bureau personnel and examined reports made
available by the commissioners.
(Now, before I go any further, I want to say that any
assistance I can offer this committee is limited. I am not an expert
on narcotics drugs or narcotic addiction. If I am an expert on anything, it is what people know about it. I can tell you something
1. ixc~rpted from Legislative Council Criminal Code Committee, Minutes
of Meeting of March 9, 1962.
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about what people know and what they don't know. This is the first
study that we have been able to find that is based purely on empirical
use of reports and statistics. We put aside, for the most part,
studies and reports on addict population in this country, because they
are largely based on opinion.)
Narcotics Census. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics keeps an
addict census. It is based on who reports what to the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, and I am sure that most of you are aware that when you
have to take things at face value from a reporting agency, you have to
accept the fact that the things are not accurate. The Federal Bureau
of Narcotics only holds them out as reported statistics. However,
very dangerous comparisons are made in justification of narcotics
control policies by using the figures which are based on reported
addicts. Currently, there are something like 45,000 addicts known by
name. This figure is often used to balance against estimates from the
early nineteen hundreds. Estimates at that time ranged from 100 to
200,000, and in some cases, up as high as a million. In using estimates,
let's take the most conservative one of 100,000 and compare it with
44,000 now, and it is highly impressive. But 44,000 is not an estimate,
it is an enumeration, and there is no factor added to it.
In these seven states people were contacted who either had
the statutory responsibility for narcotics control or whose names were
given us by people connected with narcotic drug control. Information
was requested on the number of narcotic offenses, the sentences which
were imposed, the length of sentences actually served, recidivism, and
narcotic-associated crimes.
•
.· The replies to these initial inquiries were unbelievably
disappointing. In most places the bureau or division or department
charged by statute with maintaining .information or with responsibility
of the administration of drug laws had no idea what was going on.
Other places, especially where records were kept, tried to do very,
very little to enlighten us on what was going on. The statistics which
can be marshalled can support any view you wish to take. If I were
hired as a statistical consultant by this committee and I knew which
way the committee was leaning, I could provide you with whatever kind
of information you wished, and someone else could provide the exact
opposite. It is one area where there is a wealth of statistical
information, and very little of it is any good.
I think this is an extremely important point for all of you
to keep in mind when you are considering modification in your own
narcotic laws -- that almost all the information which can be
provided to you is subject to rebuttal.
Ohio and Michigan
Ohio is frequently cited as the model jurisdiction in
narcotics, supposedly having the stiffest law in the country. We have
been told that narcotic addiction has fallen off at some dramatic
rate in Ohio, but there is no way to prove or disprove this. The number
of narcotic arrests has declined in Ohio, but not nearly so markedly
as the supposed decline in addiction. Remember the tie-up between
narcotic addiction and crime everywhere; the toll of narcotics addiction
is said to provide 50 per cent of the crime in the large cities and
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25 per cent of the crime throughout the United States.

Narcotic
addiction in Ohio is supposed to have declined something like 80 per
cent since it enacted its harsh legislation, but the crime normally
associated with narcotics has not. Larceny, robbery, burglary,
forgery, and prostitution have not declined at all.
Now it seems to me that one must come to one of two
conclusions on this kind of evidence. Either addiction has not
declined in Ohio, or addiction does not promote the crime to the extent
we are told it promotes. This is the confused picture all over the
country.
Now, the next thing to keep in mind when examining the results
of particular legislative efforts is that there is a world of difference
between writing harsh legislation and having it applied. Michigan has
a 20-year minimum mandatory penalty for the sale of narcotics. That's
fine, but hardly anyone gets convicted in Michigan for the sale of
narcotics, something less than three per cent. The charges are usually
reduced to possession. This happens because the judges just will not
impose the mandatory penalty. The ~nerican Bar Foundation has undertaken
an extensive study of the administration of criminal justice, and this
study has been going on for six years. When the staff was working in
Detroit, it was fbund that people were not convicted for sale of
narcotics, and there the answer they were given was that the judge
would not allow it, because they would not impose 20-year minimum
sentences on these people.
The California Narcotics Commission went to Michigan to talk
with the judges, and their answer was that the juries would not convict.
Whatever it is, they don't do it. Now, because of this, the proponents
of heavy penalties for narcotics addicts will suggest (despite the
fact that Michigan comes closest to their ideal of stiff sentences)
that you must have cooperation from district attorneys and from the
judiciary to make the law work. This is quite true, and I don't know
how you are going to get it, unless you conduct an education program
to convince the judges and the juries that such sentences are desirable.
Let us assume now that a state has severe penalty legislation
and a cooperative judiciary and prosecuting body. Suspension,
probation, and parole aren't stopped~ they are going to get out. I
could not find out from the course of this study very satisfactory
answers on how many months people convicted of various narcotic offenses
actually spent in prison. I could find it out in the federal system.
There is no parole for narcotic addicts and there is a minimum fiveyear penalty, so they spend it all in prison. In examining these
matters, we all need a lot more information than is available. One of
the greatest services any state legislature could provide now is
(regardless of whatever kind of control measures you feel are necessary)
the development of some system for checking the effectiveness of these
controls over a period of time; there is no way to do this now. Also
the information that you need to know now about people charged and
convicted of narcotics offenses is very extensive.
What causes addiction? Doctors state that many people can
spend a long time in the hospital under severe pain. During this time
they are being administered morphine or some less potent drug, and when
the pain subsides, they are not addicted; another individual, however,
under similar circumstances is addicted. Why? If it's true in
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hospitals, it'll be true in prisons.

When one individual starts using

narcotics drugs, if he is removed from the source by imprisonment, he
may come out fine and never need it again. The majority apparently
do not. This does not mean, however, that addiction is not curable,
that it cannot respond adequately to treatment. But the difficulty
thus far in developing treatment and rehabilitation procedures in
penal and medical institutions is that nobody (legislatures,
appropriation committees, public health services, and such) has provided
the funds to conduct follow-up studies to find out what happened.
I was really moved with great pity when I went to the
Lexington Narcotics Hospital, which is staffed by an extremely
dedicated group of people, but their job seems to be like that of a
surgeon who operates on a patient for cancer today and never knows
whether the man lived or died. Tomorrow he has to perform the same
operation again, and he doesn't know whether to modify his procedure
because he knows nothing about its success. If you are going to
provide facilities to aid narcotics addicts, they will be valueless
unless you provide additional facilities to find out what happened to
them; and they have to be fairly extensive facilities.
In New York, a few studies have been conducted, and some of
them have been most gratifying, particularly those on intensive parole
care with narcotics patients. And when you remember that it costs
something like $350 a year per parolee for this intensive care as
compared to the $250 for a regular parolee, it sounds a little bit high
at first, but in New York it costs about $2,000 a year to keep a person
in prison. It costs money to support his dependents while he is there
(they usually don't have any income), plus, we are told, millions and
millions ·of dollars in depredation by narcotics addicts. Intensive
care for parolees and rehabilitation services in penal institutions
are really a small investment in comparison to what it costs without
it.
Solutions to the Narcotics Problem
Now, let us turn for a moment to the proposed solutions to
the narcotics problems. Generally, there are about five major ones.
First, and the most important is the one now followed, that of applying
criminal sanction. The proponents of criminal sanction as a method of
control argue that for practical reasons you cannot make distinctions
about people who have narcotic drugs in their possession. I can cite
you an exampl~ I thin~ which points up most of the criticism of the
approach: I can have 10 pounds of uncut heroin in my possession
and you can have one capsule, and under the federal laws we both go
to prison for the same length of time. Now, it may be practical to
administer such a law, but it is also justifiably unrealistic. There
are severe problems about allowing and making distinctions in the
amount of drugs possessed. It has been tried in New York. New York
policemen tell me that the narcotics pushers carry one grain less
than the statutory minimum for a misdemeanor, and their business
flourishes. This may very well be true.
I don't see, myself, why the discretion that has been vested
in judges for years in all sorts of criminal offenses has to be_den~ed
in this particular area. Judicial discretion allows the determ1nat1on
- 140 -

of the sentence according to what the conditions are in the particular
case, what the background of the defendant is, and what hi~ prospects
for recovery are. But the proponents of stiff penalty leg1slati~n .
apparently lose all their confidence in the judiciary. They ma1nta1n
that the criminal sanction system will not work without uniform, severe
application of sentences and contend there are always soft-hearted
judges who let some go.
The converse of this is the fact that the statute is
unyielding; there are always promising people who go to jail for five
years, and who come out in worse condition than when they started.
If you are going to operate on the assumption that the judges cannot
be given the discretion to sentence in the area of narcotics as they
are in other areas, then there is nothing to do except to impose a
severe statutory minimum mandatory penalty without benefit of suspension,
probation, and parole, which is done in several jurisdictions. If you
can operate on the assumption that your judges can apply discretionary
sentences with an eye to correcting the problems of particular
individuals, then you are well on the way toward bringing together
some of the best aspects of all of the proposals.
Narcotic Clinics. The antithesis of the criminal sanction
approach is the narcotic clinic, which was tried in this country in the
1920's immediately after the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act began to produce
some chaos for a while because thousands of narcotic addicts who had
been getting drugs freely before suddenly didn't, and they were
apparently in very distressing circumstances. There are a lot of
various methods proposed in connection with narcotics clinics. One
proposal is that they be operated by the state on a 24-hour day basis,
where the addict has to come and get every shot one at a time. Obviously
this is unrealistic; a man who has to go to the hospital every four
hours cannot hold a job. Another proposal is that he be given a oneday's supply or up to a two-days' supply. Of course, these proposals
are all connected with registration requirements, photographs,
fingerprints, etc., in order to prevent, insofar as possible, diversion
of the drugs by the people registered.
The biggest advantage which the proponents of the narcotic
drug clinics espouse is that it will cut into the illicit traffic.
Doubtless it will; I don't think it will eliminate it. There is
considerable evidence that narcotic addicts are associated with
criminal activity in other ways than using narcotic drugs. Is this
the cause or an effect? Which comes first, addiction or criminal
activity? Here again various statistics are open to speculation.
But there are going to be people who for reasons of their criminal
activity are not going to register and are going to seek to continue
to get drugs from illicit sources.
There is also a good possibility that if narcotic drug
clinics are established where confirmed addicts can get their supply,
there will be more active proselytizing by pushers. If this business
is worth all we are told it's worth to the pushers, they are probably
going to try and continue to develop new markets. I might say, right
here, that certainly there is evidence of this. Most of the intensive
investigation, like the senate and house hearing in this connection,
indicate that proselyting to induce people into addiction is really
not a very large problem. Certainly, addiction is a contagious
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thing, but most people appear, as far as can be determined, to take
it up like we take up smoking, because some of their friends did, or
it was a clever thing to do. The first thing they know, they smoke
all the time and cannot help it, but not because somebody came out
and induced them to do it behind the barn or in the corn field.
There is a strong possibility, however, that if legitimate
supplies are provided to existing addicts, then the pushers might
turn to this kind of development. If one state sought to establish
narcotic clinics before all states did, it probably would become an
Eden for addicts. If they were established uniformly everywhere,
there might be a different result.
British System. This same kind of problem arises in
connection with the employment in the United States of something like
the British system. The British system was something we were told
for years didn't exist. This is because the British dangerous drug
act reads very much like the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act. Both of them
have the usual terms that are subject to much interpretation, such as
"in the course of the doctor's professional practice," "in good
faith," and "for the relief of pain," etc. In Great Britain when the
question of proper professional practice arose, a committee of doctors
was formed to determine what proper professional practice was, or is.
In the United States it was determined by non-medical arbiters.
On paper there are three things which distinguish the
British system. (I mention the British system because it is widely
advocated in this country.) This committee set forth three
circumstances under which drugs could be administered to addicts:
1) when -the patient is under treatment by a gradual withdrawal method
with a view toward cure; 2) when, after attempts at cure, it appears
that the drug cannot be completely discontinued because of the
severity of withdrawal symptoms; and 3) when it has been demonstrated
that the patient is capable of leading a relatively normal life if
given drugs and that he cannot lead such a life without drugs.
Many American authorities say there is no such thing as
this third condition, where a person can function successfully
with drugs and cannot function without it. A number of others say
that there are many such circumstances. The British say that they
find them fairly often. Great Britain with a population of 50 million
people has about 400 reported narcotic addicts. The United States,
with something less than 200 million people, has a reported 44,000
narcotic addicts and an estimated 60,000, which is a very conservative
estimate. Without doubt, the British reporting techniques are not as
good as ours. I think that their addict population is doubtless
higher than 400. But it requires the application of a pretty high
error factor to raise that 400 up to a level comparable to our
60,000.
Recent studies in Great Britain have shown opposite
conclusions. Two doctors sent by Governor Rockefeller to study the
program in Great 8ritain came back and reported that addiction in
Great Britain is not the result of their system, but their system is
the result of the fact that they do not have a large addict problem.
Mr. Scheerer, who has written a new book on the subject, reports the
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opposite, that the British law has been instrumental in the shaping
of public attitude about narcotics addiction and that public
attitude in combination with the laws and the freedom of the doctors
to treat addiction has resulted in their low addiction rate.
Now, if any attempt were made in this country by each
state to adopt the British system, there would be some of the same
problems that would occur with narcotics clinics, unless there was
excellent cooperation from the medical society.
Medical Practice and the Harrison Act
After the enactment of the Harrison Act and the closing
of narcotic clinics, many doctors continued to administer drugs to
their patients (their addicted patients); some in an attempt to cure,
some doubtless because it was easier and they were faced with no
trouble as long as they kept giving the patient his morphine tablets,
and some to make money. But the law enforcement authorities started
putting doctors in jail at a fantastic rate, and the doctors
immediately backed off from the problems of narcotic addiction. It
is still basically a medical problem.
Today, in most places a sincere narcotic addict who wished
to kick his habit would probably get politely turned away from the
offices of most doctors because: 1) they are afraid of prosecution;
and 2) because they have avoided the problem so long that they don't
know how to treat narcotics addiction. The problem of the role of
the doctor is basic and elemental in narcotics control statutes,
administration, and policy. Right now there are some states where the
doctor has virtually no discretion in treating an addict who, comes to
him for care. In California, ambulatory treatment is absolutely
forbidden or addicts must be treated in prison or a medical institution
approved by the state. And the required treatment, of course, is set
forth in the statutes. "He shall not have more than X grains of
morphine for 15 days, on the 16th day he shall be reduced to a smaller
amount which continues on for another 15 days, and thereafter nothing."
I think that this represents the extreme of intervention in medical
practice by the legislatures. It allows for no variation by the
doctor. The question of ambulatory treatment, of course, I think
is an area in which legislatures have substantial interest because
of their responsibility to protect the public. I think, however,
that legislatures should examine very closely the improvements which
have been made in narcotic addiction treatment, largely through
psychiatry and through after-care provisions of parole facilities.
Legislatures should determine anew whether it is really necessary
for addicts to be locked up in order to be treated.
I would like to point out this fact about treatment. I
know when I started this study I had what I believe was a typical
view, that when a person becomes addicted to narcotic drugs,
there is no way to stop the addiction without going th~ough horrible
ordeals, some of which may kill. Apparently, from what I have been
able to discover, this isn't so under the withdrawal techniques now
available at Lexington Hospital and at other treatment facilities.
In most cases a narcotic drug user can be taken off narcotic drugs
relatively painlessly in a matter of 10 days to two weeks, so that
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his body does not require them any more. His psyche probably
continues to require them in most cases thereafter, but this is
where rehabilitation can bring about some dramatic changes in some
people.
Talking with federal correctional institution people,
however, I have been informed that their rehabilitation responsibilities
have been completely undermined by mandatory minimum penalties.
Psychiatric care and counselling services and parole and probation
techniques, which have proven themselves in so many areas of general
activity, require a motivation of some kind, and obviously the best
kind of motivation when you are in prison is to get out. But the
narcotic addict in the federal prison and the narcotic offender
(and all addicts are offenders if possession is implicit in use)
know that no matter how well they perform, how well they respond to
treatment, how promising their future is, not one single solitary
thing they can do can get them out one day earlier. You don't get
very good cooperation in a rehabilitation program this way. And it's
not a willful refusal to cooperate; you've just got to have a
motivation, and it's not there.
Now a few comments about a couple of other suggestions
and approaches: one is isolation, to put everybody away in a leper
colony. There have been also recent suggestions (especially in
New York and in other places) to create mass institutional facilities.
In New York City, it was suggested that the facilities should have in
excess of .10,000 beds for narcotic addicts to be taken off the streets
and placed in medical-penal facilities for a period of a year or so
for attempts at rehabilitation and then in long-term facilities
thereafter. Obviously, this has a lot of merit to it, but the cost
would be enormous, and in view of other oroblems that states are
faced with, they are not justified in spending this amount of money
on a problem as small as addiction.
Report Recommendations
I have suggested three things basically in the conclusion
to my report: First, in the absence of compelling considerations,
which I did not find in the course of the report, people who are
charged with the responsibility of dealing with narcotic addicts
ought not to be denied the means which have been found to be effective
in other areas of criminal activity. And in this category I include
judicial discretion in sentencing and the use of probation and
parole procedures in the same way in which they are used in other
criminal activities. There may be compelling considerations, but
I think that they should be examined very carefully· in light of what
you are attempting to do, what the cost to the community is of maintaining people for extensive periods of time in prison, and what the
result is when the people finally get out.
The second large conclusion I offered is that the adoption
of new and untried approaches to narcotics problems should be postponed until additional information has been systematically gathered
which will enable cnlighted planning and avoid tragic steps: I have
also prepared in the conclusion a statement of what I consider t~e
minimum information which must be gathered in order to make a valid
evaluation of narcotic rehabilitation, treatment, and correction
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programs. These should be amplified by consultation with sociologists,
psychiatrists, medical men, correctional people, and law enforcement
officers. The ones that I have offered have been submitted to people
representing all of these disciplines and have been generally accepted
by them as important ingredients in such a plan.
Without bringing together for the purposes of study the
kind of information I have suggested at the end of this report, people
will continually be able to do as I am able to do right now, offer
you a rebuttal to any kind of authority you quote for any kind of
proposition. I don't believe that the proponents of harsh penalty
legislation, who have had 20 to 40 years of experience, can prove
their claims that it deals effectively with the narcotic problem. I
feel quite sure that if they had incontrovertible demonstrative
evidence, they would have offered it. And they didn't offer it, and
I couldn't find it.
Mr. Eldridge provided the following additional information
in answer to questions from committee members:
1) No state attempts to control addiction by confinement
and treatment. Some states even make addiction a crime. A number
of states, however, have some kind of provision for confinement of
narcotic addicts if they don't commit a crime, but this is unrealistic
because most of them don't have any facilities to treat these people.
2) Most officials and others concerned with narcotic
problems agree that a) the pusher for profit should be penalized very
heavily; and b) the addict should be provided with care. But there
is considerable disagreement about what to do about the people in
between, those who just sell enough dope to support their habit.
I don't have a satisfactory solution to offer for the
people in between, because they present problems. The only suggestion
I can offer is that this is best left to judicial discretion. When
an addict is brought before a judge under circumstances that indicate
that he is not really a profit-motivated pusher, even though he may
have sold small quantities of drugs, let the judge determine whether
he should be committed for treatment and care or whether he should be
confined as a seller. It has been our experience that statutes alone
which try to detail everything on this subject are not satisfactory,
and they don't allow for exceptional conditions.
3) Narcotic addiction is a medical problem and the British
regard it as such, but we don't. Sometimes, lip service is paid to
this concept by law enforcement people and by legislators, who then
go right ahead and legislate on medical matters. I think that the
medical profession should be encouraged to participate again in
efforts to cope with the problem. Today, the only thing medicine
has to do with narcotics addiction, essentially, is through the
public health service at the two federal hospitals. I would say
that if we were to adopt the British system effectively in this
country, we would not get the same results the British get, probably.
And I say too, that this is not all due to the sociolooicial
differences, which are so often offered. One major difference is the
amount of money that is available in this country as compared with
Great Britain and other countries. We are the prime target for
internationdl nurcotics sellers.
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4) If a·clinic program is something more than a dope
cafeteria, I think you might also accomplish perhaps an even more
important objective of educating the public about narcotic addiction
and what kind of a threat it really offers. Despite the fact that I
say that physical and moral problems are not so bad, there is something basically wrong with addiction from my ethical point of view,
and I think mine is fairly typical. The addicts are people who have
to depend on a crutch in order to live, in order to orient themselves
to their community. Of course, we all have crutches of one sort or
another, but addiction is a particularly dangerous one because there
is no realism involved with people who are under the influence of
drugs. With the clinic you could strike at illicit traffic, you
could remove serious health problems that result from the way in
which some people use drugs rather than from the use itself, things
such as absesses and perforated navels and emaciation because they
spend all their money on drugs, etc. These things could be reduced
through the clinic, and if you add some real treatment facilities,
you could accomplish a good deal.
5) The New York Academy of Medicine has proposed a plan
for dealing with addiction problems through the establishment of
treatment clinics. These clinics would have the power to dispense
narcotic drugs in connection with treatment. Addicts would be
registered, photographed, fingerprinted, etc.; they would receive a
three days' suppiy during the time they are trying to work with them.
Their view is one that I have expressed earlier: an effective cure to
addiction must be based on real life circumstances, and you must
persuade the addict to give up drugs of his own free will. Clinic
personnel would try to diminish the narcotic dose gradually,
establishing, if necessary, a stabilized dose while they continue to
work with him on some cure. You must realize that some people will
not respond to any kind of treatment, blandishment, coercion or
anything else, and they recommend that these people be given a
stabilized dose.

Now, one of the things that is wrong with this approach
is the problem about the amount of the stabilized dose. They have found
thus far no maximum toleration that an addict can develop. Seventyfive grains is the highest I have heard of, but this man apparently
could have gone on indefinitely taking more and more and more; the
body will adjust to it. It is easy, however, to establish a dosage
at which withdrawal symptoms can be forestalled. For most confirmed
addicts, the experiments at Lexington suggest that 10 grains a day
will take care of most everybody. The problem is that a stabilized·
dose, as the body becomes accustomed to it, produces no real kicks
anymore; the euphoria is gone. All addicts are not necessarily after
euphoria. Here you get into arguments with the psychiatrists and
physicians about what the addicts are really after. Some say that
their real motivation is to stave off withdrawal symptoms, which are
very acute. In most cases, a stabilized dose will do it, but if they
are really after euphoria, a stabilized dose will not do it. If there
is any kind of ambulatory arrangement where the addict is to be
supplied with drugs, either on a permanent basis or as part of the
treatment, you will have a problem, with some of them at least. They may
have to be given ever increasing doses· or they may continue to turn
to underworld traffic in order to achieve euphoria.
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6) The majority of addiction occurs in areas not so much
characterized by poverty as characterized by dislocation, for example,
East Harlem in New York and the south side in Chicago are areas where
people live who have come to the city recently from some place else.
They are people without stability, who are transients, live in
crowded conditions, and are not established in the community. Currently,
they are mostly Negroes and Puerto Ricans. Sometimes certain areas are
always a problem. We know that in Chicago, for instance, the south side
has always been the area of addiction. Before the Negroes and the
Puerto Ricans, who live in this area now, it was the Irish, because
they were the people who were displaced, immigrants who left a
community with which they were familiar and oriented and whose lives
were disturbed and torn up, and they turned to narcotics too.

7) Usually, the only determinant as to whether the state or
federal government prosecutes narcotics offenders is who has the
stiffest penalty. Federal authorities, if there is a favorable
situation in a given state (for example, if the penalty is high
enough and/or if the judges are harsh), will let these offenders be
tried before the state court. If it is a federal addiction offense
such as possession or sale, and they think the local climate is not
good enough, then they will try them in a federal court. As a
general rule the Federal Bureau of Narcotics says it is not interested
in little people. Its aim is to strike at the traffic itself, and
it assists the local people a great deal in finding little pushers
and the end men, while it works on the big promoters.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULES AND STATUTORY CHANGES

The Colorado Supreme Court adopted the rules of criminal
procedure on September 1, 1961. These rules were originally drafted by
the Criminal Law Committee of the Colorado Bar Association. Since
the adoption of the rules, a subcommittee of the bar association's
criminal law committee has been examining the rules and Colorado's
criminal statutes to determine: 1) which statutes should be repealed
or amended; and 2) which rules should be amended or added. This
subcommittee submitted the following report to the Legislative Council
Criminal Code. Committee:

Report to the Criminal Code Committee
on
Effect of Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure
on Existing Colorado Statutes
Existing Colorado statutes which parallel the
Colorado rules, whether the language is exactly
the same or not, should be repealed as creating
unnecessary duplication and confusion. Existing
statutes which are inconsistent with the rules
must be repealed to avoid the even greater confusion involved in the question of which law to
·follow. Some statutes should be amended rather
than re pea led.
The search for statutes to be repealed or amended
led to some discoveries of matter contained in
the statutes which might properly be added to the
rules. A list of suggested amendments to the rules
is attached for the consideration of the Supreme
Court. It will in some instances be quite
important to amend the rules at or before the
time when the statutes are repealed.
Portions of the original report of this subcommittee
were allocated to members of the C.B.A. Committee
on Criminal Law for careful checking before submission to the Criminal Code Committee of the
Legislative Council for submission to the 1963
Legislature.
Since Colorado criminal procedure is now principally
a compound mixture of Colorado Supreme Court rules
and Colorado statutes, and because the rules do not
purport to cover all phases of criminal procedure,
it is recommended that the section numbers and
titles of statutes which are repealed should be left
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on the statute books, to which should be added a
reference to the applicable Rule of Criminal
Procedure, as was done by Congress in the case of
the United States Code, title 18, part II
(Criminal Procedure). Thus when the text of
39-2-3 of C.R.S. '53 (as amended) is repealed,
what would remain in C.R.S. '53 would be:
39-2-3. Warrants on suspicion -- commitment -- bail.
See Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, rules

3, 4, 5, 9, 46.

On the other hand, 39-2-1 and 39-2-2, which deal with
topics not covered by the rules, would remain as
they now are.
Subcommittee on Repeal of Statutes
William L. Rice
Austin W. Scott, Jr.
The portion of the report enumerating the statutes to be
amended or repealed was reviewed by the Legislative Reference Office
and after a meeting with the bar association, further changes were
made. Following is the list of statutes for which repeal or amendment
is recommended:

Statutes to be Repealed or Amended
39-2-3 Repeal.
as amend.
Colo.L. '61

Covered by Rules 3, 4, 5, 9 and 46. And perhaps add
bail bond terms concerning appearance in court to
Rule 46.

39-2-4

"

Rule 7(b)(l), providing for names of witnesses when
information is filed, is inconsistent witn 39-L-4 on
naming witnesses at preliminary examination in the
case of those not admitted to bail.

39-2-5

Repeal,

39-2-7 Repeal,
as amend.
Colo.L. '61

but amend Rule 5 to allow defendant in custody to
demand names of witnesses before the filing of the
information as provided in Rule 7(b) (1).
because covered by Rules 4 and 5(a)(l), all but last
sentence, which concerns hot pursuit across county
lines by officers with warrant. This part of statute
should be reenacted and include Chapter 103, Laws of
'61 on hot pursuit of traffic violator across county
or municipal lines. If is recommended that a statute
be enacted as to who can execute a warrant or summons,
e.g., authorizing police officer of X County to arrest
on warrant issued by JP of Y County and sent to or
communicated to him.
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39-2-8

Repeal,

upon amending Rule 4(a) to permit issuance of warrant
to a named person, as in 39-2-8, as well as to any
officer authorized by law. 39-2-8 on taking arrestee
before issuing JP must be repealed as inconsistent
with Rules 4(a)(l)(ii) and 5(a)(l) on taking him
before nearest JP.

39-2-10 Repeal,

because inconsistent with Rule 5(b)(2) and Rule 9
requiring taking arrestee before nearest JP.

39-2-11 Repeal.

Covered by Rule 4(b)(l)(v). Second sentence of 39-2-11,
that technical mistakes in arrest warrant do not
require release, though not mentioned in Rules, is in
the spirit of the Rules.

39-2-12 Repeal.

Covered by Rules 5(d) and 46, which by implication
provide that one for whom bail is fixed who cannot
raise it till later is entitled to release when he
later raises it.

39-2-16 Repeal.

Covered by Rule 46(a)(2). But perhaps Rule 46 should
be amended to provide for return day on the bond.

39-2-17 Repeal.
as amend.
Colo.L. '61

Covered by Rules 9(b)(l)(second sentence) and 46.
(Perhaps Rule 46(c) should be amended to provide
specifically for a return date on the bond.)

39-3-3

Repeal.

Covered by Rules S(a) and 13.

39-3-4

Repeal.

Covered by Rules 8(a) and 13.

39-3-6

Repeal.

Covered by Rule 7. (But as Rule 7(b)(l) limits
requirement of witnesses' names to informed-against
defendants, Rule 7 should be amended to provide that
indicted defendants are also entitled to names of
witnesses. Perhaps Rule 10 should be amended to
provide that a defendant at arraignment, or as soon
thereafter as the jury panel is drawn and the list of
those chosen compiled, be supplied on request with the
list of names making up the jury panel.)

39-3-7

Repeal.

F i rs t sentence c ov ere d by Rule s 12 ( b ) ( 2 ) a n d 12 ( b ) ( 3 ) ,
the balance by Rule 7(c). See Rule 52 on harmless
error.

39-4-1

Keep.

It is important to keep 39-4-1, since Colorado
Constitution, Art. II, 5 8, provides that "until
otherwise provided by law" felony prosecutions require
indictment, and "law" here probably means statutory law.

39-4-2

Re pea 1.

Covered by Rule 7(b)(l), Rule 7(b)(3) and Rule 7(c).

39-4-3

II

39-4-4

II

First sentence covered by Rule 7(c), second sentence
by 8 (a ) .
Covered by Rule 7(c) and Appendix of Forms, form 6.
-
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39-5-1

Repeal.

First sentence is covered by Rule 7(b)(2), and the
second sentence by Rule 7(b)(3).

39-5-2

II

Covered by Rule 5(d), last sentence.

39-6-7

II

Covered by Rule 17.

39-6-8

II

Covered by Rule 15(b).

39-6-9

II

Covered by Rule 15(b) and (d).

39-6-10

II

Covered by Rule 15(d) and (e).

39-6-11

II

Covered by Rule 15(f).

39-7-1

II

Covered by Rule 9. Sentence in 39-7-1 on transporting
prisoner through counties is not necessary, though not
provided for in Rules.

39-7-5

II

Covered by Rules ll(a) on arraignment and 55(a) on the
criminal docket.

39-7-6

II

Covered by Rule

39-7-7

II

Covered by Rules 12(a) and 47.

39-7-8

II

First sentence covered by Rule ll(a), second by
Rule 32(b).

39-7-9

"

Covered by Rule ll(a).

39-7-10

II

Covered by Rule 48(a).

39-7-11

II

Covered by Rules 8(b) and 14.

39-7-12
"
as amend.
Colo.L. '61
C•

12(a) and Rule 47.

Covered by and inconsistent with Rule 48(b).

101

39-7-17

II

Covered by Rule 52 requiring disregard of immaterial
variances and of defects and irregularities (including
those at trial or in judgments or in informations and
indictments) not affecting substantive rights.

39-7-18

"

Covered by Rule 30.

39-7-19

"

Covered by Rule 30.

39-7-20

II

Covered by Rule 3l(a)(2).

39-7-22

II

Covered by Rules 37 and 51.

39-7-23

"

Covered by Rule 39(c).
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39-7-24
as amend.
Colo. L. '55

Should be retained, bacause of Rule 39(a) on continuing
present writ-of-error procedure, until C?lorado Supr 7me
Court rewrites Rules 37, 38 and 39 on writ of error 1n
criminal cases. (The Supreme Court has this rewriting
task under advisement.)

39- 7-26 Repeal.

Inconsistent with Rule 39(c).

39-7-27
as amend.
Colo.L. '55

Same comment as for 39-7-24 applies here.

39-7-28

Repeal, but only after Rule 38 is amended to provide (as 39-7-28
now provides) that the trial court may, at the time of
sentence, stay a sentence of imprisonment on motion of
a dependant wh~ wishes to secure S~preme Court review
on -?rror.

39-7-29

Repeal. Covered by Rule 44.
(But perhaps add to Rule 44 that in
misdemeanor case an attorney may, not shall, be appointed
to represent an indigent defendant.)

39- 7-30

Amend.

39-7-31

Repeal. Covered by Rule 44.

39-7-32

II

This might read: "When a court of record appoints an
attorney to represent an indigent defendant, it shall
be the duty of the appointing court to allow the
attorney a fee, to be fixed by the judge of the court,
and to be paid out of the county treasury of the county
wherein the indictment or information is found. At the
conclusion of the proceedings in the trial court the
clerk of the appointing court shall give the attorney
a certified copy of the order appointing him counsel,
on which the judge of the court shall endorse the
amount of the fee allowed, upon the presentation of
which the county commissioners of the county shall
order a warrant drawn upon the county treasurer in
payment of such fee. If the trial court appoints an
attorney to represent an indigent defendant for
purposes of review by the Colorado Supreme Court, the
trial court upon conclusion of such review shall allow
the appointed attorney a fee as herein provided."

Covered by and inconsistent with Rule 17(b) because
Rule is not limited to judicial district or 100 miles.

39-8-1(1) II
as amend.
Colo.L. '55

C ov ere d

by Ru 1e 11 ( b ) .

39- 9-1

II

C ov ere d

by R t 11 e s 18 ( b ) a n d 21 ( b ) .

3.9-9-2

II

Covered by Rule 2l(a)(2)(first sentence).

39-9-3

II

Inconsistent with Rule 2l(a)(2) on selection of the new
judge to try the case.
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39-9-4

Re pea 1.

C ov ere d by Ru 1e 21 ( a ) ( 1 ) .

39-9-5

II

Covered by Rule 2l(c)(l); inconsistent as to number of
a f f i da v it s .

39-9-7

It

Inconsistent with Rule 21, which does not and should
not limit number of venue changes.

39-9-8

II

Covered by Rule 2l(c)(3).

39-9-9

II

Covered by Rule 21 ( c) (4).

39-9-10

II

Covered by Rule 21 ( c) (4).

39-9-11

II

Covered by Rule 21 ( c) (4).

39-9-12

II

Covered by Rule 2l(c)(6).

39-9-13

II

Covered by Ru 1 e 21 ( c ) ( 6 ) .

39-9-14

II

Covered by Rule 2l(c)(5).

39-9-15

II

Covered by Rule 21 ( c) (6).

39-9-16

II

Cov ere d by Ru 1 e 21 ( c ) ( 2 ) .

39-9-17

"

Covered by Rule 2l(c) (2).

39-9-18

II

Covered by Rule 2l{a)(3).

39-9-19 Amend,

first sentence to read the same as Rule 2l(c)(7).
Retain second and third sentences of 39-9-19.

39-9-20 Repeal.

Covered by Rule 2l(c){2).

39-16-2

II

Covered by Rule 32{a)(l) and Rule 32{a){2).

40-2-12

II

Covered by Rule 18(b). No need for specific statute
on murder, for Rule 18(b) covers all crimes (including
murder) committed across county lines, e.g., A in X
County shoots BB gun through glass window in Y County.
No need for special statute on death in another
county or state.

40-9-19

"

Covered by Rule 41. It is suggested that all other
special search and seizure statutes be repealed, so
that rules on search and seizure will be uniform.

78-2-13 Re pea 1,

because covered by Rule 24(c). As to civil trials,
the matter is covered by Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 47.

78-5-1

Amend,

by deleting from 78-5-1 the provision found in Rule
24 {a)(3) on petit jury in criminal case. But leave
the part on grand jury now in 78-5-1.

78-5-2

Keep,

because although the criminal aspect is covered by
Rule 24 (a)(2)(iv) (second clause), it must be kept
for purposes of civil trials, no Civil Rule covering
the matter.

78-5-3

Repeal. Covered by Rule 24 (a)(2)(vi).
criminal statute.)

78-5-4

II

78-5-5

Keep,

Covered by Rule 24 (b)(l).

(78-5-3 is a purely

(78-5-4 is purely criminal.)

because although the criminal aspect is covered by
Rule 24 (a)(4), it must be retained for purposes of
civil trials, since no Civil Rule covers the matter.
Suggested Amendments to Rules

l)

Amend Rule 4(a) by adding in line 4 after "execute it" the words:
"or to any other person named in the warrant to execute it."

2)

Amend Rule 5(d) by inserting after next-to-last sentence and before
la st sentence this new sentence: "If the justice of the peace
commits the defendant, either because the offense is not bailable
or because the defendant is unable to procure bail, he shall endorse
upon the warrant of commitment the names and addresses of the
prosecution witnesses who testified at the preliminary examination
and shall furnish the defendant with a copy of the warrant so
endorsed."

3)

/-\mend Rule 7 (a) by adding a new sentence at the end: "The indictment
shall be returned in open court and shall have endorsed thereon
the names of witnesses in the same manner and with the same effect
as in the case of the endorsement of witnesses upon an information."

4)

Amend Rule 10 by adding a new subsection (f) at the end: "{f) As
soon as the jury panel is drawn which will try the case, a list of
the names of the jurors on the panel shall be made available by
the Clerk of the court to defendant's counsel, and if the defendant
has no ~ounsel the list shall be served on him personally or by
certified mail."

5)

Amend Rule 2l(a)(3) by inserting in line 4, after the word "any"
and before the word "cause," the word "other."

6)

Amend Rule 35(b) by adding the following sentence at the end:
"The order of the trial court granting or denying the motion is
a final order reviewable on writ of error."

7)

Amend Rule 38(a)(2) by inserting the following sentence after "(2)
Imprisonment": "The sentencing court sha 11 on writ ten motion of a
defendant stating that he intends to seek review on writ of error
stay a sentence of imprisonment."
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8)

Amend Rule 44 by inserting at the end thereof the following new
sentence: "In any misdemeanor case, upon such a showing of
indigency, an attorney may be assigned to represent the defendant
at every stage of the tria 1 court proceedings."

9)

Amend Rule 46(c) by adding to the end of the first sentence the
following: "in court on a designated day, or on the first day of
the next term of court and from day to day thereafter, as the
court may deem appropriate."

10)

Amend Rule 2l(c)(4) by changing the word "Recognizance" to read
"Bail Bond" in the title and "bond" elsewhere.

11)

Amend Rule 46 by striking the present 46{e) and adding the following: 1
"(e)

Forfeiture.

"(l) Declaration. If there is a breach of condition of a bond,
the court shall declare a forfeiture of the bail.
(2) Setting Aside. The court may direct that a forfeiture be
set aside, upon such conditions as the court may impose, if it appears
that justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture.
11

"(3) Enforcement. When a forfeiture has not been set aside, the
court shall on motion enter a judgment of default, and execution may
issue thereon. By entering into a bond the obligor submits to the
jurisdiction of the court. His liability may be enforced without the
necessity of an independent action. The court shall order the issuance
of a citation directed to the obligor to show cause, if any there be,
why judgment should not be entered against him forthwith and execution
issue thereon. Said citation may be served personally or by certified
mail upon the obligor directed to the address given in the bond.
Hearing on the citation shall be held not less than 20 days after
service. The defendant's attorney and the prosecuting attorney shall
be given notice of the hearing.
"(4) Remission. After entry of such judgment, the court may remit
it in whole or in part under the conditions applying to the setting
aside of forfeiture in paragraph (2) of this subdivision. If a bond
forfeiture has been paid into the general fund of the county, the commissioners thereof shall be notified of any application for remission.
"(f) Exoneration. The obliger shall be exonerated as follows:
1. When the condition of the bond has been satisfied; or 2. When the
amount of the forfeiture has been paid; or 3. Upon surrender of the
defendant into custody before judgment upon an order to show cause,
upon payment of all costs occasioned thereby. The obliger may seize
and surrender the defendant to the sheriff of the county wherein the
bond shall be taken, and it shall be the duty of such sheriff, on such
surrender and delivery to him of a certified copy of the bond by which
the obliger is bound, to take such person into custody, and by writing
acknowledge such surrender.
1.

These provisions are also included in the recommended bail bond
statute and should be deleted from the proposed statute, if the
Colorado Supreme Court decides to incorporate them in the rules
as set forth here.
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11

(9} Continuation of Bonds. In the discretion of the trial
court and with the consent of the surety or sureties, .the same bond
may be continued until the final disposition of the case in the trial
court to pending disposition of the case on review."
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ADDENDUM

Proposed Revision of Criminal Insanity Statutes,
Procedures, and Test: Some Constitutional Considerations
This analysis of the revision in criminal insanity statutes and
procedures proposed by Senator Edward J. Byrnel was prepared at the
request of the Criminal Code Committee by Professor Jim R. Carrigan,
University of Colorado Law School and legal consultant to the committee.
The committee asked Professor Carrigan to make this study because of the
far-reaching changes proposed by Senator Byrne and the constitutional
questions raised by these changes. Senator Byrne did not have the
opportunity to review this analysis prior to its inclusion in this
report because of time limitations resulting from the provision in
Senate Joint Resolution No. 14 (1961) directing the Legislative Council
to report the findings and recommendations of the Criminal Code Study
no later than the convening of the Forty-fourth General Assembly in
1963. For this reason, Senator Byrne has not added his comments on
the findings made by Professor Carrigan.
Features of the Proposed Revision
The proposal made by Senator Byrne has six salient features:
l) repeal of the present statutory plea of 11 not guilty by
reason of insanity at the time of the alleged commission of .the crime,"
(C.R.S. 39-8-1 (1) (Supp. 1960) and statutory abolition of the common
law defense of insanity;
2) substitution of an immunity from prosecution on the ground
of insanity at the time of the alleged crime for the present and
common law defenses of insanity;
3) substitution of a three-judge panel to try the fact of
insanity on the defendant's motion to quash the indictment or information
for the present jury trial of the insanity plea;
. 4) substitution of the new, broader test adopted in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v.
Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 1961) for the present legal test
of insanity {C.R.~. 39-8-1 (2));
5) adoption of a greatly improved procedure for commitment and
treatment following a finding of insanity constituting a ground for
immunity from prosecution; and
6) adoption of a standard for release after commitment calculated
to protect society while assuring the defendant reasonable means of
obtaining his release upon successful treatment of his mental condition.

1.

See pp. 122-124 of this report.
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This analysis covers these features of the proposal in the order
presanted above.
Abolition of the Defense of Insanity
An attempt by the legislature to abolish the defense of insanity
entirely in substance as well as in form -- and to treat the insane
as fully responsible to the criminal law for their actions would no
doubt be unconstitutional. (I Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure
83 (Anderson ed. 1957)). Nevertheless, such an attempt to abolish
the insane defendant's immunity from punishment for his act while
insane must be distinguished from statutes merely subjecting that
defense to procedural restrictions, while leaving the essence of the
defense intact. "Statutes which are merely reasonable regulations of
procedure do not destroy the right to raise the defense and are
constitutional." (Ibid.) Thus, it was held that the due process
guarantee of the United States Constitution, applied against the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment, was not violated by an Oregon statute
which imposed the burden of proving his defense of insanity beyond a
reasonable doubt on a defendant charged with crime. The court declared
that due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment require that a
state's criminal procedure not offend "some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental. ... " (Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952)).
It would seem that the idea that an insane man cannot be punished
by criminal prosecution for his act while insane is deeply enough rooted
in the traditions of common law countries to be ranked as fundamental
to our concept of fair procedure. The whole fabric of our criminal law
is contrived on the premise that men are responsible for their actions.
It is not a new idea that: "An involuntary act, as it has no claim
to merit, so neither can it induce any guilt; the concurrence of the
will, when it has its choice either to do or to avoid the fact in
question, being the only thing that renders human actions either
praiseworthy or culpable. Indeed, to make a complete crime cognizable
by human laws, there must be both a will and an act." (4 Blackstone,
Commentaries 20, 21.)
If it be argued that the purpose of the criminal law is not
punishment but deterrenc~ the rejoinder may be that an insane man's
inclination to commit crime will not be deterred either by the example
of punishment meted out to others or the threat of punishment to himself. Nor can it be said that the many examples of modern statutes
defining certain conduct as criminal without regard to specific intent
or knowledge have established de facto that the legislative branch may
make acts criminal without regard to the state of the defendant's
mind when the act is committed. Even where the crime itself requires
no wrongful intent (e.g., the sale of impure food or sexual relations
with a girl under the statutory age of consent while fully believing
she is of age) the act must be voluntary to be a crime. Thus, if one
is forced to drive his car over the speed limit, he would have a defense.
although no specific intent is required. His act was not his. it was
not v0lationa~ and therefore he is not criminally responsible. All
crime presuppos~s a sane mind capable of directing volun!ary muscular
action. The act of will is as much an element of tho crime as the
.
physical act which is prohibited. The legislature could no more abolish,
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in the crime of selling liquor to minors, the mental element than it
could abolish the requirement that to support a conviction the evidence
ba required to show a sale of liquor to a minor.
"An act done by me without my will, or in the absence of my
will, is not my act.'' (State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac.1020,
1024 (1910)). "It is not at all certain that the courts would consider
th~mselves powerless to question the constitutionality of legislation
which undertook to eliminate the element of intelligent intention or
volation as a requisite to criminal liability." (Weihofen, 1v1enta1
Disorder as a Criminal Defense 478 (1954).) A 1928 Mississippi statute
abolishing the defense of insanity in murder cases but allowing insanity
at the time of the offense to be shown in mitigation was held
unconstitutional as depriving the insane defendant of his life or
liberty without due process.
(Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132
So. 581 (1931).) Four of the six Mississippi Supreme Court Justices
who held the statute unconstitutional also felt that it amounted to
imposing "cruel and unusual punishment," and deprived the insane
defendant of the constitutionally guaranteed right to be heard by
himself or his counsel, which right could not be intelligently exercised
by one not sane.
(Id. at 587) This last argument is closely related
to the right of the defendant to be present in person at his trial, a
right which presupposes a mental presence as well as a physical presence.
At this point it is well to recall that the Colorado Constitution
forbids deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law (Art. It §25), guarantees the right of the accused in a criminal
case to ilppear and defend in person (Art II, sl6), and prohibits 11 cruel
and unusual punishment." (Art. II, 620.) In addition, the state
constitution guarantees the defendant the right ''to meet the witnesses
against him face to face ... ," a right which would be of no value to the
insane.
(Art. II, §16). In State v. Strasburq, supra, Chief Justice
Rudkin of the Washington Supreme Court felt that all of these
guarantees were probably violated by a statute purporting to abolish
the defense of insanity.
(110 Pac. at 1028, concurring opinion.)
In
addition,he asserted that the defendant's right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation was denied, for the insane defendant
could not be effectively informed.
(Cf. Colo. Const. Art. II, §16).
In summary, it seems clear that the legislature could not
wholly abolish the defense of insanity. Even though the United States
Supreme Court has never expressly so held, it is likely that the
court would hold such a statute to violate due process.
(See Wharton,
Criminal Law and Procedure 83, note 1, and the cases there citedJ
The only attempts by state legislatures to abolish the defense have
been rejected by state appellate courts in Mississippi and Washington
(Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. SRl (1931); State v.
Strasburg. 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020 (1910).)
It appears that the statute can be upheld only by finding that
it is intended not to abolish the plea in substance, but merely to
provide a new and different procedure for presenting the plea and
trying the defense. Of course, any such new procedure must conform
to state and federal constitutional requirements governing procedures
in criminal cases.
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The New Immunity dnd the New Procedure
Points (2) and (3) as set out above will be discussed together
und8r this headir1~ The core of the proposal is to abolish both the
common law dnd stdtutory defenses of insanity and substitute in their
place an immunity from prosecution for one who meets the new test of
insanity as of the date· of the alleged offense. The procedure for
determining whether the immunity is available in a particular case is
by a motion to quash the indictment or information on the ground the
defendant was insane when the acts on which the prosecution is based
were committed. After psychiatric observation and examination similar
to that under present procedure~ a hearing on the motion to quash would
be held before a panel of three judges.
Three-Judge Panel. The three-judge panel is ingenious in several
respects. First, it would spread the responsibility for what could be
a most unpopular decision to three judges. This is especially significant
in view of the fact that our judges are popularly elected. It is
apparently thought that the three-judge panel would provide a fact
finding tribunal less susceptible of being swayed by emotional arguments
and one which would be more capable of weighing the relative quality
of conflicting m~ical testimony than a jury which now determines the
fact of insanity. Moreove~ the tribunal which would try the issue of
insanity would apparently be entirely separate and different from the
tribunal which would try the case on a not guilty plea iri th~ event
that the defendant should be found to have been sane at the time of
the offense. Obviously this would allow the defense much greater freedom
in presenting facts which would indicate insanity, but which might also
tend to prejudice a jury against a defendant. Furthermore, the proposed
new legal test of insanity would free the experts to testify far beyond
the usual range of such testimony under the present "right-wrong" plus
irresistible impulse tests and thus provide the tribunal a basis for
decision more consonant with expert medical opinion on the defendant's
mental condition. 1he real issue in such a •trial would be whether the
defendant should be inst.itutiondlized for a mental disease or defect,
be imprisoned or otherwise punished for a voluntary anti-social act.
Proc edura 1 Chang c~. The nub of the procedural change would be to
eliminate the defendant's present right to trial of his insanity defense
by J jury. This is candidly stilted in the Criminal Code Committee
memorandum of October S, 196~: "By abolishing the plea of not guilty
by reason of insanity, the constitutional need for a jury trial on the
question would be eliminated." It appears incontrovertible that the
denial of jury trial on an issue now and traditionally tried by jury
is the net effect, if not. the chief purpose, of the proposul. Whether
or not such a change would be wise or desirable is a matter of policy
for the General Assembly: however, whet.her or not such a change would
bE-1 within the constitutionul power of the Gencrul /\ssembly is a
quest.ion of law for the courts.
Before turning to the constitutional issue, it should be noted
thul the proposal would dlJ.ow a defendant who has been found sane at
th() hearing before the~ three-judge punel to offer evidence of mental
condition i•in iJ _proper cusc, as bearing upon the capacity of the accused
to form the specific intc~nt essential to con.,_;titute a crime. 11 Pre~umably
this evidence would be offered before a trial jury, and therefore it
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might be argued with prima facie plausibility that the right of jury
trial is not being dffected. The obvious answer is that unless the
defendant is accorded substantially the same opportunity to contest the
fact of insanity at the time of the offense before a jury as he now
has, then his right of j1Jry trial has been obliterated, at least in
part.
lhe legislature has no more power to abolish constitutionally
guaranteed rights piecemeal than it has to abolish them entirely. If
it is contended, on the other hand, that the intent of the proposal
is to retain the defendant's right to try the insanity issue fully
before the trial jury, as that right exists now and existed immediately
prior to adoption of the Colorado Constitution, then the proposal
simply gives a criminal defendant two opportunities to escape via the
insanity route. If it is contended that the proceeding before the
three-judge panel is civil in nature -- and not a criminal proceeding
required to be tried before a jury -- then there is no need for it. since
adequate civil commitment procedures presently exist under which the
district attorney could obtain a determination of status of a defendant
thought to be insane. Moreover, the Colorado Supreme Court has held
that an insanity hearing in a criminal case is not a civil, but a
criminal proceeding.
(Castro v. People, 180 Colo. 493, 503; 346 P. 2d
1020 (1959) .) Finally, it should be noted that the provision reserving
to the def2ndant his right to present evidence of mental condition at
the main trial applies, by its terms, only to crimes including as an
element a 11 specific intent." Many, if not most, modern statutory
definitions of crimes require only a general criminal intent or merely
require that the forbidden act has been done consciously and voluntarily;
yet insanity is a defense. The saving provision would not reserve
any jury trial rights except in specific intent crimes.
Constitutional Guarantees. Does the proposal violate federal
or state constitutional guarantees of jury trial in criminal cases?
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "trial
by an impartial jury" in all criminal prosecutions.
It is fundamental that the first eight amendments were aimed
~t restricting the power of the federal government, not that of the
states. Further, it has been uniformly held that the due process clause
of the fourteenth Amendment does not automatically apply against the
states all the restrictions contained in the first eight amendments,
but only those which the United States Supreme Court by a case by case
process of exclusion and inclusion determines to be so fundamental
as to be part of due process.
(Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124,
125 (1959).) The Sixth Amendment rights have not been incorporated in
tot □ against the states by the Fourteen Amendment.
(Betts v. Brady, in
316 U.S. 455. 461-62 (1941).) Thus the federal constituion would not
be offended by the feature of the instant proposal denying jury trial,
unless the United States Supreme Court would consider this feature a
denial of due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Federal
due process has been interpreted as flexible enough to give the states
considerable latitude in establishing their own procedural rules governing
the insanity plea in criminal cases.
(Leland v. Oreoon, 343 U.S.
790 (1952) upholding the requirement that the defendant prove insanity
beyond reason~ble doubt.) In conclusion it may be said that it is not
at all clear that federal constitutional rights would he denied by
eliminating the right of jury trial on the issue of insanity in criminal
CdS<JS.
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A more serious question is whether the Colorado Constitutional
provisions regarding trial by jury would be violated by the proposed
procedure. The state constitution provides in Article II, ~ection 16
that "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to.,.
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury .... " This guaran~ee is repeated
in Article II, Section 23, which declares: "The right of trial by
jury shall remain inviolate in criminal cases .... " These provisions
should be read in the light of Article II, Section 24 which provides:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law."
It is possible to rationalize the proposed procedure as not
depriving the defendant of his right to jury trial by arguing that a
jury will here the case on the general plea of not guilty and therefore
provides the "jury trial" guaranteed by the state constitution. This
argument assumes that what was once a single trial covering the issue
of insanity as well as all other issues may be divided into two or
more trials, leaving some issues for trial by the jury while turning
other issues over to a judge or judges for trial. At first glance it
would seem that the present Colorado procedure for a bifurcated trial
when insanity is pleaded would support the "two trials" analysis. But
the Colorado Supreme Court has held that even though the present procedure
makes possible the separate trial of the insanity plea and the not
guilty plea, this procedure constitutes only one trial, albeit in two
sections. ( Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 535, 543; 322 P. 2d 674 ( 19~)8).)
Moreover it must be remembered that the defendant is entitled to a jury
trial in each section of this single trial.
Could not the legislature provide that all questions except the
defense of insanity are triable to a jury? It has been held that to
take from the jury determination of the defense of self defense is a
denial of the constitutional right to jury trial.
(Young v. People,
47 Colo. 352, 107 Pac. 274 (1910).) How is the defense of insanity
different? Addressing itself to this very point, the Washington Supreme
Court declared that the "mental responsibility of the accused is
a fact entering into the question of his guilt, upon which he has a
right of trail by jury, the same as upon any other fact inherent in that
question, even as the fact that the muscular action of his physical body
did or did not commit the physical act charged as a crime against
him." (State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020, 1021 (1910).)
In holding unconstitutional as a deprivation of the right to jury trial
a statute providing for determination of the defendant's insanity
plea by a commission of experts, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded:
that where "the offense itself is triable, under the Constitution,
by jury, the accused has the constitutional right to have his defense
of insanity tried by jury." (State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So.
639, 642 (1929).) There is no authority to the contrary.
It may be contended that the General Assembly could rationalize
taking determination of the insanity issue from the jury on the ground
that the proposed procedure -- abolishing the defense of insanity -merely provides a conclusive presumption of fact that all persons are
sane for the purpose of criminal trials. In effect this would be a
conclusive presumption that anyone charged with crime had the requisite
mental capacity, to commit the crime at the time of commission, unless
he filed the motion to quash as provided. This would be tantamount to
presuming conclusively that an infant two years of age has capacity to
commit crime, a presumption which would be equally contra to common
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law and to common sense. Such a presumption would violate both federal
due process (Heiner v. Donnan, 258 U.S. 312 (1932)
and state due
process
(Garcia v. People, 121 Colo. 130, 213 P. 2d 387 (1949)).
It would be no more valid than a presumption abolishing the defense of
alibi and thus conclusively presuming that d defendant was at a place
where 100 witnesses swear he was not at the time of the offense.
(See
Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (l93l)(concurring opinion).)
It may be argued that the proposed change merely alters procedure
without injury to the substance of the defendant's jury trial right. So
long as the substance of the right to jury trial is preserved, the
procedure or means by which the result is reached is wholly within the
legislature's dlscretio~ and the courts may not declare a statute
un~onstitutional merely because the procedure is different from that
followed at common law.
(Walker v. Southern Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593
596 (1897)); People v. Troche, 273 Pac. 767, 770 (Calif. 1928) .)
Thus, the test to be met by a statute to be upheld as merely altering
the procedure for jury trial is whether it deprives the defendant
of any right of substance which he had before its enactment.
It is the ref ore imp era ti v e to com pa re the def end ant's rrac tic a .l
problems in proving the insanity defense under the present procedure
with the problems he would have under th,? proposed procedure. The
defendant is now entitled to have his insanity defense tried as a fact
by a jury of twelve. At the outset of the insanity trial, the
def,?ndant is presumed sane and it is incumbent on him "to g,rnerate a
reasonable doubt" of his sanity.
(Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 53~), 546,
322 P. 2d 674 (1958).) The defendant may be acquitted, under present
procedures by mer~ly introducing~ reasonable doubt of his sanity
in the minds of the twelve jurors. Probably more important, from the
practical point of view, he can escape conviction by merely raising a
reasonable doubt of his sanity in the mind of a single juror, for any
conviction must be by unanimous vote. He has, under present law,
twelve chances -- twelve theoretically independent minds, any one of
which can give him at least a hung jury.

Under the proposed procedure, only three persons act as triers
of fact, and the proposal does not indicate whether their determination
must be unanimous, nor is it indicated whether the defendant or
the state has the burden of proof on the insanity issue or by what
weight of evidence proof must be made. Assuming these points are
settled in a manner leaving the statute as strong as possible -- that
is that the defendant can be acquitted by raising a reasonable doubt of
his sanity in the minds of the three judges and can obtain a second
trial of the issue by raising such a doubt in the mind of only one
judge, the proposal still leaves the defendant in a worse position than
under present law. Instead of having twelve ·minds to which his ,plea
may be addressed, he has only three. Thus he has been deprived of nine
of the prior twelve chances to obtain at least a hung jury. Under the
present rules, once the defendant has produced evidence tending to
beget a reasonable doubt, he casts upon the prosecution the heavy burden
proving beyond a reasonable doubt to twelve minds that he is sane.
(Leick v. People, supra.) It appears clear that the state's burden is
lightened when instead of being required to persuade twelve jurors,
it is required only to persuade three. The proposal would indeed
deprive the defendant of a jury trial right of practical, substantial
vrJlue.
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Comments From Other Authorities
The constitutionality of the proposed change was raised with
several law professors who are nationally recognized authorities
in the field of criminal procedure as it relates to constitutional
law. Their respective opinions on the proposal follow.
Professor Henry Weihofen, who is presently servinq as director
of the Mental Competency Study at George Wast1ington University Law
Center, commented as follows on the jury trial problem:
The more interesting change, as you say, is the
procedural one. I assume that the proposal includes
a provision not spelled out in the summary, namely,
that the proceedings for quashing the indictment or
information are dispositive - that is, if the court
finds the defendant sane and denies the motion to
quash, the defendant will be denied permission to
introduce the insanity defense at the jury trial
(except for the "specific intent" issue).
Without that exception, I suppose most lawyers would
be of the opinion that the scheme would be
unconstitutional. With only few minor exceptions,
the statutory definition of all crimes includes a
mental element, and a statutory scheme that attempted
to deny defendants the right to have the jury pass on
the issue of whether that element of the crime was
actually proved would probably be held unconstitutional ....
Is the "specific intent" exception enough to justify
the opposite result? I'm inclined to doubt it. The
mental element in some serious crimes, including common
law murder, is usually regarded as general rather than
specific. It seems difficult to justify a distinction
under which a jury trial is constitutionally required for
a crime involving specific intent but not for a crime
involving mens rea generally. And since a charge of a
more serious offense requiring specific .intent usually
includes lesser offenses ... and the jury on an indictment
for the greater may find the lesser, the distinction seems
not only illogical but impractical. Even if the
cons ti tuti ona l hurdle is overcome, there remains the
broader question of whether the proposal seems desirable.
The answer depends largely on what its objective is. I
gather that the objective is to keep the bifurcated
trial now used in Colorado but to eliminate the jury for
the insanity issue. Except for eliminating the jury, I
see nothing to be gained by having the insanity issue
raised on a motion to quash the indictment instead of as
a defense on the trial ...
Persons who may be inclined to favor the current
proposal because they think juries are t?o prone to be
misled by the "insanity dodge," may consider whether
this proposdl might not give juries more power rather
than less. On a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity, a defendant is not set free; he is sent to
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a mental hospital and his stay there is indefinite.
Statistics show thdt dS a matter of fact such persons
spend more time in the hospital than they would if
they had been sent to prison. [1ut under the "specific
intent" exception, evidence of mental abnormality would
be addressed to a verdict of not guilty, rather than
not guilty by reason of insanity. An acquittal would
therefore mean that the defendant walks out a wholly
free man ... (Letter dated November 5, 1962)
Professor David W. Louisell of the University of California
School of Law (at Berkeley), who has devoted considerable thought and
effort to studying California's problems with the insanity plea, writes
as follows concerning the Byrne proposal:
Speaking for myself, in all frankness, I must say that
I am not very sanguine about the proposal to abolish
trial by jury in the area of mental responsibility,
whatever semantics may be used to achieve that formula.
In this connection I do not worry much about the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process, but
I do worry considerably about the Colorado constitutional
guarantee of jury trial in criminal cases. Even more
basically, however, I question the social desirability
at this stage of removing the ultimate sanction of jury
trial, even conceding that on many occasions it is wise
to waive it. I do not think that we have yet reached
the stage where it would be wise, from the standpoint
of protecting individual rights, totally to destroy the
protection implicit in jury trial against arbitrary
judicial conduct. And, from the social standpoint, I
question very much whether we are yet at the stage of
psychiatric knowledge which justifies remitting the
problem of responsibility to the psychiatrists and the
judges. Complex and difficult though the problem is,
in my opinion it is still one that society must bear.
(Letter dated October 29, 1962)
Professor Arthur H. Sherry of the University of California
School of Law at Berkeley, who is presently co-chairman of the
California Special Commissions on Insanity and Criminal Offenders, writes
as follows:
The device of determining the issue of responsibility
by a procedure which may result in the quashing of
an indictment or information by a three-judge court
is unique. In effect, it seems to me that this is
simply making it possible to employ a civil commitment
procedure where a criminal action is pending in lieu of
determining the issue in the criminal proceeding. I
suppose this can be done now under existing Colorado
law should the District Attorney choose to invoke civil
procedures in lieu of initiating a criminal prosecution.
The p:i;actical considerations, however, cannot be
avoided, and strong reasons may exist which ~ould
militate against the proposal for the three-Judge
court. Apart from the constitution,llity of the
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procedure with respect to jury trial as it has been
formulated in the proposal, some question might arise
dS to the constitutiondlity of depriving the defendant
of his common law defense of not guilty by reason of
insanity in the event the three-judge court found him
sane. I realize that there is a clause which does
preserve his right to introduce evidence of "mental
condition" in a subsequent criminal proceeding, but this
may well be interpreted to include evidence of
"insanity." If so, the proposal may not effect any
real improvement or change in present procedures.
(Letter dated November 19, 1962)
Professor Robert B. McKay of New York University School of Law,
concurs as follows:
I must agree that the proposal for determination of
insanity by a three-judge panel does seem to impinge
upon the Colorado Constitution's guaranty of jury
trial. Thus I would agree with your own judgment
and that which you have received from Professors
Weihofen and Louisell. I do not see in this a
Fourteenth Amendment due process problem, however,
since there is no jury trial guaranty incorporated
into the Fuurteenth Amendment.
(Letter dated November
27, 1962)
In summary, it appears that the proposal for having the insanity
plea heard by a three-judge court is unconstitutional as depriving
defendants of the jury trial in criminal cases guaranteed by the
Colorado Constitution. This hurdle, however, may not be insurmountable.
Obviously it could be overcome by a constitutional amendment. Short
of that, the proposal could be passed and an opinion as to its
constitutionality could be obtained from the Colorado Supreme Court
befort? signature by the governor. Finally, the proposal might be
considered for enactment without this one f~ature which raises the
constitutional problem.
Other 1\srects of the Proposal
The remaining features of the proposal seem highly desirable
and apparently raise no constitutional problems. The proposed new
legal standard for determining the sanity of a defendant at the time
of the allegedly criminal conduct would greatly modernize and improve
present procedure. It would accord expert witnesses considerably
more latitude in testimony and thus would bring law and psychiatry closer
together in this vital arec1. One note of caution should be sounded,
however. The proposed test of insc1nity, based on the standards adopted
in United Stdtes v. Currens, 290 A. 2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961) would probably
make the insanity defense available to more defendants than are now
benefited by the present test. This is not a defect, but rather a
great advantage, for it would enable the state thus to identify and
treat persons whose illness is responsible for their anti-social
conduct. Moreover, it would provide a means of identifying those who
would flrobably rereat their anti-social conduct after a brief period
in prison. These offenders could be held until it is determined by a
competent hoard thdt it is safe for socie~y to release.them. ,\ new
maximum security facility where mentally ill or defective offen~e~s_may
be trec1ted c1ppears ·to be required by the proposed test and confin~ment
provision.
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